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IS IT CONSTITUTIONAL TO EXECUTE SOMEONE
WHO IS INNOCENT (AND IF IT ISN'T, HOW CAN IT
BE STOPPED FOLLOWING HOUSE V. BELL)?

David R. Dow,* Jared Tyler,** Frances Bourliot,*** Jennifer
Jeans****
We begin with a question that might seem ridiculous: does the Constitution
prohibit the execution of someone who is actually innocent? Remarkably, this question
remains open. In this article, we discuss how a death row inmate who has strong
evidence of actual innocence can gain legal relief in postconviction proceedings on those
grounds in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision in House v. Bell.1
Much of our analysis is applicable to all criminal cases, not just death penalty
cases. In certain respects, however, death penalty cases are unique. Several states
provide for special procedural rules in capital cases, and the so-called "death is different"
doctrine generates a more robust set of constitutional claims for capital defendants and2
death-sentenced inmates than for other actors in the criminal justice arena.
Consequently, although much of our analysis may well have broader application, our
focus is on capital cases.
The general issue we are addressing concerns a death-sentenced inmate who
3
identifies new evidence that, viewed in the context of all the evidence, suggests that he
is innocent of the crime (as distinguished from innocent of the sentence). 4 Necessarily,

* University Distinguished Professor, University of Houston Law Center. I am grateful to the University
of Houston Law Foundation for financial support. The argument also benefited from the opportunity to address
this issue at the National Innocence Network Conference at the University of Washington School of Law and
from conversations and e-mail exchanges with Nina Morrison at the Innocence Project in New York. In
addition, the material presented in Appendix A and Appendix B was collected and analyzed in cooperation
with the Texas Appleseed Foundation and Texas StandDown.
** Staff Attorney, Texas Defender Service.
*** Research Fellow, Texas Innocence Network.
**** Staff Attorney, Nevada Legal Services.
1. 126 S. Ct. 2064 (2006).
2. See e.g. Gardnerv. Fla., 430 U.S. 349 (1977); Woodson v. N.C., 428 U.S. 280 (1976). Justice Scalia
has been on a mission to jettison this basic idea. E.g. Atkins v. Va., 536 U.S. 304, 352-53 (2002) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
3. We use the masculine pronoun throughout this article because nearly all death row inmates are men.
4. Because a death penalty trial is actually two trials-the jury determines whether the defendant
committed a death-eligible crime at the first trial and, assuming the defendant was found guilty of a deatheligible offense at the first trial, determines whether the defendant should be sentenced to death at the second
trial-it is possible for a death row inmate to be guilty of the offense but improperly condemned to death. It is
therefore possible, though semantically clumsy, for someone to be "innocent" of a sentence. See e.g. Sawyer v.
Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
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this evidence is discovered subsequent to trial and after the period (prescribed by state
law) in which new evidence can be presented to the trial court to arrest entry ofjudgment
on the jury's verdict. Conceptually, this evidence can enter the case at four different
phases: (1) during the direct appeal proceedings; (2) during the initial state habeas corpus
proceedings; (3) during the initial federal habeas corpus proceedings; and (4) during
subsequent (or successive) state or federal habeas proceedings. 5 In this article, we are
concerned with the litigation of innocence claims during the final two phases (i.e., the
6
first federal habeas and subsequent habeas proceedings).
Before assessing the current landscape for litigating claims of actual innocence, a
7
word about the historical background may be warranted. Not since Herrerav. Collins,
decided more than a decade ago and prior to enactment of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 8 has the Supreme Court addressed
whether a stand-alone innocence claim is cognizable in federal habeas corpus
proceedings. A stand-alone innocence claim arises when an inmate asserts that he is
actually innocent but does not raise any other constitutional violations, such as
ineffective assistance of counsel, 9 the wrongful withholding of evidence, l0 or the like.
Most innocence claims arise in a somewhat different context, as when an inmate
invokes his innocence as a basis for forgiving a procedural default. For example, federal
habeas law requires that state prisoners present their claims for relief to the state courts
1
prior to seeking relief in federal court; this is known as the "exhaustion" requirement. l
If, however, a prisoner waits too long under state law to file a state habeas petition, then
the state court may rule against the inmate on procedural grounds--i.e., without
addressing the merits of the issues the inmate wishes to have adjudicated. 12 Such an
inmate will therefore not have exhausted his claims in state court and be unable to obtain
review in federal court.
However, one exception to the general rule that bars the federal court from
addressing the merits of such claims arises when the inmate argues that he is actually
innocent of the crime. In this case, the inmate must satisfy the criteria identified in
Schlup v. Delo13 to establish his actual innocence; the standard is to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that, in view of the newly discovered evidence, no
14
reasonable factfinder could have found the inmate guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The purpose of arguing his innocence in this context is to obtain a merits review in
federal court of some other constitutional claim. In other words, the claim of innocence

5. Review Appendix A for state-by-state procedures on raising these claims in state habeas proceedings.
Review Herrerav. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993), and Herrera v. Collins: A New Innocence Principle? 11 Harv.
Blackletter J. 191 (1994), for raising these claims in federal and successive petitions.
6. In fact, as we discuss below, the issue might also be raised at a fifth stage: clemency proceedings. We
do not address clemency at any length in this article.
7. 506 U.S. 390.
8. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
9. E.g. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
10. E.g. Brady v. Md., 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

11.
12.
13.
14.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(l)(A) (2000).
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991).
513 U.S. 298(1995).
Id. at 327.
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operates as a "gateway" that permits the federal court to address the merits of one or
more issues that it would otherwise be precluded from addressing.
In some cases, however, an inmate does not want the federal court to address other
issues. Instead, he simply wants the court to evaluate evidence that established his
innocence. In the era of DNA, where we have the ability to be certain about facts that
were once subject to substantial doubt, are such stand-alone claims of actual innocence
cognizable in federal habeas proceedings? Many observers hoped this question would be
answered in House, but it was not.
In Herrera itself, the Court left open the possibility that "a proper showing of
actual innocence" would warrant habeas relief 15 but failed to define "proper showing."
As a result, there has always been deep uncertainty about the soundness of the inference
that stand-alone innocence claims are in fact cognizable. 16 Indeed, Justice Scalia
implied that where the evidence of innocence is discovered shortly before an execution,
17
the Constitution does not prevent a state from moving forward with the execution.
Justice Scalia's insinuation prompted Justice Blackmun to insist that the Constitution
must prohibit the execution of someone who is actually innocent, for such an execution
"comes perilously close to simple murder." 18
Although the HerreraCourt did not address the question, the majority did assume
that "in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after
trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal
habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim.' 19 The
preceding sentence, of course, is highly conditioned. Justice O'Connor's concurrence,
however, was more explicit and went further than the Court's opinion, noting that a
"fundamental legal principle [holds] that executing the innocent is inconsistent with the
Constitution. Regardless of the verbal formula employed ...the execution of a legally
and factually innocent person would be a constitutionally intolerable event." 20 Prior to
House, therefore, it already seemed fair to conclude that Justice O'Connor's statement in
prohibits the execution of someone who is actually
Herrera--that the Constitution
21
innocent-is the law.

15. 506 U.S. at 404.
16. Review Nicholas Berg, Turning a Blind Eye to Innocence: The Legacy of Herrera v. Collins, 42 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 121 (2005), for a discussion on the implications of Herrerav. Collins.
17. Herrera,506 U.S. at 427-28 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
18. Id. at 446 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at417.
20. Id.at 419 (O'Connor & Kennedy, JJ., concurring); see also Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88; Royal v. Taylor,
188 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1999); Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 2000); Felker v
Turpm, 83 F.3d 1303, 1312 (11th Cir. 1996); see generally Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)
(holding that the Due Process Clause "bar[s] certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them").
21. Her opinion was joined by Justice Kennedy. In addition, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Stevens
and Souter, expressly concluded that executing the innocent is unconstitutional. Herrera,506 U.S. at 430-31
(Blackmun, Stevens & Souter, JJ., dissenting in parts I-IV). Five Justices, therefore, announced that the
execution of an innocent inmate would offend the Constitution. Only two Justices-Justice White in a
concurring opinion and Justice Blackmun in dissent-addressed the burden of proof that a death row inmate
should be required to meet in order to press an actual innocence claim in habeas proceedings. Justice White
suggested that a death row inmate presenting a stand-alone innocence claim (an innocence claim
unaccompanied by an independent constitutional violation) would have to show that, in view of the newly
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Nevertheless, the precise question remained unresolved on the eve of House. In
House, as we will discuss below, the Court confronted facts that strongly suggested-but
certainly fell short of proving absolutely-that the inmate on death row was innocent.
This, of course, is how most cases of actual innocence can be described: there is strong,
but ultimately inconclusive, proof of actual innocence. In House, therefore, the Court
had an opportunity to remove any remaining confusion relating to whether the
Constitution places limits on the power of the states to execute inmates whose cases
satisfy this description, but the Court chose not to. As a result, the procedural issues
relating to how an actual innocence claim could or must be raised remain somewhat
murky.
In this article, we explore how, procedurally, a death row inmate can raise a
challenge to his death sentence based on a claim of actual innocence. Our concern is
exclusively with the power of federal courts to grant relief. We do not address either
state court collateral proceedings or the clemency process. 22 In point of fact, these other
mechanisms for obtaining relief may provide safeguards against the execution of
someone who is actually innocent, a safeguard that would be redundant were these
claims also cognizable in federal habeas proceedings. It is not clear, though, why the
existence of a federal remedy should hinge on whether some other remedy is available.
In any case, the remainder of this article addresses the litigation of actual
innocence claims following House. Part I lays out the relevant statutory language,
addresses the meaning of "innocence," and examines the statutory language in view of
what "innocence" means. Part II examines the Supreme Court's recent decision in
House. Finally, the conclusion identifies three significant questions relating to claims of
actual innocence that remain open even in House's aftermath.
I.

THE RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND THE MEANING OF "INNOCENCE"

Because the language of the text bears heavily on the answer to the question of
how an innocent death row inmate must proceed, we shall set out several relevant
provisions of AEDPA before discussing them. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides, in

pertinent part:
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain
an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

discovered evidence, "no rational trier of fact could [find] proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 429
(White, J., concurring) (quoting Jackson v. Va., 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979)). The standard suggested by Justice
White was endorsed by Judge Merritt, who concluded that it is now clear that it is in fact unconstitutional to
carry out the execution of someone who is actually innocent. House v. Bell, 386 F.3d 668, 688-90 (6th Cir.
2004) (Merritt, J., dissenting).
22. Appendix A contains a state-by-state summary of the cognizability of stand-alone innocence claims in
state court proceedings. Appendix B contains a state-by-state summary of the consideration of innocence
claims in clemency proceedings.
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(e)(l) In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue
made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden
of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.
(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court
proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the
applicant shows that(A) the claim relies on-

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise
of due diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the
applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244 provides, in pertinent part:
(b)(1) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section
2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.
(2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section
2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless-

(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously
through the exercise of due diligence; and
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole,
would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for
constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the
underlying offense.
For our present purposes, we should pay careful attention to three provisions of
these statutes. First, § 2254(a) authorizes habeas relief only if the prisoner is in custody
in violation of federal law. If, therefore, the incarceration or punishment of someone
who is actually innocent does not, in and of itself, violate federal law, then habeas does
not provide a remedy for such a prisoner. Consequently, a stand-alone innocence claim
will be available in an original (i.e., first) federal habeas petition only if executing
someone who is innocent violates federal law.
Second, the statute itself acknowledges the significance of actual innocence
claims; thus, § 2254(e)(2) authorizes a federal court to hold an evidentiary hearing in
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certain circumstances where the inmate has identified new facts 2 3 and, in view of those
facts, no reasonable factfinder could have found the inmate guilty.2 4 Third, and
similarly, § 2244(b)(2) permits a federal court to address the merits of a second or
successive habeas petition in certain circumstances, including when there are newly
discovered facts 25 in view of which no reasonable factfinder could have found the
26
prisoner guilty.
Overall, therefore, §§ 2254 and 2244 do evince a concern for the problem of
innocence. In both statutory provisions, however, the issue of innocence is tethered to
the violation of some other constitutional right. For example, § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) refers
to "constitutional error" as distinct from the issue of actual innocence. The habeas
statute consequently signals the importance of innocence without explicitly permitting a
federal court to entertain a stand-alone claim of actual innocence.
In addition, AEDPA itself does not say very much about the very meaning of
"innocence." Even if it is plausible, therefore, to conclude that the Constitution forbids
the state from executing someone who is actually innocent, it is necessary to be precise
as to what "innocent" means. It goes without saying that, in any discussion of actual
innocence, the words "innocent" and "innocence" must be understood in a legal sense,
rather than a metaphysical one. 2 7 Thus, for example, the references in §§ 2254(e) and
2244(b) refer to what a reasonable factfmder would have concluded, as distinguished
from what is true.
Prior to trial, of course, the defendant is presumed innocent, and the state must
therefore prove that the defendant is not innocent, i.e., is guilty. The state's burden is to
establish guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt." Although the meaning of this phrase is not
entirely transparent and the Supreme Court has accepted a variety of jury instructions
relating to its meaning, it is generally understood as being a weighty burden. 2 8 Once the
state has met this burden by persuading a jury to return a verdict of guilty, the burden is
on the defendant, who is now a convicted murderer, to establish innocence.
Proving innocence subsequent to a verdict of guilty, however, is substantially more
difficult than proving guilt in the first place-leading to the peculiar irony that it is easier
for the state to secure a guilty verdict against someone who is innocent than it is for
someone who is innocent to establish his actual innocence following a verdict of guilty.
At trial, the state must prove that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet
once the state has met that burden, an inmate who wishes to undo the guilty verdict by
establishing actual innocence must satisfy a far more rigorous burden.
The federal habeas statute, for example, employs the same standard as Texas law,
meaning that a postconviction petitioner who claims actual innocence must prove that

23. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii).
24. Id. at § 2254(e)(2)(B).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) (2000).
26. Id. at § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).
27. Unfortunately, even the legal definition of innocence embodies intractable metaphysical difficulties.
Those difficulties, however, are not our immediate concern, so we shall not linger over them.
28. For a variety of acceptable definitions of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, review David R.
Dow & James Rytting, Can ConstitutionalErrorBe Harmless? 2000 Utah L. Rev. 483, 507-08.
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"no reasonable juror" could have voted to convict. 29 The "no reasonable juror" standard
is far more onerous than the state's original burden. Even in the face of DNA
exclusions, some jurors disbelieve the evidence or believe that an individual participated
in the crime anyway. In one notorious case in Texas, Roy Criner was convicted of
rape even though DNA found in the victim excluded Criner as the rapist.3 1 The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals nevertheless refused to order a new trial. 32 In short, as an
empirical matter, it is clear that satisfying the "no reasonable juror" standard is
somewhere between exceedingly difficult and entirely impossible. The burden is so
onerous that it may well be sensible in some cases, especially death penalty cases, and
even more especially death penalty cases involving DNA, to reduce that burden if there
is some legitimate reason why the evidence of innocence was not identified previously.
Legitimate reasons include incompetent legal assistance, police or prosecutorial
misconduct, or even a lack of resources to perform an adequate investigation. At the
moment, however, the burden remains daunting.
Even if a stand-alone innocence claim is cognizable in an original federal habeas
proceeding, raising such a claim in a second or successive petition will be even more
difficult. The statute provides:
A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254
that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless .. the factual
predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of
due diligence; and the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the
evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that,
but for constitutional error,33no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty
of the underlying offense.
Semantically, it may be possible, if barely, to read § 2244 as permitting an inmate
to raise a stand-alone innocence claim in a second or subsequent petition. To begin with,
it simply does not make sense to say that a showing of a constitutional error will not
warrant habeas relief unless the constitutional error led to an erroneous conviction unless
there is something especially problematic about an erroneous conviction. However, if
there is something especially problematic about an erroneous conviction, then the
absence of a constitutional error does not negate that problem. In other words, by
recognizing that there is something special about an erroneous conviction,
§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) implies that an erroneous conviction must itself supply a basis for
federal intervention.
Second, the due diligence provision in § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) would not make sense
unless § 2244 anticipated that a stand-alone innocence claim would warrant habeas relief
because the facts that underlie any claim other than a claim for actual innocence will

29. See Exparte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (quoting Schlup, 513 U S. at 327);
see also Appendix A (collecting state laws).
30. Crinerv. State, 816 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex. App. 9th Dist. 1991).
31. Id. at 139.
32. For the views of one of the participating judges, review Frontline, Interview with Judge Sharon Keller,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/case/interviews/keller.html (accessed Jan. 31, 2007).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2), (b)(2)(B).
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almost always have been previously discoverable through the exercise of due diligence.
In other words, stand-alone claims of actual innocence are precisely the types of claims
that will most commonly involve new evidence that was not previously discoverable.
Or, put somewhat differently, the prototypical type of new evidence that was not
previously discoverable will be new evidence of actual innocence-like an advance in
DNA testing technology that reveals innocence or a deathbed confession from the actual
perpetrator--rather than evidence of some other constitutional violation. (Of course, it
may be possible to recharacterize many cases involving newly discovered evidence of
actual innocence as cases where the failure to locate or hand over such evidence to the
defense amounted to police or prosecutorial misconduct. 34 In some cases, however, the
state will truly not be culpable for the belated discovery of exculpatory evidence.)
II.

HOUSE V. BELL

Prior to House, the Supreme Court held that in order to demonstrate actual
innocence in a collateral proceeding, an inmate must present "relevant evidence that was
either excluded or unavailable at trial" and "show that it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have found [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." 35 House
did not disturb this requirement, but neither did it provide extensive clarification. As a
consequence, at least three significant questions that will recur in death penalty cases
with some regularity remain.
A.

The Facts of House

On July 14, 1985, neighbors discovered the body of Carolyn Muncey, hidden
among branches, roughly one hundred yards from her driveway. 36 She had a black eye
37
and bruises on her neck and legs, and both hands were bloodstained up to the wrists.
Her nightgown and panties contained traces of semen. 38 The county medical examiner
declared the injuries consistent with a "traumatic origin." 39 He concluded that Muncey
had been choked and that the cause of death was a severe blow to the left forehead that

34. How an inmate obtains such evidence is a different question. Some courts of appeals have held that an
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be used to obtain exculpatory evidence. See e.g. Harvey v. Horan, 278
F.3d 370, 374 (4th Cir. 2002); Kutzner v. Montgomery Co., 303 F.3d 339, 340 (5th Cir. 2002). However, no
court has gainsaid that an inmate does indeed have a constitutional right of access to exculpatory evidence. See
e.g Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287, 1288 (11 th Cir. 2002) (recognizing a right of access to DNA evidence);
Godschalk v. Montgomery Co. D.A. 's Off., 177 F. Supp. 2d 366, 367 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (ordering postconviction
DNA testing). And where this right is asserted prior to trial, a line of jurisprudence four decades old supports a
defendant's right of access to such material. Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972); Brady, 373 U.S. at
86.
35. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327-28. Schlup may well be inconsistent with AEDPA. Whereas Schlup
essentially adopts a preponderance of the evidence standard, AEDPA, as indicated above, requires clear and
convincing evidence. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that AEDPA imposes a more difficult
burden of proof than was articulated in Schlup. E.g. Cooper v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 2004).
The Ninth Circuit also observed that the Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether the standard of Schlup
has been displaced by AEDPA or whether, on the contrary, the AEDPA standard is impermissible. E.g.
Jaramillov. Stewart, 340 F.3d 877, 881 (9th Cir. 2003).
36. House, 126 S. Ct. at 2068.
37. Id. at 2070.
38. Id. at 2072.
39. Id. at 2070 (citation omitted).
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40
opened a laceration to the bone and caused a severe right-side hemorrhage.
Paul House was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Carolyn
Muncey. 4 1 The State's case against House centered on the semen found on Muncey's
nightgown and panties and on bloodstains found on House's jeans. 4 2 The State
43
introduced testimony that the source of the semen was a secretor with blood-type A.
Secretors are those individuals whose blood type can be ascertained from other bodily
44
fluids (like saliva or semen); secretors comprise eighty percent of the population.

House is a secretor, and his blood type was A. 4 5 Carolyn Muncey, as well as her
46
husband, William Muncey, was also type A.
Analysts located spots of blood on House's jeans in five locations: the left outside
leg, the right bottom cuff, the left thigh, inside the right inside pocket, and on the lower
pocket on the outside. 47 Testimony indicated that each of the five stains was type-A
blood; further analysis presumably established that the blood did not belong to House
and was consistent with Carolyn Muncey's. 4 8 However, fiber analysis showed neither
hair nor fiber consistent with the victim's hair or clothing on House's pants.4 9 The State
relied heavily on the semen evidence to argue at trial that House had sexually attacked
50
and murdered Muncey.
At the time of Muncey's murder, House was on probation following a sentence of
five years to life for the crime of aggravated sexual assault. 5 1 New to the area, House
quickly became a suspect. 52 When initially questioned, he claimed-falsely---that he
had been with his girlfriend, Donna Turner, at the time of the Muncey murder.53 House
had scratches on his arms and hands and a bruise on his finger. 54 He said that the
scratches were from Turner's cats and that the bruise was from an injury he had suffered
at his construction job.5 5 Turner told police that House had left her trailer the previous
evening and had returned later, out of breath, without his shirt and shoes. 56 He told her,
according to Turner, that he had been attacked by people he did not know while out on
his walk.57
House maintained his innocence from the outset. By the time his case was in

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 2070-71.
House, 126 S. Ct. at
Id at 2072.
Id.
Id.
Id.
House, 126 S. Ct. at
Id.
Id. at 2072-73.
Id. at 2073.
Id. at 2072.
House, 126 S. Ct. at
Id. at 2070.
Id. at 2071.
Id.
Id.
House, 126 S. Ct. at
Id.

2074-75.

2072.

2071.

2071.
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habeas proceedings, new testing had undermined the State's case against him. 58 The
semen on Muncey's clothing, for example, was shown conclusively to belong to
Muncey's husband.5 9 (The State had knowledge, moreover, that the Munceys had had
sexual relations on the morning of the day Muncey was killed; the jury, however, was
not so apprised. 60 ) The blood evidence, too, lost any probative value because an entire
vial of blood taken during the autopsy disappeared, supporting the theory that the blood
was spilled on House's jeans when the jeans and autopsy blood were transported to the
laboratory for testing in the same container.6 1 This theory gained additional support
when the State's Assistant Chief Medical Examiner testified that the blood found on
House's jeans was too degraded to have come from the murder but was in fact consistent
with the quality of blood found in the autopsy tubes. 62 (Had the blood splattered onto
House's jeans at the time of the murder, the enzymes would not have decayed as they did
because the cloth would have acted to prevent that degradation. 63 Therefore, the fact
that there was degradation caused this expert to conclude that the blood on the jeans
came from blood taken from the body during the autopsy or at some other time postmortem. 64 )

In addition to the disintegration of the case against House, additional evidence
surfaced that strongly suggested Mr. Muncey killed his wife. When questioned shortly
after the murder, Mr. Muncey stated, falsely, that he had been at a dance at the time of
the murder and had left it only briefly to buy beer. 65 In addition, Carolyn Muncey's
brother told authorities that he had witnessed Mr. Muncey, who was drunk at the time,
striking his sister and that his sister had told him that she was scared of her husband and
wanted to leave him. 66 House located additional witnesses who testified that Muncey
had physically abused his wife. 67 Two witnesses who had known Muncey for many
years testified that Muncey had confessed to them that he had murdered his wife. 68 (One
of these witnesses attempted to testify at House's trial but was turned away by House's
counsel. 69 )
B.

The Holding of House

House's conviction and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the
Tennessee Supreme Court. 70 House filed a pro se state habeas petition. 7 1 The court
appointed counsel to assist House, but House's appointed counsel offered no evidence at

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 2075.
Id. at 2078-79.
Id at 2072.
House, 126 S. Ct. at 2080.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2072, 2084.
House, 126 S. Ct. at 2083.
Id.
Id. at 2084.
Id.
Id. at 2075.
House, 126 S. Ct. at 2075.
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the hearing beyond what was in the trial transcript. 72 The petition was dismissed and, on
appeal, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.7 3 The Tennessee Supreme
Court and the United States Supreme Court both denied review. 74 House then filed a
second petition in state court, seeking investigative and expert assistance. 75 The
Tennessee Supreme Court held that House's claims were barred by a state statute
because they had not been raised in prior postconviction proceedings. 76 The United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 77
House next filed a federal habeas petition, identifying evidence supporting his
claim of actual innocence and arguing that he had received ineffective assistance of
counsel and that his trial had been rendered unfair by prosecutorial misconduct. 78 In
order for House to obtain review of the merits of these claims in federal court, however,
he had to satisfy an exception to the procedural default that the state court had
identified. 79 Citing Schlup 80 and Sawyer v. Whitley,8 1 House argued that he satisfied the
so-called actual innocence gateway, which allows a federal court to consider otherwise
defaulted constitutional claims when the inmate can establish that he is actually innocent
of the crime. 82 House showed that the semen did not belong to him, the blood on his
jeans was probably transferred from the blood recovered during the autopsy, Muncey's
husband was abusive, and Mr. Muncey had in fact confessed to the murder. 83 The
District Court denied relief, finding that House had not met the standards required in
84

Schlup or Sawyer.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a certificate of appealability under
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). 85 Initially, after finding that House had made out a
compelling case of actual innocence, the Sixth Circuit certified questions to the
Tennessee Supreme Court,86 seeking to have that Court indicate whether House had
available to him any state law avenue for pursuing his claim of innocence. 87 The
Tennessee Supreme Court declined to answer the certified question. 8 8 Thereafter, a
divided en banc court, by a vote of eight to seven, denied House relief.89 Of the seven
dissenters, six believed House had established his actual innocence and would have
ordered him released from confinement; the seventh would have remanded to the district

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
House, 126 S. Ct. at 2075.
Id.
Id.
Id.
513 U.S. 298.
505 U.S. 333.
House, 126 S. Ct. at 2075.
Id. at 2078-84.
Id. at 2075.
Id.
Id. at 2075-76.
House, 126 S. Ct. at 2076.
Id.
Id
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The Supreme Court
court to address the merits of the issue in the first instance.
granted certiorari. 9 1
By a vote of five to three, with Justice Alito not participating, the Supreme Court
reversed. 92 House conceded that his constitutional claims were barred by regularly
applied state procedural rules, but he insisted that the evidence tending to establish his
the federal court should nonetheless
actual innocence was sufficiently weighty that
93
address the merits of the constitutional claims.
Generally, a federal court can address the merits of a constitutional claim that has
been forfeited under state law only in limited circumstances-.e., if the petitioner can
demonstrate cause for and prejudice from the default 94 or where the petitioner can show
that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will result from non-review (where such a
miscarriage is tantamount to the conviction or execution of someone who is actually
innocent).9 5 In the case of these exceptions, however, the petitioner is identifying a
constitutional violation, rather than a stand-alone innocence claim. As discussed above,
in Herrera,96 the Court addressed whether a death row inmate can raise a stand-alone
innocence claim and, without actually deciding that question, ruled that if such a claim is
cognizable, it triggers an extraordinarily high evidentiary threshold.97 House did not
present a Herrera-like claim, however, because he identified independent constitutional
violations. Accordingly, under Schiup, he could obtain federal merits review of those
claims if he could demonstrate that there exists "new reliable evidence ... that was not
presented at trial",98 and, in light of the new evidence, "it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have found [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." 99 The
federal court assesses the totality of the evidence to ascertain whether these criteria are
satisfied.1 ° ° If they are, the petitioner has passed through the Schlup gateway, and the
court will address the merits of the constitutional claims.
The Supreme Court concluded that House had in fact satisfied the actual innocence
gateway standard of Schlup.101 Justice Kennedy's majority opinion did not go as far as
the six judges on the court of appeals who believed that House had already established
his actual innocence, but the Supreme Court majority did determine that any reasonable
02
juror would entertain reasonable doubt as to House's guilt. 1

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
House, 126 S. Ct. at 2068.
Id. at 2086.
Murray v. Carrier,477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986).
Edwards v. Carpenter,529 U.S. 446,451 (2000).
506 U.S. 390.
Id. at 417.
513 U.S. at 324.
Id. at 327.
Id. at 329.
House, 126 S. Ct. at 2087.
Id. at 2086.
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III.

CONCLUSION: THREE REMAINING QUESTIONS.

Actual innocence is a hot topic, especially in death penalty cases. For example, in
Kansas v. Marsh,1 03-- a case involving a challenge to Kansas' so-called equipoise
instruction rather than an innocence claim-Justices Scalia and Souter, using Professor
Sam Gross' study of exonerations of death-sentenced inmates as a starting point,
engaged in a long debate as to how many innocent people have been sent to death
row. 10 4 This ostensible concern over innocence explains the Court's approach in House.
In short, the Court held that a habeas court applying the Schiup criteria must not limit
itself to admissible evidence. As Justice Kennedy summarized:
Our review in this case addresses the merits of the Schiup inquiry, based on a fully
developed record, and with respect to that inquiry Schlup makes plain that the habeas court
must consider "all the evidence," old and new, incriminating and exculpatory, without
regard to whether it would necessarily be admitted under "rules of admissibility that would
govern at trial." Based on this total record, the court must make "a probabilistic
determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do." The court's
function is not to make an independent factual determination about what105likely occurred,
but rather to assess the likely impact of the evidence on reasonable jurors.
House thus explicitly holds that a holistic review of the evidence in a federal
habeas petition asserting an actual innocence claim requires a court to review and weigh
evidence that would not necessarily be admitted at trial. 10 6 This emphasizes that,
regardless of what the jury may or may not have been shown, judges must examine every
piece of evidence, weigh it as a whole, and then determine what a reasonable juror would
do. Moreover, this analysis does not require a petitioner who has lost in district court to
demonstrate on appeal that the lower court's conclusion was "clearly erroneous"
because, even though the court's analysis is quasi-factual, it is inferring from those facts
a legal conclusion. Instead, to pass through the Schiup gateway, a petitioner must show
only that a reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt sufficient to acquit.
Nevertheless, despite this apparent generosity to inmates asserting claims of actual
innocence, the short history of the decision in House has revealed three facts worth
noting.
First, inmates raising so-called House claims have, with no published
exceptions, 10 7 foundered on either the first or second hurdle of Schlup--that is, they
have been deemed not to have identified new, reliable evidence 108 or they have not
persuaded a court that, in view of putatively new evidence, no reasonable juror would
convict. 10 9 This fact perhaps reveals that the Court's view of House, and the doctrine

103. 126 S. Ct. 2516 (2006).
104. Id. at 2536-38 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 2545 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
105. House, 126 S. Ct. at 2077 (citations omitted).
106. Id.
107. Appendix C shows all dispositions of so-called House claims as of October 9, 2006.
108. E.g Arrington v. Williams, 2006 WL 2615512 at *5 (10th Cir. Sept. 13, 2006); Torrefranca v. Schriro,
2006 WL 1981788 at *11 (D. Ariz. July 13, 2006); Darity v. McDonough, 2006 WL 2792891 at *10 (M.D. Fla.
Sept. 27, 2006).
109. E.g. Alongi v. Hendricks, 2006 WL 2129107 at * 12 (D.N.J. July 26, 2006). In Alongi, the petitioner
also argued that the district court did not consider his Brady claim in a holistic manner, but this failure is
negated by the court's determination that the evidence as a whole would not create enough reasonable doubt for
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built upon it, is highly dependent on the fact that House's evidence included DNA
evidence. How precisely House will apply to more common cases involving witness
recantation or new non-scientific evidence remains uncertain.
Second, House's federal habeas petition was his first. The State had argued that
l10
AEDPA had replaced the Schiup standard with the stricter test found in Sawyer,
which permits consideration of successive, defaulted sentencing claims "only if the
petitioner 'show[s] by clear and convincing evidence that, but for a constitutional error,
no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty under
the applicable state law."' 11 1 The Court reasoned, however, that because House's
federal habeas petition was his first, the successor provisions of AEDPA-specifically,
the provisions found in Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) and 2254(e)(2)-did not
apply because neither provision addresses a first federal habeas petition seeking
12
consideration of defaulted claims based on a showing of actual innocence.1
Finally, although House seems to allow an inmate who has secured new evidence
tending to establish actual innocence to pursue the innocence claim in his first federal
habeas petition, some inmates who wish to raise an innocence claim will, unlike House
himself, not be in possession of the evidence that could establish their innocence. Is
there anything they can do?
Judge J. Michael Luttig has suggested that under such circumstances, where an
inmate can identify evidence that could establish his actual innocence, the inmate is
entitled to a stay of execution and an order permitting him to test the very evidence that
may prove exculpatory. 113 As Judge Luttig wrote:
[W]here the government holds previously-produced forensic evidence, the testing of which
concededly could prove beyond any doubt that the defendant did not commit the crime for
which he was convicted, the very same principle of elemental fairness that dictates pre-trial
production of all potentially exculpatoj 114evidence dictates post-trial production of this
infinitely narrower category of evidence.
Judge Luttig's view makes perfect sense, but it is important to stress that neither
the Supreme Court nor any federal court of appeals has adopted this rule. Moreover,
Judge Luttig's approach fits more comfortably with first habeas petitions than with

a reasonable juror not to convict. Id.at **21-22; e.g. also Hazelton v. Shannon, 2006 WL 2302666 at *7
(M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2006).
110. House, 126 S. Ct. at 2078.
111. Id.(quoting Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 336) (brackets in original).
112. Id.
113. Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 318 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en
banc).
[I]t would simply be constitutionally intolerable for the government to withhold from the convicted,
for no reason at all, the very evidence that it used to deprive him of his liberty, where he persists in
his absolute innocence and further tests of the evidence could, given the circumstances of the crime
and the evidence marshaled against the defendant at trial, establish to a certainty whether he actually
is factually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted.
Id (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
114 Id. at 317. The principle Judge Luttig has identified is essentially a predicate of the conclusion that the
Constitution forbids the execution of the actually innocent. If the inmate is in fact innocent, and his innocence
precludes the state from executing him, he has a predicate constitutional right of access to the evidence that will
establish his innocence.
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second or successive petitions, meaning that this problem is exacerbated by the second
problem discussed above.
Nevertheless, it may be reasonable to say that, to the extent that AEDPA is at odds
with Judge Luttig's suggestion where second or successive petitions are concerned,
§ 2244 is unconstitutional. As the Sixth Circuit has reasoned, if § 2244 "prohibit[s] this
court and the Supreme Court from reviewing claims of innocence in death penalty
habeas cases [then it] raise[s] serious constitutional issues under the due process clause
1
and under Article I, § 9, which prohibits the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus."' 15
Further, it is possible to read § 2244 broadly enough to permit an inmate who does not
possess exculpatory evidence to proceed.ll6 For example, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals has indicated that the actual innocence gateway of § 2244 is satisfied where the
death row inmate presents evidence that "tend[s] to show actual innocence."' 17 Indeed,
in Schlup, the Supreme Court indicated that an inmate asserting actual innocence is only
required to point to evidence that would establish his innocence-rather than existing
evidence of actual innocence. 118 Construing Schlup, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
has emphasized that an inmate can satisfy § 2244 even if he "has not affirmatively
proved his actual innocence"; rather, the inmate's burden under § 2244 is to identify
"sufficient doubt about the validity of his conviction." 119
Despite these various dicta, however, all three problems remain unresolved. Thus,
an inmate whose evidence is less certain than DNA may find no haven in House. A
death row inmate who has already filed one federal habeas petition may be outside the
scope of House. And a death row inmate who believes that there may be exculpatory
evidence, but who has neither obtained nor tested it, will also probably lie outside the

115. Workman v. Bell, 227 F.3d 331, 337 n. 4 (6th Cir. 2000). Similarly, the Second Circuit has suggested
that if a petitioner were to demonstrate that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted,
then application of the AEDPA statute of limitations to bar habeas corpus relief might well constitute a
suspension of the writ. Triestman v. U.S., 124 F.3d 361, 378-79 & n. 21 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that a claim of
actual innocence would raise serious due process and Eighth Amendment questions but declining to address
alleged Suspension Clause violation).
On the precise question of whether AEDPA's statute of liimtations provision constitutes an
unconstitutional suspension of the writ in cases where an inmate asserts actual innocence, the circuits are split.
In addition to Triestman, compare David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343, 347-48 (1 st Cir. 2003) (finding no suspension
while noting that the rule might be different in a capital case); Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir.
2000) (finding no suspension of the writ while noting that, although inmate had claimed actual innocence, he
had not shown it) with Burger v. Scott, 317 F.3d 1133, 1141 (10th Cir. 2003); Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976,
978 (10th Cir. 1998).
116. Moreover, if § 2244 would be unconstitutional if it precluded a death row inmate from raising a claim
that rests on evidence that is known to exist but the content of which is uncertain, then, under the doctrine of
constitutional doubt, § 2244 should be construed to permit what the Constitution requires. Cf J.N.S v St. Cyr,
533 U.S. 289, 336 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J. & Scalia, Thomas & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting) (noting that doctrine
of constitutional doubt is used to interpret ambiguous statutory provisions in a manner that renders them
constitutional).
117. Torres v. Senkowski, 316 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir. 2003).
118. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324 (noting that a claim of actual innocence requires petitioner to support his
allegations of constitutional error with "new reliable evidence" of factual innocence such as "exculpatory
scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or criticalphysicalevidence" (emphasis added)); see also
Amrine v. Bowersox, 128 F.3d 1222, 1229 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that inmate's proffered evidence, "if found
reliable," would satisfy actual innocence standard of § 2244 and, therefore, authorize inmate to file subsequent
petition).
119. Carrigerv. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 478 (9th Cir. 1997). Such doubt, moreover, can be established by
impeachment evidence alone. Id. at 478-79.
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boundaries of House. The Court's decision in House will certainly prove significant if
House ultimately gains release from Tennessee's death row, but, in view of the questions
it leaves unanswered, the decision may ultimately prove significant only to inmates
named Paul Gregory House.
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APPENDIX

A:

STATE PROCEDURES FOR RAISING CLAIMS OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE IN
STATE HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Alabama
Criminal Rule of Procedure 32.1 allows a defendant convicted of a criminal
offense to institute a proceeding based on newly discovered material facts that require
the vacation of the sentence or conviction. 120 The newly discovered facts must:
have been unknown to the petitioner at the time of trial, sentencing, appeal, or post-trial
motion;
not have been discoverable through the exercise of reasonable diligence;
be neither merely cumulative nor merely impeaching;
be of such a nature that, had they been known at the time, the result probably

would

have

been different; and
establish that the petitioner is innocent of the crime or should not have received the
sentence. 121

Criminal Rule of Procedure 32.2 precludes a court from granting relief on a
successive petition unless the petitioner shows that good cause exists for the failure to
raise the claim earlier and that failure to entertain the petition would result in a
miscarriage of justice. 12 2 A petition brought on the ground of newly discovered
evidence must be filed within one year from the date when the judgment became
final or
12 3
later.
is
whichever
facts,
material
the
of
discovery
the
of
within six months
Alaska
Alaska's postconviction relief statute authorizes petitions for relief based on
material facts "not previously presented and heard . . . that require[] vacation of the
conviction or sentence in the interests of justice." 124 Alaska Statute § 12.72.020(b)
waives the statute of limitations for applications based on newly discovered evidence
when the petitioner establishes (1) due diligence in presenting the claim; (2) that the
evidence was not known within two years after the conviction; (3) that the evidence is
not cumulative; (4) that the evidence is not merely impeaching; and (5) that the evidence
25
clearly and convincingly establishes the petitioner's innocence. 1
A successful application under Alaska Statute § 12.72.010 demonstrates that newly
discovered evidence could result in acquittal. 126 Such evidence "must be realistically
evaluated in light of the totality of the evidence to be presented in the event of a retrial,
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Ala. R. Crim. Proc. 32.1(e).
Id.
Id. at 32.2(b).
Id. at 32.2(c).
Alaska Stat. § 12.72.010(4) (Lexis 2004).
Id. at § 12.72.020(b).
James v. State, 84 P.3d 404 (Alaska 2004).
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127

Arkansas
Arkansas' habeas statute provides for relief on the basis of new scientific evidence.
Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-112-201 allows a person convicted of a crime to petition
for relief if the petitioner presents scientific evidence, unavailable at trial, establishing
his actual innocence. 128 A petitioner is also eligible for relief if the new evidence,
considered "in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear
and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact-finder would find the petitioner guilty of
' 129
the underlying offense."
Similarly, Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-112-202 allows a person convicted of a
crime to move for fingerprinting, forensic DNA testing, or other tests in order to
demonstrate his actual innocence. 130 A movant seeking fingerprinting or DNA testing
must prove, among other things, that identity was an issue at trial and that the evidence
has not been materially altered. 13 1 The circuit court must hold a hearing on the petition
132
if the record in the case fails to show conclusively that no relief is warranted.
California
California provides relief through its habeas statute as interpreted through case
law. In In re Hall, the Supreme Court of California articulated a standard of review for
claims of actual innocence, holding that the evidence supporting such claims must be
"conclusive and 'point[] unerringly to innocence. ' 133 The Court rejected, however, the
requirement that "each bit of prosecutorial evidence be specifically refuted," 134 holding:
It would be unconscionable to deny relief if a petitioner conclusively established his

innocence without directly refuting every minute item of the prosecution's proof, or if a
petitioner utterly destroyed the theory on which the [state] relied without rebutting all other
possible scenarios which, ifthey had been presented at trial, might have tended to support a
135
verdict of guilt.

Similarly, in In re Clark, the California Supreme Court held that, if a petitioner
made a showing that he was actually innocent of the crime, it would demonstrate a
fundamental miscarriage of justice, thus exempting the petition from the procedural
136
barring of untimely petitions from consideration.

127. Id.at407.

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-201(a)(1) (Lexis 2006).
Id. at § 16-112-201(a)(2).
Id. at § 16-112-202.
Id. at § 16-112-202(4), (7).
Id. at § 16-112-205(a).

133. 637 P.2d 690, 698 (Cal. 1981) (quoting In re Weber, 523 P.2d 229, 243 (Cal. 1974)).
134. Id.

135. Id.(emphasis in original).
136. 855 P.2d 729, 760-61 (Cal. 1993).
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Colorado
Colorado provides relief through Colorado Revised Statute § 18-1-410 and
Criminal Rule of Procedure 35(c). An application may be made under either of these
provisions if
there exists evidence of material facts, not theretofore presented and heard, which, by the
exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have been known to or learned of by the
defendant or his attorney prior to the submission of the issues to the court137
or jury, and
which requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice.
Similarly, Colorado Revised Statutes §§ 18-1-412 and 18-1-413 authorize incarcerated
persons to apply for DNA testing if they can demonstrate by a preponderance of the
138
evidence that favorable results will demonstrate actual innocence.
Connecticut
Connecticut provides relief through case law interpreting the state habeas
statute. 139 In Summerville v. Warden, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held a
"substantial claim of actual innocence" to be cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, even without proof that a constitutional violation affected the trial result. 14° In
Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, the Court addressed the standard for a claim of
actual innocence:
First, taking into account both the evidence produced in the original criminal trial and the
evidence produced in the habeas hearing, the petitioner must persuade the habeas court by
clear and convincing evidence, as that standard is properly understood and applied in the
context of such a claim, that the petitioner is actually innocent of the crime of which he
stands convicted. Second, the petitioner must establish that, after considering all of that
evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom,
as the habeas court did, no reasonable fact
14 1
finder would find the petitioner guilty.
In addition, Connecticut requires law enforcement officials to preserve biological
evidence so that an incarcerated individual may petition for DNA testing of any available
evidence. 142 The relevant provision requires a court to order DNA testing if it finds a
reasonable probability that the petitioner would not have been convicted if exculpatory
43
results were available at trial. 1
Delaware
Criminal Procedure Rule 61 provides for the setting aside of a conviction or a
death sentence imposed by a court without jurisdiction or on any ground otherwise

137. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-410(1)(e) (Lexis 2006); Colo. R. Crim. Proc. 35(c)(2)(V).
138. Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-1-412 to 18-1-413 (Lexis 2006).

139. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-466 (West 2005).
140. Summerville v. Warden, 641 A.2d 1356, 1369 (Conn. 1994).
141. Miller v. Commr. of Correct, 700 A.2d 1108, 1130-31 (Conn. 1997).

142. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-102jj (West Supp. 2006).
143. Id. at § 54-102kk(b)(1).
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available for collateral attack. 144 Criminal Procedure Rule 33 requires a motion for a
new trial based on newly discovered evidence to be made within two years of final
judgment; 145 however, otherwise applicable procedural bars do not apply if the petition
makes a "colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a
constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, 14
reliability,
integrity or
6
conviction."
of
judgment
the
to
leading
proceedings
the
fairness of
In order for a new trial to be granted based on the discovery of new evidence under
Rules 61 and 33,
[I]t must appear (1) that the evidence is such as will probably change the result if a new
trial is granted; (2) that it has been discovered since the trial, and could not have been
discovered before by the exercise of due diligence; and (3) that it is not merely cumulative
or impeaching. 147
In State v. Condon, a petitioner for postconviction relief argued that newly discovered
evidence demonstrated a "miscarriage of justice," thus exempting his application from
the procedural bars of a motion for a new trial made under Rules 61 and 33. 148 The
court declined to address this argument because the 14petitioner
failed to identify new
9
evidence that would warrant the granting of a new trial.
Finally, Delaware Code § 4504(a) allows a person convicted of a crime to file a
motion requesting DNA testing in order to demonstrate actual innocence. 15 The motion
must be filed within three years of the judgment of conviction becoming final. 151
Districtof Columbia
D.C. Code § 22-4135 allows a person convicted of a criminal offense to move for a
52
new trial or to have a sentence vacated on grounds of actual innocence at any time. 1
The court shall grant a new trial "[i]f, after considering [the new evidence], the court
concludes that it is more likely than not that the movant is actually innocent." 153 The
court must vacate the conviction if, after considering the new evidence, the court
concludes by clear and convincing evidence that the movant is actually innocent of the
15 4
crime.
D.C. Code § 22-4134 requires law enforcement agencies to preserve biological
material that resulted in a conviction for five years or as long as any person connected
with the case remains in custody, whichever is longer. 155 Similarly, D.C. Code § 22-

144. Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1).
145. Id. at R. 33.
146. Id. at R. 61(i)(5).
147. State v. Condon, 2003 WL 1364619 at *4 (Del. Super. Mar. 13, 2003) (quoting State v. Hamilton, 406
A.2d 879, 880 (Del. Super. 1974)).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4504(a) (Lexis 2001).
151. Id.
152. D.C. Code Ann. § 22-4135(a)-(b) (Lexis Supp. 2006).
153. Id. at § 22-4135(g)(2).
154. Id. at § 22-4135(g)(3).
155. Id. at § 22-4134(a).
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4133 authorizes a person in custody for a crime of violence to apply for56DNA testing of
1
biological material in the possession of the state or federal government.
Finally, D.C. Code § 23-1 10(a) allows a prisoner in custody to petition the
Superior Court to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence because
(1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the
laws of the District of Columbia; (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose the
authorized by law; [or] (4) the
sentence; (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum
57
attack.1
collateral
to
subject
otherwise
is
sentence
Florida
Rule 3.850(a) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure incorporates the
remedies historically available through the writ of habeas corpus. 158 Rule 3.850(a) also
159
provides relief when the judgment or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack.
Rule 3.850(b) prohibits the consideration of a motion filed in a non-capital case more
than two years after the judgment and sentence became final. 16 Similarly, a court may
not consider a petition filed in a capital case more than one year after the judgment and
sentence became final 16 1 unless the petitioner alleges, among other things, that "the facts
movant's attorney
on which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant or the162
diligence."'
due
of
exercise
the
by
ascertained
been
have
not
could
and
Florida courts have authorized claims of newly discovered evidence of actual
innocence made under Rule 3.850.163 In reviewing a claim made on the grounds of
newly discovered evidence, a trial court is required to "'consider all newly discovered
evidence which would be admissible' at trial and then evaluate the 'weight of both the
at the trial."" 164
newly discovered evidence and the evidence which was introduced 165
Florida also allows incarcerated individuals to petition for DNA testing.
Georgia
Georgia Code § 5-5-23 provides that a new trial may be granted based on new
material evidence that is not merely cumulative or impeaching. 16 6 Motions under this
section must be made within thirty days of the judgment. 167
A motion for a new trial made more than thirty days after entry of judgment is an

156. Id. at § 22-4133(a).
157. D.C. Code Ann. § 23-110(a) (Lexis 2001).
158. Rule 3.850(a) provides relief from a judgment or conviction imposed in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States or the State of Florida, by a court lacking jurisdiction, or in excess of the maximum
penalty authorized by law. Fla. R. Crim. Proc. 3.850(a)(1)-(4). A petitioner may also obtain relief from an
involuntary plea. Id. at 3.850(a)(5).
159. Fla. R. Crim. Proc. 3.850(a)(6).
160. Id. at 3.850(b).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 3.850(b)(1).
163. E.g. Mills v. State, 786 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 2001); Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1998).
164. Jones, 709 So. 2d at 521 (quoting Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911,916 (Fla. 1991)).
165. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 925.11 (West Supp. 2006); Fla. R. Crim. Proc. 3.853.
166. Ga. Code Ann. § 5-5-23 (1995).
167. Id. at § 5-5-40(a).
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"extraordinary" motion. 168 Generally, a trial court must hold a hearing on a motion for a
new trial; an extraordinary motion, however, may be denied without a hearing. 1 69 In
order for a court to grant a motion for a new trial, the movant must establish:
(1) that the newly discovered evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial; (2) that
want of due diligence was not the reason that the evidence was not acquired sooner; (3)
that the evidence was so material that it would probably produce a different verdict; (4)
that it is not cumulative only; (5) that the affidavit of the witness is attached to the motion
or its absence accounted for; and
(6) that the new evidence does not operate solely to
70
impeach the credit of a witness. 1
Hawaii
Hawaii's Rule of Penal Procedure 40 encompasses all common law and statutory
procedures for postconviction relief. 17 1 A person may seek relief from a conviction
172
under Rule 40 based on newly discovered evidence at any time:
As a general rule, a hearing should be held on a Rule 40 petition ...where the petition
states a colorable claim. To establish a colorable claim, the allegations of the petition must
show that if taken as true the facts alleged would
change the verdict; however, a
73
petitioner's conclusions need not be regarded as true. 1
Idaho
Idaho's Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act 174 allows a prisoner to petition
for relief based on "material facts, not previously presented and heard, that require[]
vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice." 175 Under Idaho
Criminal Rule 57(c), an applicant for postconviction relief has the burden of proving, by
176
a preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which the application is based.
177
The Idaho Supreme Court enunciated the test for relief in State v. Drapeau:
A motion [for a new trial] based on newly discovered evidence must disclose (1) that the
evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant at the time of trial; (2)
that the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) that it will probably
produce an acquittal; and (4) that failure
to learn of the evidence was due to no lack of
78
diligence on the part of the defendant. 1
Idaho Code § 19-4902 allows for the filing of a petition for DNA or fingerprint

168. Dyal v. State, 172 S.E.2d 326, 327 (Ga. App. 1970).
169. E.g. Dick vState, 287 S.E.2d 11, 13 (Ga. 1982).
170. Dick, 287 S.E.2d at 13-14 (citing Tanner v. State, 276 S.E.2d 627, 631 (Ga. 1981); Timberlake v. State,
271 S.E.2d 792, 795-96 (Ga. 1980); Bell v. State, 183 S.E.2d 357, 360-61 (Ga. 1971)).
171. Haw. R. Penal Proc. 40(a) (West 2006).
172. Id. at40(a)(1).
173. State v. Allen, 744 P.2d 789, 792 (Haw. App. 1987) (citations omitted).
174. Idaho Code Ann. §§ 19-4901 to 19-4911 (Lexis 2004).
175. Id. at§ 19-4901(a)(4).
176. Idaho Crim. R. 57(c); Odom v. State, 826 P.2d 1337, 1338 (Idaho App. 1992).
177. 551 P.2d 972 (Idaho 1976).
178. Id. at 978 (citation omitted).
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testing. 179
Illinois
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the conviction of an innocent person violates
the Due Process Clause of the Illinois Constitution. 180 Similarly, the Court has
recognized the right of postconviction petitioners to assert actual innocence based on
18
newly discovered evidence. 1
Illinois courts have required petitioners seeking a new trial under the PostConviction Hearing Act 182 on the basis of newly discovered evidence to prove that the
evidence was not available at the original trial and that the defendant could not have
discovered the evidence earlier through due diligence. 183 The evidence must also be
material, noncumulative, and "of such conclusive character that it would probably
change the result on retrial. '' 184 Illinois' postconviction statute, however, considers any
claim not made in the original or amended petition to be waived.18 5
In People v. Morgan, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that, before a successive
postconviction petition may be heard on the merits, a petitioner must establish that such
consideration is required by fundamental fairness. 186 In order to establish fundamental
fairness, a petitioner must show "both cause and prejudice with respect to each claim
presented."' 187 The defendant must also show "good cause for failing to raise the
188
claimed error in a prior proceeding and that actual prejudice resulted from the error."
The Court held that prejudice will be found "where the defendant can show that the
claimed constitutional error so infected his trial that the resulting conviction violated due
process."

189

Indiana
The Indiana Rules of Procedure for postconviction remedies provide for
postconviction relief based on "material facts, not previously presented and heard, that
require[] vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice." 190 A
proceeding seeking such relief may be authorized at any time. 19 1 The Supreme Court of
Indiana has held that an individual seeking relief based on newly discovered evidence
must establish:
(1) that the evidence was not available at trial; (2) that it is material and relevant; (3) that it

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Idaho Code Ann. § 19-4902 (Lexis 2004).
People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1337 (I11.1996).
Id.
725 II1.Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/122-1 to 5/122-8 (West 2002).
People v. Morgan, 817 N.E.2d 524, 527 (II1. 2004).
Id. (citing People v Barrow, 749 N.E.2d 892, 913 (111.2001)).
725 111.Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/122-3 (West 2002).
Morgan, 817 N.E.2d at 527.
Id. (citing People v. Lee, 796 N.E.2d 1021, 1023 (I11.2003)).
Id.
Id. (citing People v. Tenner, 794 N.E.2d 238, 246 (111.2002)).
Ind. R. Proc. Post-Conviction Rem. § l(I)(a)(4).
Id.at § l(1)(a).
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is not cumulative; (4) that it is not merely impeaching; (5) that it is not privileged or
incompetent; (6) that due diligence was used to discover it in time for trial; (7) that the
produced upon a retrial of the case; and (9)
evidence is worthy of credit; (8) that it can be192
that it will probably produce a different result.
Indiana Code § 36-38-7-5 allows an inmate to petition for DNA testing or
analysis. 193 Similarly, a new trial is mandatory under Criminal Procedure Rule 16 when
a party seeks to address "newly discovered material evidence ...which, with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered and produced at trial."'1 94 A motion under
195
Rule 16 must be made within thirty days of sentencing.
Iowa
Iowa Code § 822.2 allows for postconviction relief for persons claiming the
existence of "material facts, not previously presented and heard, that require[] vacation
of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice." 196 Iowa courts have held that an
individual requesting such relief must establish:
(1) the evidence was discovered after the verdict; (2) the evidence could not have been
discovered earlier in the exercise of due diligence; (3) the evidence is material to the case
and not merely cumulative or
impeaching; and (4) the evidence probably would have
197
changed the result of the trial.
An application for relief under § 822.3 must be filed within three years from the
date the conviction or decision became final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date
the writ of precedent was issued. 198 This time limitation is waived, however, for a
motion based on facts or law that could not have been raised within the three-year time
period.' 99
Kansas
Kansas' habeas corpus statute authorizes a prisoner to petition for relief from a
sentence on the ground that it was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States or Kansas, the court lacked jurisdiction, the sentence exceeded the
maximum authorized by law, or the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack.2 ° °
A court is not required to entertain successive petitions for similar relief,2° 1 nor is it
required to consider any petition brought later than one year from the date that the

Wisehart v. State, 693 N.E.2d 23, 33-34 (Ind. 1998) (citing Fox v. State, 568 N.E.2d 1006, 1007 (Ind.

192.

1991)).
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
(Iowa
198.
199.
200.
201.

Ind. Code Ann. § 35-38-7-5 (Lexis Supp. 2006).
Ind. R. Crim. Proc. 16(A).
Id
Iowa Code Ann. § 822.2(4) (West 2003).
Grissom v. State, 572 N.W.2d 183, 184 (Iowa App. 1997) (citing Jones v. State, 479 N.W.2d 265, 274
1991)).
Iowa Code Ann. § 822.3 (West 2003).
Id.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1507(a) (2005).
Id. at § 60-1507(c).
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conviction became final.2 °2
A petition may be exempted from the timeliness
requirement, however, in order to prevent manifest injustice. 2 0 3 Kansas Statute § 223501 provides that a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence may be
made within two years after final judgment unless an appeal is pending, in which case
the court may grant the motion only upon remand. 2 04 Kansas courts have delineated a
two-prong test for determining when new trials are required under § 22-3501: the
defendant must show "the evidence could not with reasonable diligence have been
produced at trial" and "the evidence must be of such materiality it would likely produce a
20 5
different result at a new trial."
Kansas statutes also authorize individuals in state custody who have been
convicted of rape or murder to petition the court for the testing of DNA evidence, subject
20 6
to various statutory conditions.
Kentucky
Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 10.02 authorizes a court to grant a new trial
for any cause that "prevented the defendant from having a fair trial, or if required in the
interest of justice." 2° 7 Rule 10.06(1) requires that a motion for a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence must be made within one year of the entry of the judgment or
at a later time if the courtfor good cause so permits.2 08 To move for a new trial based
on newly discovered evidence, the "evidence must be of such a decisive nature that it
20 9
would, with reasonable certainty, change the verdict."
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(b) provides for relief from a judgment on
the grounds of newly discovered evidence that could not have been discovered through
due diligence in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59.02. 2 1 0 The movant under
Rule 60.02 "must affirmatively allege facts which, if true, justify vacating the
judgment." 2 11 A motion for a new trial must be made within one year from the
2 12
judgment from which the petitioner is seeking relief.
Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.42 allows a prisoner in custody to move
to have his sentence vacated, set aside, or corrected at any time. 2 13 However, in Foley v.
Commonwealth, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that Rule 11.42 does not apply to
2 14
newly discovered evidence.

202. Id. at § 60-1507(0(1).
203. Id. at § 60-1507(0(2).
204. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3501(1) (1995).
205. State v. Neal, 763 P.2d 621, 625 (Kan. 1988) (citations omitted).
206. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-2512 (Supp. 2005).
207. Ky. R. Crim. Proc. 10.02(1).
208. Id. at 10.06(1).
209. Foley v. Cmmw., 17 S.W.3d 878, 888 (Ky. 2000) (citations omitted).
210. Ky. R. Civ. Proc. 60.02(b). Rule 60.02 applies to criminal cases. Gross v. Cmmw., 648 S.W.2d 853,
856 (Ky. 1983).
211. Id.
212. Ky. R. Civ. Proc. 60.02.
213. Ky. R. Crim. Proc. 11.42(1).
214. 17 S.W.3d at 887.
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Louisiana

Louisiana provides for postconviction relief under Article 930.3 of the Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure if the results of DNA testing prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the petitioner is factually innocent of the crime for which he was
convicted. 215 Article 926.1 allows a person convicted of a crime to apply for DNA
testing.

2 16

Article 851 requires the court to grant a new trial based on "[n]ew and material
evidence that, notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable diligence by the defendant, was
not discovered before or during the trial, is available, and . . . probably would have
changed the verdict or judgment." 2 17 Article 853 requires a motion for a new trial based
on newly discovered evidence to be filed within one year of the date that the trial court
imposed the sentence. 2 18 Before a motion for new trial on the basis of new evidence
may be granted by the court, the petitioner must allege:
(1) [t]hat notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable diligence by the defendant, the new
evidence was not discovered before or during the trial;
(2) [t]he names of the witnesses who will testify and a concise statement of the newly
discovered evidence;
(3) [t]he facts which the witnesses or evidence will establish; and
(4) [t]hat the witnesses or evidence are not beyond the process of the court or are otherwise
2 19
available.
In State v. Reed, the court of appeals held that the petitioner's motion for a new
trial based on newly discovered evidence was not timely because it was filed more than
one year after the verdict. 220 The court also held the one-year time limitation did not
deprive the petitioner of his rights under Articles 19 and 22 of the Louisiana
22 1
Constitution, nor did it deprive him of his federal and state due process rights.
Maine
Title 15 Maine Revised Statutes §§ 2121 through 2132 describe the exclusive
method of reviewing criminal judgments and post-sentencing proceedings and
incorporate both common-law and statutory remedies. 222 Section 2128(3) provides that
all grounds for relief which are not raised in the first petition are waived unless the state
or federal Constitution requires otherwise or the court determines that the ground could
not have been raised in an earlier action. 223 Section § 2128 similarly requires that a
petition seeking review of a criminal judgment must be made within one year of the

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221
222.
223.

La. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 930.3.
Id. atart. 926.1.
Id. atart. 851(3).
Id.at art. 853.
Id. at art. 854(1)-(4).
712 So. 2d 572, 582 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1998).
Id. at 582-83.
15 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 2122 (2003).
Id. at § 2128(3).
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following, whichever is latest:
A. The date of final disposition of the direct appeal from the underlying criminal judgment
or the expiration of the time for seeking the appeal;
B. The date on which the constitutional right, state or federal, asserted was initially
recognized by the Law Court or the Supreme Court of the United States... ; or
C. The date on which the factual predicate of the claim
or claims presented could have
224
been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
Criminal Rule of Procedure 33 authorizes a court to grant the petitioner a new trial
if required by the "interest of justice." 225 Any motion for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence must be made before, or within two years after, the judgment is
entered. 2 26 In order to prevail on a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence, a petitioner must show:
(1) that the evidence is such as will probably change the result if a new trial is granted,
(2) that it has been discovered since the trial,
(3) that it could not have been discovered before the trial by the exercise of due diligence,
(4) that it is material to the issue, and
(5) that it is not merely cumulative or impeaching,
unless it is clear that such impeachment
22 7
would have resulted in a different verdict.
Maryland
Maryland Rule 4-331 allows a court to grant a new trial or other appropriate relief
based on newly discovered evidence that was not discovered through due diligence in
time to move for a new trial. 22 8 A motion made under this rule must generally be filed
one year from the date of the sentence or the date the trial court received a mandate from
an appellate court, whichever is later.2 29 A motion asserting new evidence showing that
the defendant is innocent of a capital crime or a motion based on DNA evidence
2 30
establishing innocence may be filed at any time.
To prevail on a motion for a new trial, a petitioner must show that (1) the new
evidence is material to the issues involved and (2) "there was a substantial or significant
possibility that the verdict of the trier of fact would have been affected. '23 1 A claim of
newly discovered evidence is not grounds for postconviction relief under Maryland's
Criminal Procedure Code § 7.102.232

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at § 2128(5).
Me. R. Crim. Proc. 33.
Id.
State v. Estes, 418 A.2d 1108, 1114 (Me. 1980) (citations omitted).
Md. R. 4-331(c).
Id. at4-331(c)(1).
Id. at4-331(c)(2)-(3).
Yorke v. State, 556 A.2d 230, 233-35 (Md. 1989).
Gray v. State, 857 A.2d 1176, 1183 (Md. Spec. App. 2004).
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Massachusetts
Massachusetts Rule of Criminal Procedure 30 allows an individual who is
imprisoned pursuant to a criminal conviction to file a motion requesting release or
correction of the sentence being served at any time. 233 Rule 30 also allows the trial
to grant a new trial "at any time if it appears that justice may not
judge, upon motion,
234
done.'
have been
A motion made under Rule 30 based on newly discovered evidence "must establish
both that the evidence is newly discovered and that it casts real doubt on the justice of
the conviction." 235 A petitioner must also show that the evidence was "unknown" to
pretrial
him or his counsel and could not have been discovered through "reasonable
236
diligence" at the time of trial or of filing any previous motions for a new trial.
Michigan
Michigan's Criminal Procedure Rules 6.501 through 6.509 provide for post-appeal
relief from a judgment 2 37 Rule 6.508 waives otherwise applicable procedural bars if the
court determines "there is a significant possibility that the defendant is innocent of the
crime." 238 In order for a court to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence,
the petitioner must show
that the evidence itself, not merely its materiality, was newly discovered; that it is not
cumulative; that it is such as to render a different result probable on a retrial of the cause;
and that the
party could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced it at
23 9
the trial.
Minnesota
Minnesota Statute § 590.01 allows an individual convicted of a crime to petition
for postconviction relief based on scientific evidence, unavailable at trial, establishing his
actual innocence. 24 ° In addition, such an individual may file a motion requesting the
performance of fingerprint or DNA testing in order to demonstrate his actual
Finally, an individual convicted of a crime may petition for
innocence. 24 1
postconviction relief by claiming that the conviction violated his rights under the state or
24 2
federal Constitution.
In Martin v. State, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that "a defendant may base a
petition for postconviction relief [under § 590.01(1)] on a claim of newly discovered

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Mass. R. Crim. Proc. 30(a).
Id. at 30(b) (emphasis added).
Cmmw. v. Pike, 726 N.E.2d 940, 945 (Mass. 2000).
Id.at 945-46.
Mich. Crim. Proc. R. 6.501-6.509.
Id.at R. 6.508(D)(3).
People v. Clark, 110 N.W.2d 638, 640 (Mich. 1961) (citations omitted).
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 590.01(1)(2) (West 2000).
Id. at § 590.01(la)(a).
Id.at § 590.01(1)(1).
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evidence." 24 3 In a postconviction claim of newly discovered evidence, the petitioner
must establish:
(1) that the evidence was not known to him or his counsel at the time of trial,
(2) that his failure to learn of it before trial was not due to lack of diligence, (3)
that the evidence is material (or. . . is not impeaching, cumulative or doubtful),
and (4) that the evidence will probably produce
either an acquittal at a retrial or
244
a result more favorable to the petitioner.
The court may summarily deny a second or successive petition for similar relief on
behalf of the same petitioner. 245 Similarly, a court may deny a petition raising issues
that have already been decided by the court. 246 In State v. Knaffla, the Court held that
any matter raised on direct appeal, as well as any claims "known but not raised," were
waived for purposes of postconviction relief.247 However, in Boitnott v. State, the Court
noted "[d]espite the Knaffla bar. . . .we have at times opted to review an appellant's
24 8
claims on the merits in the interests of justice."
Missouri
In State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, the Missouri Supreme Court allowed an
individual facing a death sentence to assert a freestanding claim of actual innocence in a
petition for habeas corpus. 249 The Court held that it would grant relief to such a
petitioner who could demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he was actually
2 50
innocent.
In State ex rel. Nixon v. Jaynes, the Missouri Supreme Court allowed a petitioner
to assert actual innocence as a gateway to overcome an otherwise applicable procedural
bar.2 51 The Court noted that when a defendant fails to raise a claim in a postconviction
252
proceeding, it generally cannot be raised in a subsequent petition for habeas corpus.
Adopting the federal standard, the Court required a petitioner asserting innocence in
order to waive a procedural bar to prove "that it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of [the] newly discovered
evidence." 253 Missouri Code § 547.360 provides postconviction relief for convictions or
sentences that violate the state or federal Constitution, exceed the maximum allowable
sentence, or were entered by courts without jurisdiction to do so.254
Missouri Code § 547.035 allows a person in the custody of the state to petition for

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

295 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. 1980).
Race v. State, 417 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Minn. 1987).
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 590.04(3) (West 2000).
id.
243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976).
631 N.W.2d 362, 369-70 (Minn. 2001).
102 S.W.3d 541 (Mo. 2003).
Id. at 548.
63 S.W.3d 210, 216 (Mo. 2001).
ld. at 214.
Id at 216 (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327).
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 547.360(1) (West 2002).
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a person's innocence, a motion for release
DNA testing. 255 If such testing demonstrates
2 56
may be filed with the sentencing court.

Montana
Montana Code § 46-21-102(2) allows claims based on newly discovered evidence
if, "viewed in light of the evidence as a whole," it establishes that the petitioner did not
engage in the criminal conduct for which he was convicted. 257 Such a claim must be
made within one year of the date on which the conviction becomes final or the date on
which the petitioner discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the existence of
the evidence, whichever is later.2 58 Montana Code § 46-21-105 requires that a second or
demonstrate good cause why its claims were not asserted in the
subsequent petition
259
petition.
original
In State v. Pope, the defendant's petition was barred by the three-year (now one260
year) statute of limitations and because he did not raise his claims on direct appeal.
The Court concluded that the jurisdictional bar could be overcome by a showing of a
"clear miscarriage of justice"---i.e., if Pope was actually innocent of the crime for which
he was convicted. 26 1 Noting that Pope submitted the newly discovered evidence in order
to pass through an "actual innocence" gateway, the Court held that Pope "needed to
demonstrate that, in light of the new evidence, a reasonable juror would, more likely than
not, find that the State did not prove he was guilty of the crime for which he was
2 62
convicted.
Nebraska
Nebraska's DNA Testing Act provides a procedural framework for individuals
seeking relief based on DNA evidence. 263 Under the Act, a petitioner may request and
obtain DNA testing if such testing may produce noncumulative, exculpatory evidence
264
A
relevant to the individual's claim that he was wrongfully convicted or sentenced.
court may vacate a judgment on the basis of DNA results when, considered in light of
a "complete lack of
evidence presented at trial, the results exonerate the person and show
265
evidence to establish an essential element of the crime charged."
Nebraska Statute § 29-2101 allows for the granting of a new trial based on newly
discovered material evidence, not discoverable through reasonable diligence by the time
of trial. 266 Nebraska Statute § 29-2103 requires that a motion for a new trial based on

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id. at § 547.035(1).
Id. at § 547.037(1).
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-102(2) (2005).
Id.
Id. at § 46-21-105(1)(b).
80 P.3d 1232, 1237 (Mont. 2003).
Id. at 1241.
Id. at 1242.
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-4116 to 29-4125 (Supp. 2002).
Id. at § 29-4120(5).
State v. Bronson, 672 N.W.2d 244, 250-51 (Neb. 2003).
Neb. Rev. Stat § 29-2101(5) (1995).
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newly discovered evidence be brought within three years of the date of the original
verdict. 267 In order for a court to grant a motion for a new trial under §§ 29-4123(3) or
and admitted
29-2101(5), the evidence must be of such a nature that, had it been offered
26 8
at trial, it probably would have produced a substantially different result.
Nevada
Nevada provides relief from convictions obtained in violation of the Constitution
269
of the United States or the laws or Constitution of Nevada in its habeas corpus statute.
In part, the habeas statute requires that, unless there is good cause for the delay, a
petition must be filed within one year after the entry of the judgment or, if an appeal was
27
taken, one year from the date that the Supreme Court issued its remittitur. 0
Similarly, § 34.810 of the habeas statute prevents the court from considering
petitions in which the grounds for relief could have been presented in a prior proceeding,
27 1
as well as successive petitions failing to allege new or different grounds of relief.
Dismissal of the petition may be overcome if the court finds actual prejudice to the
petitioner and that good cause exists for not presenting the claim previously or for
272
presenting it again.
Nevada Statute § 34.800 allows for the dismissal of a petition if delay in its filing
273
prejudices the state in its response to the petition or in its ability to retry the petitioner.
A petitioner may overcome this prejudice to the state by showing his petition is based
upon grounds that could not have been known through the exercise of reasonable
diligence or, in the case of prejudice to the state in conducting a retrial, if a fundamental
miscarriage of justice occurred at trial. 274 If a petition is filed after five years, the
2 75
petitioner must rebut a presumption of prejudice to the state.
The Nevada Supreme Court has held that in order "[t]o show good cause, a
petitioner must demonstrate that an impediment external to the defense prevented him
from raising his claims earlier." 276 Similarly, "[a]ctual prejudice requires a showing not
merely that the errors [complained of] created a possibility of prejudice, but that they
worked to [the petitioner's] actual and substantial disadvantage, in affecting the state
proceeding with error of constitutional dimensions. ' 277 Finally, the Nevada Supreme
Court noted that it "may excuse the failure to show cause where the prejudice from a
failure to consider the claim amounts to a 'fundamental miscarriage ofjustice."' 278 The

267. Id. at § 29-2103.
268. State v. Ferris,344 N.W.2d 668, 669 (Neb. 1984).
269. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.724 (2005).
270. Id. at § 34.726(1).
271. Id. at § 34.810(1)(b), (2).
272. Id. at § 34.810(3).
273. Id. at § 34.800(1).
274. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.800(1).
275. Id. at § 34.800(1)(b).
276. Pellegriniv. State, 34 P.3d 519, 537 (Nev. 2001) (citing Harris v. Warden, 964 P.2d 785, 787 (Nev.
1998)).
277. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (brackets in original).
278. Id. (citing Mazzan v. Warden, 921 P.2d 920, 922 (Nev. 1996); Hogan v. Warden, 860 P.2d 710, 715-16
(Nev. 1993)).
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Nevada Supreme Court also recognized that a fundamental miscarriage of justice exists
when "the petitioner makes a colorable showing he is actually innocent of the crime or is
ineligible for the death penalty." 2 79 In Pellegrini v. State, the Nevada Supreme Court
adopted the federal standard found in Schiup, explaining that "a petitioner claiming
that no reasonable juror would
actual innocence must show that it is more likely than2 not
80
have convicted him absent a constitutional violation."
New Hampshire
New Hampshire allows a person in custody to petition the court for DNA
testing. 28 1 If the results of the testing are favorable to the petitioner, the court must order
a hearing and enter any order that serves the interests of justice, including an order
vacating and setting aside the judgment, discharging the petitioner, resentencing the
petitioner, or granting a new trial.2 82

New Hampshire Statute 526:1 provides that "[a] new trial may be granted in any
case when through accident, mistake or misfortune justice has not been done and a
further hearing would be equitable." 283 Section 526:4, however, specifies that the
petition for a new trial must be filed within three years of the adverse judgment. 284 To
prevail on a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence, the petitioner
must prove:
(1) that [he] was not at fault for not discovering the evidence at the former trial; (2) that the

evidence is admissible, material to the merits, and not cumulative; and (3) that [the
evidence is] of such a character that a different result will probably be reached upon

another trial.

2 85

New Jersey
New Jersey Court Rule 3:20-2 allows a motion for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence to be made at any time. 2 86 New Jersey Court Rule 3:20-1 allows
2 87
the trial judge to grant the petitioner a new trial "if required in the interest of justice."
Newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial if it is: "(1) material to the issue and not
merely cumulative or impeaching or contradictory; (2) discovered since the trial and not
discoverable by reasonable diligence beforehand; and (3) of the sort that would probably
2 88
change the jury's verdict if a new trial were granted."
289
New Jersey Court Rule 3:22 contains the state's postconviction procedures.

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
1985))
286.
287.
288.
289.

Id. (citing Mazzan, 921 P.2d at 922; Hogan, 860 P.2d at 715-16).
34 P.3d at 537 (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327).
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651-D:2(1) (Lexis Supp. 2005).
Id.at § 651-D:2(VI)(b).
Id.at § 526:1 (Lexis 2006).
Id.at § 526:4.
State v. Steed, 665 A.2d 1072, 1076 (N.H. 1995) (quoting State v. Abbott, 503 A.2d 791, 795 (N.H.
(brackets in original).
N.J. Ct. R. 3:20-2.
Id.at R. 3:20-1.
State v. Carter,426 A.2d 501, 508 (N.J. 1981) (citations omitted).
N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-1 to 3:22-12.
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Rule 3:22-4 bars grounds for relief that were not raised in previous proceedings unless
the court finds that such grounds could not reasonably have been raised in a prior
proceeding, that enforcing the bar would result in fundamental injustice, or that denying
relief would be contrary to the United States or the New Jersey Constitution. 29 0 Rule
3:22-5, on the other hand, considers the prior adjudication of a claim on the merits to be
conclusive. 29 1 Rule 3:22-12 requires a postconviction petitioner to file a motion within
five years from the date of the entry of judgment unless the failure to do so can be
excused. 29 2 Rule 3:22-12 also requires a petition filed on behalf of an individual
sentenced to death to be brought within thirty days of the denial of certiorari or other
293
final action by the United States Supreme Court on the direct appeal.
In State v. Ways, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that "[h]owever difficult the
process of review, the passage of time must not be a bar to assessing the validity of a
2 94
verdict that is cast in doubt by evidence suggesting that a defendant may be innocent."
New Mexico
New Mexico Rule of Criminal Procedure 5-614 allows an individual convicted of a
crime to petition for a new trial in the interest of justice. 295 A motion for new trial based
on the newly discovered evidence under this section must be made within two years of
the final judgment. 296 Rule of Criminal Procedure 5-801 allows a court to modify a
sentence imposed in an illegal manner. 297 Motions to reduce an illegally imposed
sentence must be filed within ninety days of the sentence's imposition or the receipt of
2 98
an appellate court mandate.
It is unclear whether a petitioner claiming actual innocence would create an
exception to the time limitations of Rules 5-614 and 5-801. In State v. Lucero, the
petitioner sought a new trial, contending that the instruction given to the jury effectively
removed the question from the jury's discretion. 299 Holding that the defendant's failure
to comply with the time requirements of Rule 5-614 deprived the trial court of
jurisdiction to rule on the motion, the New Mexico Supreme Court failed to decide
whether the jurisdictional requirement is absolute or equivocal, noting that the petitioner
failed to present any of the "extremely unusual circumstances that would otherwise
New Mexico also allows for
justify an exception from the time requirements." 300 30
1
provisions.
corpus
habeas
its
through
relief
postconviction

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Id. at R. 3:22-4.
Id. at R. 3:22-5.
Id. at R. 3:22-12(a).
Id. at R. 3:22-12(b).
850 A.2d 440,449-50 (N.J. 2004).
N.M. R. Crim. Proc. 5-614(A).
Id. at 5-614(C).
Id. at 5-801(A).
Id. at 5-801(B).
30 P.3d 365, 365 (N.M. 2001).
Id. at 367.
N.M. R. Crim. Proc. 5-802.
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New York
New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.30(1-a) establishes a procedure through
which persons convicted of crimes may petition for DNA testing of evidence. 30 2 A
petitioner under this section must show that, had such testing been performed prior to the
trial and the results made available at trial, there is "a reasonable
probability that the
30 3
verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant."
New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.10(1) provides that, at any time after the
entry of ajudgment, a court may, upon the petitioner's motion, vacate a judgment based
on new evidence. 304 A court may vacate a motion only if the evidence could not have
been produced at trial despite the petitioner's due diligence and there is a probability
that, if such evidence had been introduced at trial, the verdict would have been more
favorable to the defendant. 30 5 A motion based on new evidence must be made with due
diligence after the evidence is discovered.30 6 Section 440.10(h) allows a court to vacate
a judgment that violates the petitioner's rights under the United States or New York
3 7
Constitution. 0
In People v. Cole, a New York supreme court held that "a person who has not
committed any crime has a liberty interest in remaining free from punishment" and "the
conviction or incarceration of a guiltless person violates elemental fairness, deprives that
person of freedom of movement and freedom from punishment and thus runs afoul of the
Due Process Clause of the State Constitution. ' 3 ° 8 The court also held that punishing an
innocent person violates the Cruel and Inhuman Treatment Clause of the New York
Constitution. 309 The court required "a movant making a free-standing claim of
innocence [to] establish by clear and convincing evidence ...

that no reasonable juror

3 10
could convict the defendant of the crimes for which the petitioner was found guilty."
New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.10(2) requires the court to deny a
motion to vacate when the ground or issue was previously determined on the merits
during direct appeal, the petitioner unjustifiably failed to appeal or to raise such ground
on appeal, or the ground related solely to the sentence and not the conviction. 3 11 Section
440.10(3) allows the court to deny a motion to vacate when the defendant unjustifiably
failed to discover such evidence even though it was discoverable through due
diligence. 3 12 Similarly, the court may deny a motion if the issue was previously
determined on the merits in a prior proceeding other than direct appeal or if the issue
could have been raised in a previous motion under this section but was not.3 13 Despite

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.30(1-a)(a) (McKinney 2005).
Id.
N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 44 0.10(1)(g).
Id.
Id.
Id.at § 440.10(1)(h).
1 Misc. 3d 531, 541-42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
Id.at 542.
Id.at 543.
N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.10(2).
Id.at § 440.10(3)(a).
Id.at § 440.10(3)(b)-(c).
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one of the discretionary bars, § 440.10(3) allows a court to grant a motion3 if
14 the motion
is in the interest of justice, shows good cause, and is otherwise meritorious.
North Carolina
North Carolina General Statute § 15A-1415 allows a defendant to move for
postconviction relief at any time based on newly discovered evidence. 3 15 Such evidence
must have been "unknown or unavailable" to the petitioner at trial, despite his due
diligence. 3 16 Newly discovered evidence may include recanted testimony that has a
"direct and material bearing" upon the petitioner's guilt or on his eligibility for the death
penalty. 3 17 A motion based upon such evidence must be filed within a reasonable time
after its discovery. 3 18 In order to receive a new trial, a petitioner must demonstrate:
(1) the witness or witnesses will give newly discovered evidence; (2) the newly discovered
evidence is probably true; (3) the evidence is material, competent and relevant; (4) due
diligence was used and proper means were employed to procure the testimony at trial; (5)
the newly discovered evidence is not merely cumulative or corroborative; (6) the new
evidence does not merely tend to contradict, impeach or discredit the testimony of a former
witness; and (7) the evidence
is of such a nature that a different result will probably be
3 19
reached at a new trial.
North Carolina General Statute § 15A-269(a) allows a defendant to request DNA
analysis of biological evidence. 32 Such evidence must be untested, material to the
defense, and related to the investigation that resulted in the judgment.32 1 Section 15A269(b) allows the court to grant the motion for DNA testing if the results may establish a
reasonable probability that, had they been available at trial, the verdict would have been
322
more favorable to the defendant.
North Dakota
North Dakota's Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act 23 allows an individual to
apply for postconviction relief if "[e]vidence, not previously presented and heard, exists
requiring vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice." 324 Section 2932.1-12 allows the court to dismiss applications asserting previously adjudicated
claims. 3 25 6Under § 29-32.1-03, an application for postconviction relief may be filed at
32
any time.

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id.at § 440.10(3).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1415(c) (Lexis 2005).
Id.
Id.
Id.
State v. Beaver, 229 S.E.2d 179, 183 (N.C. 1976) (citation omitted).
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-269(a) (Lexis 2005).
Id.
Id. at § 15A-269(b)(2).
N.D. Cent. Code §§ 29-32.1-01 to 29-32.1-15 (2006).
Id. at § 29-32.1-01(1)(e).
Id. at § 29-32.1-12(1).
Id. at § 29-32.1-03(2).
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North Dakota's Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 also allows a trial court to grant a
new trial when required by the interests of justice. 327 A motion for a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence must be made within three years after the guilty verdict or
32 8
finding.
Section 29-32.1-01 and Rule 33(a) require the same showing to prevail on a
329
motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence:
(1) the evidence was discovered after trial, (2) the failure to learn about the evidence at the

time of trial was not the result of the defendant's lack of diligence, (3) the newly
discovered evidence is material to the issues at trial, and (4) the weight and quality of the
newly discovered evidence would likely result in an acquittal. A motion for new trial
based upon newly discovered evidence rests within the discretion of the trial court, and [the
North Dakota Supreme Court]330
will not reverse the court's denial of the motion unless the
court has abused its discretion.
Ohio
Ohio Code § 2953.21 allows an individual to petition for postconviction relief on
the basis of DNA evidence establishing that no reasonable factfinder would have found
the petitioner guilty had the evidence been available at trial. 33 1 An inmate may apply for
DNA testing pursuant to §§ 2953.71 through 2953.81 of the Ohio Code. 332 Section
2953.21 also allows individuals to petition for relief based on a state or federal
constitutional violation at trial.33 3
In State v. Byrd, an Ohio Court of Appeals rejected the petitioner's contention that
334
his claim of actual innocence provided substantive grounds for postconviction relief.
The Byrd court held that "a defendant's claim of 'actual innocence' based on newly
discovered evidence . . . does not demonstrate a constitutional violation in the

' 335
proceedings that actually resulted in the defendant's conviction."
Criminal Rule of Procedure 33(A)(6) allows a motion for new trial to be made
based on new material evidence that, with due diligence, could not have been produced
at trial. 336 Rule 33(B) provides that motions for new trial based on newly discovered
evidence must be filed within 120 days from the rendering of a verdict or decision of the
court unless the petitioner can clearly and convincingly prove that he was unavoidably
prevented from discovering such evidence within the prescribed time limit. 337 To
succeed, a motion for new trial must show that the newly discovered evidence: (1)

327.
328.
329.
330.
(N.D.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

N.D. R. Crim. Proc. 33(a).
Id. at33(b)(1).
Breding v State, 584 N.W.2d 493,498 (N.D. 1998).
State v Steinbach, 575 N.W.2d 193, 199 (N.D. 1998) (quoting State v. VanNatta, 506 N.W.2d 63, 70
1993)).
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.21(A)(1)(b) (West Supp. 2006).
Id.
Id. at § 2953.21(A)(1)(a).
762 N.E.2d 1043, 1053 (Ohio App. 1st Dist. 2001).
Id.(footnote omitted).
Ohio R. Crim. Proc. 33(A)(6).
Id.at 33(B).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol42/iss2/5

36

Dow et al.: Is It Constitutional to Execute Someone Who Is Innocent (And If I

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXECUTING INNOCENTS

2006]

discloses a strong probability that it will change the result if a new trial is granted, (2)
has been discovered since the trial, (3) is such as could not in the exercise of due
diligence have been discovered before the trial, (4) is material to the issues, (5) is not
merely cumulative to former evidence, and (6) does not merely impeach or contradict the
338
former evidence.
Oklahoma
Oklahoma's Post-Conviction Procedure Act 339 allows any person convicted of a
crime claiming new material facts, not previously presented nor heard, to institute a
proceeding seeking relief from his judgment or sentence. 340 All grounds for relief must
be stated in the original, supplemental, or amended application. 34 1 A ground that was
finally adjudicated in another proceeding or which could have been but was not raised in
for a subsequent petition unless the court finds
a prior proceeding may not be the basis
3 2
the failure to do so was reasonable. 4
343
Section 1089 deals specifically with postconviction relief in capital cases.
Subsection C provides that the only issues cognizable in an application for
postconviction relief are errors that affected the outcome at trial or evidence that the
petitioner is actually innocent. 344 Subsection D. 1 requires applications to be filed within
ninety days from the date that the appellate brief or reply brief is filed. 34 5 Under
subsection D.2, all available grounds that were not included in the application are waived
by the petitioner. 346 Subsection D.8 prohibits the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
from granting relief to untimely or successive petitions for postconviction relief unless
the petition contains claims that could not have been presented previously and
the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole,
would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for the alleged
applicant guilty of the underlying
error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the
3
offense or would have rendered the penalty of death. 47
In Slaughter v. State, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that the
Court's "rules and cases do not impede the raising of factual innocence claims at any
stage of an appeal." 3" 8 The Court "fully recognize[d] innocence claims are the PostConviction Procedure Act's foundation. But in this case [the Court] continue[d] to find
the evidence presented at trial and on appeal does not support or make a clear and
349
convincing showing of factual innocence."

338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

State v. Lopa, 117 N.E. 319, 320 (Ohio 1917).
Okla. Stat. tit. 22, §§ 1080-1089 (2001 & Supp. 2005).
Id. at § 1080(d) (2001).
Id. at § 1086.
Id.
Id. at § 1089 (Supp. 2005).
Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1089(C).
Id. at § 1089(D)(1).
Id. at § 1089(D)(2).
Id. at § 1089(D)(8)(a), (b)(2).
108 P.3d 1053, 1054 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005) (emphasis in original).
Id.
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Oregon
350

Oregon provides postconviction relief under its Post-Conviction Hearing Act
for the substantial denial of constitutional rights at trial which render the conviction
void. 35 1 In Anderson v. Gladden, the Oregon Supreme Court held that "[a]s a general
rule, habeas corpus (or its statutory counterpart in post-conviction proceedings) does not
provide relief from a conviction resulting from a mistake of fact, where proof of the
352
jury's mistake must depend upon the credibility of newly discovered evidence."
However, the Court refused to foreclose the possibility that newly discovered evidence
might serve as a basis of postconviction relief:
The prospect of a court holding itself powerless to remedy a manifestly erroneous
conviction obviously would not adorn the administration of justice. We do not, therefore,
say that executive clemency is the only remedy available when newly discovered evidence
proves the innocence of a prisoner. That hypothetical state of affairs, however, is not now
before us. We leave open the question whether newly discovered
evidence can ever give
353
rise to any kind of common-law post-conviction judicial relief.
Oregon Rule of Civil Procedure 64 allows an individual to bring a motion for a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence within ten days after the entry of the judgment or
"such further time as the court may allow." 354 If the motion is not heard within fifty-five
days of the judgment, it shall be considered denied.3 55
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania Code § 9543 provides relief for convicted persons who prove by a
preponderance of the evidence the existence of exculpatory evidence, unavailable at the
time of trial, that would have changed the outcome of the trial.35 6 A convicted
individual may petition for DNA testing in order to establish actual innocence pursuant
to § 9543.357
Pennsylvania Code § 9545 requires initial and subsequent petitions for
postconviction relief to be filed within one year of the date when the judgment became
final unless the petitioner proves that the facts upon which the claim is based were
"unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence" before that date. 3 58 Section 9545 also requires that a petition exempted from
359
the one-year requirement be filed within sixty days of the discovery of the evidence.
In order to obtain relief based on newly discovered exculpatory evidence, a
petitioner must establish that "(1) the evidence has been discovered after trial and it

350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 138.510-138.680 (2005).
Id. at § 138.530(1)(a).
383 P.2d 986, 991 (Or. 1963).
Id.
Or. R. Civ. Proc. 64B(4), 64F.
Id.at 64F.
42 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 9543(a)(2)(vi) (West 1998).
Id. at § 9543.1 (West Supp. 2006).
Id.
at § 9545(b)(1)(ii) (West 1998).
Id.at § 9545(b)(2).
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could not have been obtained at or prior to trial through reasonable diligence; (2) the
evidence is not cumulative; (3) it is not being used solely to impeach credibility; and (4)
360
it would likely compel a different verdict."
Rhode Island
Under Rhode Island Code § 10-9.1-1(a)(4), a person may obtain postconviction
relief on the basis of "material facts, not previously presented and heard, that require[]
vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice." 36 1 A motion for relief
10.9.1-12
based on newly discovered evidence may be made at any time. 362 Section 363
provides for postconviction DNA testing in order to establish actual innocence.
In Ferrellv. Wall, the Rhode Island Superior Court held that, in order to obtain
postconviction relief based on newly discovered evidence, a petitioner must establish
that the evidence is:
(1) newly discovered since trial, (2) not discoverable prior to trial with the exercise of due
diligence, (3) not merely cumulative or impeaching but rather material to the issue upon
which it is admissible, [and] (4) of the type that would probably change the verdict at trial.
For the second part of the inquiry, the hearing justice must exercise his or her discretion
and determine whether the newly discovered evidence is credible enough to warrant
364
relief.

South Carolina
South Carolina provides relief through the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure
Act.365 Section 17-27-20 provides that a person convicted of a crime claiming the
existence of "material facts, not previously presented and heard, that require[] vacation
in the interest of justice" may institute a proceeding for
of the conviction or 3sentence
66
postconviction relief.
Section 17-27-90 requires all grounds for relief to be raised in the original,
supplemental, or amended application for relief.367 Similarly, any ground which could
have been raised in a prior proceeding is considered waived unless the court finds there
was sufficient reason why the claim was not raised. 368 Section 17-27-45 requires
applications alleging newly discovered evidence requiring the vacation of a sentence to
be filed within one year of the time such facts369were actually discovered or should have
been discovered through reasonable diligence.
Similarly, the South Carolina Supreme Court retains authority under the state

360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

Cmmw. v. D 'Amato, 856 A.2d 806, 823 (Pa. 2004).
R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-1(a)(4) (1997).
Id. at§ 10-9.1-3.
Id at § 10.9.1-12 (Supp. 2005).
2005 WL 373479 at *3 (R.I. Super. Feb. 2, 2005) (citations omitted) (brackets in original).
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 17-27-10 to 17-27-160 (1985).
at § 17-27-20(a)(4).
Id.
Id.
at § 17-27-90.
Id.
Id.
at § 17-27-45(C).
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Constitution to entertain writs of habeas corpus and to "grant relief in those unusual
instances where 'there has been a violation which, in the setting, constitutes a denial of
fundamental fairness shocking to the universal sense of justice."' 370 In State v. Spann,
the South Carolina Supreme Court held that, in order to prevail on a motion for new trial,
the petitioner must show that the newly discovered evidence
(1) is such that it would probably change the result if a new trial were granted; (2) has been
discovered since the trial; (3) could not in the exercise of due diligence have been
discovered rior to the trial; (4) is material; and (5) is not merely cumulative or
impeaching.371
South Dakota
In Boyles v. Weber, the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that "[n]ewly
discovered evidence is generally an insufficient ground for habeas relief when the
evidence pertains to guilt rather than a deprivation of constitutional rights or lack of
jurisdiction." 372 The Court added that "[c]laims of actual innocence based on newly
discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief
constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal
absent an independent
37 3
proceeding."
Tennessee
The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that, under certain circumstances,
procedural bars to postconviction claims may violate due process. 374 The Court
balanced state and private interests, ultimately determining that a defendant's interest in
presenting evidence of actual innocence, particularly in a capital case, outweighed the
375
Tennessee's Post-Conviction Procedure Act376
government's interest in finality.
allows convicted individuals to assert violations377of the state or federal Constitution in
relation to their convictions to petition for relief.
Under § 40-30-102 of the Act, a prisoner may petition for relief based on new
scientific evidence which establishes that he is actually innocent. 378 Petitions filed on
this ground are exempt from the one-year filing requirement. 37 9 Section 40-30-102
380
contemplates the filing of only one petition for postconviction relief under the Act.
However, § 40-30-117 allows a petitioner to reopen his petition if the claim is based on

370. Simpson v. State, 495 S.E.2d 429, 431 n. 4 (S.C. 1998) (quoting Butler v State, 397 S.E.2d 87, 88 (S.C.
1990)).
371. 513 S.E.2d 98, 99 (S.C. 1999) (citing State v. Prince, 447 S.E.2d 177, 184 (S.C. 1993)).
372. 677 N.W.2d 531, 537 (S.D. 2004).
373 Id. (quoting Herrera,506 U.S. at 400).
374 Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100, 103 (Tenn. 2001).
375. Id.
376. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-30-101 to 40-30-122 (Lexis 2003).
377. Id. at § 40-30-103.
378. Id. at § 40-30-102(b)(2).
379. Id. at § 40-30-102(a).
380. Id. at § 40-30-102(c).
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new scientific evidence establishing actual innocence. 381 An individual may also
3 82
petition for relief under the writ of error coram nobis for newly discovered evidence.
A convicted individual also may file a petition requesting DNA analysis of evidence in
383
the state's possession.
In State v. Mixon, the Tennessee Supreme Court held:
a new trial should be granted upon the basis of newly discovered recanted testimony only
if: (1) the trial court is reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by the material
witness was false and the new testimony is true; (2) the defendant was reasonably diligent
in discovering the new evidence, or was surprised by the false testimony, or was unable to
know of the falsity of the testimony until after384
the trial; and (3) the jury might have reached
a different conclusion had the truth been told.
Texas
In State ex rel. Holmes v. Court of Appeals, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
held that the execution of an innocent person would violate the Due Process Clause of
corpus
the Fourteenth Amendment. 385 The court announced that petitions for habeas
3 86
asserting freestanding claims of actual innocence would be cognizable in Texas.
In Ex parte Elizondo, the court held that a non-capital defendant also may assert a
freestanding claim of innocence in a petition for habeas corpus. 387 The court held that a
petitioner seeking relief under habeas corpus on a freestanding claim of innocence "must
show by clear and convincing evidence
that no reasonable juror would have convicted
388
him in light of the new evidence."
Utah
Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act3 89 provides relief for individuals seeking to
vacate or modify a conviction or sentence based on newly discovered evidence. 390 A
petitioner seeking relief under the Act must assert that he was unable to present the
evidence in an earlier proceeding, that the evidence is not merely cumulative or
impeaching, and that, in light of the evidence presented at trial, the newly discovered
evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner
39 1

guilty.

Petitions based on newly discovered evidence must be made within one year from
the date that the conviction became final, that the petitioner became aware of the new
evidence, or that the petitioner should have become aware of the evidence through
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(a)(2) (Lexis 2003).
Id. at § 40-30-102.
Id. at § 40-30-303.
983 S.W.2d 661, 673 n. 17 (Tenn. 1999) (citations omitted).
885 S.W.2d 389, 397 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
Id.at 397-98.
947 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
Id.at 209 (emphasis omitted).
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-101 to 78-35a-304 (Lexis 2002).
Id. at § 78-35a-104(l)(e).
Id.
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reasonable diligence. 392 The court may excuse a petitioner's failure to file within the
3
time limitations if the interests of justice so require. 39 A petitioner may not assert a
claim raised in a prior proceeding or a claim that could have been raised in a prior
proceeding.394 A petitioner sentenced to death may not obtain relief from a court within
his execution date unless the relief is based on evidence discovered
the thirty days before
39 5
during that time.
In Gardner v. Galetka, the Utah Supreme Court held that the Post-Conviction
Remedies Act was constitutionally infirm because it limited the Court's authority to
consider successive petitions. 3 96 The Court's reasoning emphasized that the power to
petitions belonged to the 'judicial branch under the state's
review postconviction
39 7
Constitution.
convicted of a felony to petition for DNA
Utah Code § 78-35a-301 allows a person
3 98
testing in order to establish his innocence.
Vermont
Criminal Procedure Rule 33 allows a court to grant a motion for a new trial based
on newly discovered evidence if the motion is made within two years after final
judgment. 399 Vermont's postconviction statute allows a prisoner to petition for relief
from a sentence at any time if the sentence violates the federal or state Constitution or
laws, the court lacks jurisdiction, the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law,
400
Vermont courts
or the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack.
of the defendant in
innocence
guilt
or
the
however, have refused to address
40 1
postconviction relief proceedings.
Virginia
Petitions for postconviction review in Virginia are made pursuant to Virginia's
state habeas statute. 402 Section 8.01-654 requires a petition challenging a criminal
conviction to be brought within two years from the date that the judgment became
a writ based on a claim
final. 40 3 Section 8.01-654 also prevents the court from granting
4 4
0
petition.
earlier
an
in
raised
have
could
that the petitioner
In Reedy v. Wright, a Virginia circuit court held that a claim of actual innocence
could serve as a "gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his
392. Id. at § 78-35a-107(1), (2)(a), (2)(e).
393. Id. at § 78-35a-107(3).
394. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(1) (Lexis 2002).
395. Id. at § 78-35a-201.
396. 94 P.3d 263, 267 (Utah 2004).
397. Id. (citing Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Utah 1989)).
398. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-301 (Lexis 2002).
399. Vt. R. Crim. Proc. 33.
400. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 7131 (1998).
401. E.g. In re Bentley, 477 A.2d 980, 982-83 (Vt. 1984); In re Stewart, 438 A.2d 1106, 1110 (Vt. 1981).
402. Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-654 to 8.01-668 (Lexis 2000).
403 Id. at § 8.01-654(A)(2). Section 8.01-654.1 contains restrictions on when death-sentenced petitioners
may file postconviction petitions.
404 Id. at § 8.01-654(B)(2).
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otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits. ''4° 5 The
applied the federal standard, holding that a petitioner must prove:

Reedy

court

that, in light of new evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would vote

to convict. Like the plaintiff in a run-of-the-mill civil case, Reedy must prove his claim
only by the greater weight of the evidence-but what he must prove is substantial: that it is
probable that, after considering the evidence presented in support of his habeas
petition,
"no reasonable juror would have found [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ''406
Washington
Washington allows a court to vacate a conviction based on newly discovered
evidence if it is in the interest ofjustice. 40 7 For a court to grant relief, a petitioner must
demonstrate that the evidence: "(1) will probably change the result of the trial; (2) was
discovered since the trial; (3) could not have been discovered before trial by the exercise
4 08
of due diligence; (4) is material; and (5) is not merely cumulative or impeaching.',
Washington Code § 10.73.090 addresses the procedure for collateral attacks to a
conviction. 409 This section governs motions made under Rule 16.4 (newly discovered
evidence), as well as petitions for habeas corpus, motions to vacate, motions to withdraw
a guilty plea, and motions to arrest judgment. 4 1 Section 10.73.100 exempts petitions
based on newly discovered evidence from the one-year time requirement. 4 11 In order for
the exemption to apply, the petitioner must have acted4 12
with reasonable diligence in
discovering the evidence and filing the petition or motion.
West Virginia
West Virginia statutes allow for relief based on newly discovered evidence in a
petition for habeas corpus. 4 13 Under § 53-4A-1, the court may only consider
unadjudicated claims. 4 14 In addition, claims which were knowingly and intelligently
4 15
waived in a prior proceeding may not be advanced in a habeas corpus petition.
Under Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, a motion requesting a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence is exempt from the otherwise applicable ten-day filing
requirement. 4 16 For a motion for a new trial to be successful under habeas corpus or
Rule 33, the newly discovered evidence must (1) have been discovered since the trial
through the petitioner's due diligence; (2) must be new and material; (3) must not be

405. 2002 WL 598434 at *5 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 8, 2002) (quoting Herrera,506 U.S. at 404).
406. Id. (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327) (brackets in original).
407. Wash. App. R. 16.4(c)(3).
408. State v. Williams, 634 P.2d 868, 873 (Wash. 1981) (citing State v. Franks, 445 P.2d 200, 203-04
(Wash. 1968)).
409. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.73.090 (West 2002).
410. Id. at § 10.73.090(2).
411. Id. at§ 10.73.100(1).
412. Id.
413. W. Va. Code Ann. § 53-4A-I(a)(Lexis 2000).
414. Id. at § 53-4A-l(a).
415. Id. at § 53-4A-I(c).
416. W. Va. R. Crim. Proc. 33.
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merely cumulative or impeaching; and (4) must be likely to change the result of the
trial.4 17
Wisconsin
Wisconsin's postconviction statute provides relief for convictions or sentences
imposed in violation of the United States or Wisconsin Constitution. 4 18 The petitioner
must raise all grounds for available relief under this section in his original, supplemental,
or amended motion. 4 19 In State v. Ware, a Wisconsin court of appeals held:
Due process may require granting a new trial under § 974.06 on the basis of new evidence.
This is because in some situations newly discovered evidence is so compelling that it
would violate fundamental fairness not to afford a defendant a new trial at which the new
evidence could be considered. Ordinarily, whether to grant a new trial on grounds of
newly discovered evidence is a discretionary determination of the trial court. However,
whether due process4 2requires
a new trial is a constitutional question subject to independent
0
review in this court.

In order to receive a new trial, the petitioner must show that the newly discovered
evidence satisfies the following criteria:
(1) The evidence must have come to the moving party's knowledge after a trial; (2) the
moving party must not have been negligent in seeking to discover it; (3) the evidence must
be material to the issue; (4) the testimony must not be merely cumulative to the testimony
which was introduced at trial; and
(5) it must be reasonably probable that a different result
42 1
would be reached on a new trial.
Wyoming
Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 34 allows a petitioner to move for a new
422
trial based on newly discovered evidence within two years of the final judgment.
Wyoming courts have required that the evidence be discovered after trial, that it is so
material that it would probably change the verdict, and that it is not merely
cumulative. 423 In addition, the petitioner must have exercised due diligence in
424
discovering the evidence.
Wyoming's postconviction relief statute allows an incarcerated person to file a
425
motion for relief asserting a denial of his rights under the state or federal Constitution.
A petitioner seeking relief under the statute must assert questions of "constitutional

417. State v. Frazier,253 S.E.2d 534, 537 (W. Va. 1979) (citing Halstead v. Horton, 18 S.E. 953, 955 (W.
Va. 1894)).
418. Wis. Stat. Ann.§ 974.06(1)(West 1998).
419. Id.at § 974.06(4).
420. 1995 WL 302888 at *2 (Wis. App. Dist. It May 17, 1995) (citations omitted).
421. State v. Bembenek, 409 N.W.2d 432, 434 (Wis. App. Dist. 1 1987) (quoting State v. Boyce, 249 N.W.2d
758, 760 (Wis. 1977)).
422. Wyo. R. Crim. Proc. 34(b).
423. Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257, 1259-60 (Wyo. 1988) (citing Opie v. State, 422 P.2d 84, 85 (Wyo.
1967)).
424. Id.
425. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §7-14-101(b) (2005).
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magnitude which manifest a miscarriage of justice.' 4 26 In Cutbirth v. State, the
Wyoming Supreme Court acknowledged (in dicta) that a claim of actual innocence may
serve as a gateway through which a petitioner may assert an otherwise procedurally
42 7
barred claim.

426. Cutbirth, 751 P.2d at 1261 (citations omitted).
427. Id. at 1262.
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PROCEDURES FOR RAISING

CLAIMS OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE

Alabama
Distribution of Powers
The Alabama Constitution was amended in 1939 to vest authority over clemency
procedures in the state legislature. 428 The governor retains the authority to grant
reprieves and commutations only from the death penalty. 4 29 The legislature has created
the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles and vested in it the power to grant pardons in
non-capital cases. 4 30 The clemency powers granted to the Board by the legislature do
not include commutation of sentence.
Structure of Board
The Board has three members appointed by the governor and approved by the
Senate. 43 1 The appointees must be selected "from a list of five qualified persons
nominated by a board consisting of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as chairman,
the presiding judge of the Court of Criminal Appeals[,] the Lieutenant Governor, the
Speaker of the House[,] and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate.' '4 32 The members
serve six-year terms and cannot be removed except by impeachment or for
incapacitation. 433 Members are compensated and serve on a full-time basis. 434 Two
435
members of the Board constitute a quorum.
The Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles recently included four "special
members" who served a single term that ended in 2006.436 The special members were
appointed for the limited purpose of conducting hearings and making determinations
concerning clemency, paroles, and revocations. 437 During the term of the special
members, the Board sat in two panels of three. 438 Membership on each panel was
designated by the chairperson of the Board, with the chairperson serving as an alternate
440
on either panel. 4 39 Two members of each panel constituted a quorum.
Meetings set for the purpose of conducting hearings and making determinations
concerning clemency matters may be set by the chairperson, the Board, or a panel of the

428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.

Ala. Const. amend. 38, § 124.
Id.
Ala. Code §§ 15-22-20(a), 15-22-36(a) (Lexis 1995).
Id. at § 15-22-20(a), (b).
Id. at § 15-22-20(b).
Id. at § 15-22-20(c), (e).
Id. at § 15-22-20(g), (h).
Ala. Code § 15-22-20(0.
Id. at § 15-22-20(i).
Id.
Id. at § 15-22-200).
Id.
Ala. Code § 15-22-200).
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Board.

44 1

Process
The Board may grant a pardon to a person who is currently incarcerated only upon
the "unanimous affirmative vote of the [B]oard following receipt and filing of clear proof
of his . . .innocence of the crime for which he . . .was convicted and the written
approval" of the trial judge or district attorney. 44 2 Any person who was sentenced to
death but subsequently received a commutation of sentence from the governor is
ineligible for a pardon unless the Board is satisfied of the person's innocence of the
crime. 443 The Board's vote to grant the pardon must be unanimous, and the governor
444
must concur with the Board's action and approve the granting of the pardon.
Before a pardon is granted, thirty days' notice must be given to the Attorney
General, the judge and the district attorney who tried the applicant's case, the chief of
police in the city in which the crime occurred if the crime was committed in a city, the
sheriff of the county where convicted, and to the same officials of the county where the
crime occurred if different from the county of conviction. 445 When the applicant has
been convicted of certain violent offenses,
thirty days' notice must also be given to the
44 6
victim or the victim's immediate family.
Applications are considered filed simply by the applicant providing the Board a
current telephone number and address, full name, date of birth, and social security
number.447 This information may be provided in person, by telephone, or by letter.4 48
The Board states that this application process is "intended to facilitate application by
individuals who lack formal education." 449 The Board investigates thereafter and
450
supplies itself with all further necessary information.
The Board will not consider or decide whether to order or grant clemency except in
an open public meeting. 45 1 Additionally, notice of the hearing must be given to the same
persons to whom notice of the application is given. 4 52 All of these persons
must have
4 53
been allowed to appear before the Board or give their views in writing.
Board members review the file individually prior to the hearing, but Board
members may not discuss with each other their views on any case before the hearing is

441. Id.at § 15-22-23(a).
442. Id. at § 15-22-36(c).
443. Id. § 15-22-27(a).
444. Id.
445. Ala. Code § 15-22-36(d).
446. Id.at § 15-22-36(e)(1).
447. Ala. Admin. Code r. 640-X-6-.01 (2006). The applicant may provide more information to the Board,
but this information is minimally sufficient. Id.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Ala. Code § 15-22-23(b)(1); Ala. Admin. Coder. 640-X-4-.01(1); Ala. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, Rules,
Regulations, and Procedures, art. 8(1), (6), (10) (available at http://paroles.state.al.us/ALABPP/Main/
Rules.html (accessed Feb. 4, 2007)).
452. Ala. Code § 15-22-23(b)(2).
453. Id. at § 15-22-23(b)(4).
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held.4 54 Any member may then order an investigation of anything relevant to the
Board's decision. 455 Information on how to apply to the governor for a commutation of
a death sentence or on what process, if any, is given upon application and is not publicly
available.
Arizona
Distribution of Powers
The Arizona Constitution gives the governor the power to grant reprieves,
4 56
commutations, and pardons subject to restrictions and limitations as provided by law.
By statute, the governor may not grant any reprieve, commutation, or pardon except
upon the recommendation of the Board of Executive Clemency established by the
45 7
legislature.
Structure of Board
The Arizona Board of Executive Clemency consists of five members, each of
whom is appointed by the governor from a list of three candidates submitted by a
selection committee defined by statute. 458 Board members serve on a full-time basis, are
compensated, and are appointed to five-year terms on the basis of their professional and
educational qualifications and experience. 459 No more than two members from the same
professional discipline may be members at the same time. 46° The governor may remove
61
members only for cause. 46146
The chairperson is selected by the governor.46 2
The Board must meet at least once per month. 463 Three members constitute
a
4 64
quorum, but the chairperson may designate that two members constitute a quorum.
Process
Notice of an intention to apply for a pardon must be given to the county attorney of
the county where the applicant was convicted at least ten days before the Board acts
upon the application. 46 5 The applicant initiates the process by filling out and submitting
an application provided by the Board.466 If the applicant is not an inmate, the

454. Ala. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, supra n. 451, at art. 5(3), 8(1).
455. Id. at art. 5(4).
456. Ariz. Const. art. V, § 5.
457. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-402(A) (West Supp. 2005).
458. Id. at § 31-401(A) (West 2002). The selection committee is a five-member committee and is itself
appointed by the governor, but at least the director of the department of public safety and the director of the
state department of corrections must sit on it. Id.
459. Id. at § 31-401(B), (D).
460. Id, at § 31-401(B).
461. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-401(E).
462. Id. at § 31-401(F).
463. Id. at § 31-401(H).
464. Id. at § 31-401(1).
465. Id. at § 31-442(A).
466. Ariz. Admin. Code R5-4-201(B), (C) (2005).
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application is submitted directly to the Board.4 67 If the applicant is an inmate, the
application is submitted to the Department of Corrections who verifies that the inmate is
eligible to apply. 468 When an application is made for a pardon, the Board is authorized
by statute to require the judge of the court of conviction or the county attorney who
prosecuted the applicant to provide a statement of facts proved at469
trial and any other
information regarding the propriety of granting or refusing a pardon.
Once an eligible applicant has completed all application requirements, the Board
must schedule a hearing at which it votes either to deny the request for a pardon or to
recommend a pardon.4 70 If the Board recommends a pardon, members who voted in
favor must prepare a letter of recommendation for the governor that includes the reasons
for the recommendation. 47 1 Those who
opposed the pardon may send letters of dissent
4 72
to the governor if they choose to do so.
The Board's administrative rules only explicitly refer to applications for pardon,
and it has not passed any regulations concerning applications for commutations of
sentence. However, some statutory provisions exist which apply to commutation
procedures. The Board may only recommend to the governor that a sentence be
commuted after providing notice to the victim, county attorney, and presiding judge and
giving them an opportunity to be heard.473 Before recommending commutation to the
governor, the Board must find "by clear and convincing evidence that the sentence
imposed is clearly excessive given the nature of the offense and the record of the
offender and that there is a substantial
probability that when released the offender will
474
law.
the
to
conduct
his
conform"
The Board is also authorized to receive petitions from "individuals, organizations
or the department [of corrections]" for review and commutation of sentences and
pardoning of offenders in extraordinary cases. 475 If the Board unanimously recommends
commutation, its recommendation will automatically become
effective if the governor
4 76
has not acted upon it within ninety days of its submission.
Arkansas
Distribution of Powers
477
The governor has the sole power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons.
The legislature, however, regulates the procedures under which executive clemency may

467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.

Id. at R5-4-201(B).
Id. at R5-4-201(C).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-441 (West 2002).
Ariz. Admin. Code R5-4-201(E).
Id. at R5-4-201(F).
Id.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-402(C)(2).
Id.
Id. at § 31-402(C)(4).
Id. at § 31-402(D).
Ark. Const. art. VI, § 18.
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be exercised. 478 The legislature has also established the Parole Board through which all
applications for executive clemency must pass. 479 The Board's recommendations are
not binding on the governor.
Structure of Board
The Parole Board is composed of seven members who are appointed by the
governor and confirmed by the Senate. 480 Six of the members are full-time officials of
the state, one of whom is appointed chairperson by the governor. 48 1 Members serve
seven-year staggered terms such that the term of one member expires each year. 482 Four
members of the Board constitute a quorum. 48 3 Removal of Board members may only be
for good cause, which includes "[c]onduct constituting a criminal offense involving
moral turpitude; ... [g]ross dereliction of duty; . . .[g]ross abuse of authority; or...

[t]he unexcused absence of a board or commission member from three (3) successive
' 84
regular meetings without attending any intermediary called special meetings.'
Explicitly, good cause "does not include any vote, decision, opinion, or other regularly
performed or otherwise reasonably exercised power of a board or commission
4 85
member.
Process
All applications for executive clemency must be referred to the Parole Board for
investigation. 486 Prior to considering a request for a pardon or commutation, the Board
is obligated to solicit the recommendation of the convicting court, the prosecuting
attorney, and the sheriff of the county from which the person was convicted.48 7
However, these recommendations are not binding on the Board.488 Additionally, if the
applicant was convicted of certain felonies, the Board must notify the victim of the crime
or the victim's next-of-kin if he or she has filed a request for notice with the prosecuting
attorney. 4 89 In that case, the Board also must also solicit the recommendations
of the
490
victim, as well as notify him or her of the date, time, and place of the hearing.
The Parole Board's rules provide that an application for executive clemency may
be filed for any of the following reasons: "(1) to correct an injustice which may have
occurred during the person's trial; (2) life threatening medical condition that does not
qualify for Act 290; (3) to reduce an excessive sentence; (4) the person's institutional

478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-607 (Lexis 2006).
Id. at § 16-93-204(a).
Id. at § 16-93-201(a)(1).
Id. at § 16-93-201(a)(2).
Id. at § 16-93-201(a)(3).
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-201(d).
Id. at § 25-16-804(a)(1), (b)(1) (Lexis 2002).
Id. at § 25-16-804(a)(2).
Id. at § 16-93-204(a)(3).
Id. at § 16-93-204(d)(1).
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-204(d)(4).
Id. at § 16-93-204(d)(2)(A).
Id. at § 16-93-204(d)(2)(B), (d)(5).
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adjustment has been exemplary, and the ends of justice have been achieved. ' A91 Board
members then vote to either recommend denial of clemency or schedule a hearing before
the Board.4 92 If the Board schedules a hearing, it must notify the victim of the date,
time, and place of the hearing.4 93 The applicant appears before the Board, along with his
attorney, if any, and supporters. 494 In making its decision, the Board considers the
statements of the applicant, the applicant's file, the officer's report and pre-sentence
495
report, and any documentary evidence presented by interested persons.
A person sentenced to death must apply for executive clemency no later than
twenty-one days prior to any execution date. 49 6 The application for clemency is
investigated by the Board, and either the Board or a designated panel will interview the
49 7
applicant at least seven days before the execution.
After its decision is made, the Board "submit[s] to the Governor its
recommendation, a report of the investigation, and all other information [it] may have
regarding the applicant.' '4 98 If the governor chooses to grant an application for pardon or
commutation, he or she must file notice of that intention with the Secretary of State at
least thirty days before granting the application. 499 Additionally, the governor must
"direct the Department of Correction to send notice of his or her intention to the judge,
the prosecuting attorney, and the sheriff of the county in which the applicant was
convicted, and, if applicable, to the victim or the victim's next of kin." 500 Failure to
provide these notices renders the grant void.50 1
If the governor does not grant a pardon or commutation within 240 days of the
recommendation, the application is deemed denied.50 2 Any pardon or commutation
50 3
granted after the 240-day period is deemed void.
California
Distribution of Powers
The California Constitution vests in the governor the power to grant executive
clemency subject to application procedures provided by statute. 50 4 The governor cannot
grant clemency to anyone twice convicted of a felony except on the recommendation of
the California Supreme Court, with at least four judges agreeing. 50 5 Whenever the

491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497
498.
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.

Code Ark. R. 158.00.001, XVII1(2) (Weil 2006).
Id. at XVII(3).
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-91-204(d)(5)(A).
Code Ark. R. 158.00.00 1, XVIII(5).
Id.
Id. at XVIII(1).
Id. at XVIII(6).
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-204(b).
Id. at § 16-93-207(a)(1)(A) (Lexis 2006).
Id. at § 16-93-207(a)(1)(B)(i).
Id. at § 16-93-207(a)(2).
Id. at § 16-93-207(b).
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-207(b).
Cal. Const. art. V, § 8(a).
Id.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2006

51

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 42 [2006], Iss. 2, Art. 5

TULSA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 42:277

governor makes the decision to grant clemency, he or she must 50furnish
the state
6
legislature with a written statement describing the reasons for doing so.
The legislature has authorized the Board of Parole Hearings, when requested by
the governor, to investigate, report, and make recommendations on all applications of
clemency. 507 The Board is also authorized to report to the governor the names of
persons imprisoned whom it believes ought to have a commutation of sentence or be
of sentence, or any other cause,
pardoned on account of good conduct, unusual 50term
8
including evidence of battered woman syndrome.
Structure of Board
The California Board of Parole Hearings is composed of seventeen commissioners
5 9
who are appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the State Senate. 0
Each commissioner serves for a term of three years, and the terms are staggered.5 1 °
Commissioners may be reappointed. 511 The selection of commissioners must "reflect as
nearly as possible a cross section of the racial, sexual, economic, and geographic features
of the population of the state." 512 Commissioners are full-time employees and receive
an annual salary. 5 13 Commissioners may be removed by the governor only for
misconduct, incompetence, or neglect of duty and only after a full hearing before the
5 14
Board of Corrections.
5 15
The Board may meet and transact business in panels consisting of three persons.
To be valid, an action must be approved by majority vote of those present. 5 16 The Board
may employ deputy commissioners to whom it may assign the duty of hearing cases and
making decisions. 517 Finally, the Board has the power to employ assistants, take
testimony, examine witnesses under oath, administer oaths, and "do any and all things
necessary to make a full and complete investigation of and concerning all applications
5 18
referred to it."
Process
Notice of intention to apply for a pardon must be signed by the applicant and
served on the district attorney of the county of conviction at least ten days before the
governor acts on the application. 5 19 An affidavit showing proof of service must be given

506.
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.

Id.
Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§ 4812, 5075(a) (West 2000 & West Supp. 2006).
Id. at § 480 1(a) (West Supp. 2006).
Id. at § 5075(b).
Id.
Id.
Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 5075(b).
Id. at § 5076 (West 2000).
Id. at § 5081.
Id. at § 5076.1.
Id.
Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 5076.1.
Id. at § 4812 (West 2000).
Id. at § 4804.
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to the governor.
Every application for clemency must be accompanied by a full statement of any
compensation being paid to any person for assisting the effort. 52 1 Failure to do so results
in denial of the application. 522 Additionally,
the person receiving compensation must
523
file a statement with the governor.
Application for clemency is made to the governor on forms provided by that
office; the governor then transmits the application to the Board. 524 Only in the case of a
person twice convicted of felony, however, is the governor statutorily obligated to
525
transmit it to the Board of Parole Hearings.
The governor or Board may require the judge of the court of conviction or the
district attorney who prosecuted the case to provide a summarized statement of the facts
proved at trial, as well as any other facts bearing on the propriety of granting or refusing
the application. 526 Upon request, the judge and district attorney must also provide their
527
recommendations on the application and the associated reasons.
Before meeting en banc to consider the application, the Board assigns a deputy
commissioner to complete a background investigation and submit a written report. 528 In
all cases referred to it by the governor, the full Board (rather than a panel) considers the
application and decides upon the recommendation. 529 When conducting its review, the
Board is required to examine the inmate's application, the record of judicial proceedings
in the case, and all other documents submitted with the application. 53 The Board's
recommendation, along with all associated documents, is then transmitted to the
53
governor. 1
If the applicant has not been convicted of more than one felony, the governor may
grant or deny the clemency request after he or she receives the Board's
recommendation. 5 32 However, in cases in which the applicant has been convicted of two
or more felonies,
the California Supreme Court must also approve the grant of
53 3
clemency.
The California Supreme Court treats clemency applications as a court proceeding.
When applications come before the court from the governor, they are given a file
number. 534 The fact that the application has been filed is public, but, because the
documents that the governor transmits may have confidential information within them,

520.
521.
522.
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.

Id.
id. at § 4807.2.
Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 4807.2.
Id. at § 4807.3 (West 2000).
Personal communication from representative of the governor's office to authors.
Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 4802 (West 2000).
Id. at § 4803.
Id.
Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2818 (2006).
Id.
Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 4812.
Id. at § 4813 (West 2000) (applying to twice-convicted felons).
Cal. Const. art. V, § 8(a).
Id.
Cal. Sup. Ct., Internal Operating Practices & Procedures, XIV(A) (Aug. 25, 2004).
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the files themselves are not made available to the public. 535 The Court appoints an
attorney for the applicant if he is indigent, and the attorney is compensated for the
536
representation.
The Court denies applications unless granting clemency is recommended by at
least four Justices. 537 If clemency is granted, the Chief Justice informs the governor by
letter of the Court's recommendation, and the clerk transmits the record to the governor's
53 8
office.
The governor is not bound by any recommendations from the Board or the
California Supreme Court. Therefore, he or she may deny an application even if
recommended by both the Board and the Supreme Court. The only limit on the
governor's clemency power is that the recommendation of the Supreme Court (but not
the Board) is required before he or she may grant clemency to a person with more than
one felony conviction.
Importantly, the California Habeas Corpus Resource Center, created by the
appeals, is
California legislature to represent death-sentenced inmates in postconviction 539
also authorized to assist such inmates in the preparation of clemency petitions.
Colorado
Distribution of Powers
The governor has the constitutional power to grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons after conviction. 54 The legislature is given the authority to regulate the manner
of applying for pardons. 54 1 In every instance in which the governor exercises the
clemency power, he or she must send to the legislature at its next session a transcript of
the petition, all proceedings, and the reasons for the action taken. 542 Colorado statutory
law "fully authorizes" the governor to commute a death sentence to imprisonment for life
54 3
or for a term of not less than twenty years at hard labor.
Structure of Board
The Colorado Executive Clemency Advisory Board is a non-statutory agency
created by the governor that is subject to no law or administrative guidelines dictating
how it must conduct itself.544 It consists of seven unpaid volunteer members appointed
by the governor, and the governor consults it when making decisions concerning
545
executive clemency.
535.
536.
537.
538.
539.
540.
541.
542.
543.
544.
545.

Id.
Id. at XV(A), (D).
id. at XIV(A).
Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 4852 (West 2000); Cal. Sup. Ct., supra n. 534, at XIV(A).
Cal. Govt, Code Ann. § 68661(a) (West Supp. 2006).
Colo. Const. art. IV, § 7.
Id.
Id.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-17-101 (Lexis 2006).
Personal communication from representative of the governor's office to authors.
Id.
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Process
An application for a pardon or commutation of sentence must be "accompanied by
a certificate of the respective superintendent of the correctional facility, showing the
conduct of an applicant during his confinement .. .together with such evidences of

former good character as the applicant may be able to produce." 54 6 Before the governor
approves the application, it must first be submitted to the district attorney of the district
of conviction, to the judge who sentenced the applicant, and to the attorney who actually
prosecuted the applicant, if available, who each have ten days from the receipt of the
application to comment. 54 7 "Good character previous to conviction, good conduct
during confinement in the correctional facility, the statements of the sentencing judge
and the district attorneys, if any, and any other material concerning the merits of the
application" are to be given "such weight" as the governor thinks proper in the particular
case, as is evidence that the applicant has reformed. 548 The governor has sole discretion
in evaluating any comments and in soliciting whatever other comments he or she deems
9

appropriate. 54
The governor's office also maintains its own set of eligibility criteria for the
exercise of the commutation power. First, the inmate must have served at least ten years
or one-third of his sentence, whichever is less. 550 Nor can the inmate be within fifteen
months of parole eligibility. 55 1 Second, the inmate must not have committed any major
violations of the Colorado Code of Penal Discipline within the two years prior to
552
applying, and all inmates who are housed in administrative segregation are ineligible.
Third, if the inmate was on probation at the time that the crime being proposed for
clemency was committed, the inmate is ineligible for a commutation. 55 3 Fourth, all
inmates with pending criminal charges are ineligible to apply. 554 Finally, the inmate
555
must have no pending appeals and must have exhausted all other judicial remedies.
The governor or the Director of the Department of Corrections may waive any of these
requirements in the event that the inmate has "catastrophic" medical or health problems
or in exceptionally unique situations (such as "heroism," extreme disparity between the
crime the offender committed and the sentence received, or the inmate has been
5 56
rehabilitated).
An inmate may obtain an application for executive clemency through the inmate's
case manager or by contacting the governor's office directly. 557 All applicants for

546. Id. at § 16-17-102 (Lexis 2006).
547. Id.
548. Id.
549. Id.
550. Crim. J. Policy Found., Clemency: Colorado, http://www.cjpf.org/clemency/Coloradoprint.html (last
updated Jan. 17, 2007).
551. Id.
552. Id
553. Id.
554. Id.
555. Crim. J.Policy Found., supra n. 550.
556. Id.
557. Id.
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executive clemency must also complete the Executive Clemency Advisory Board's
Application Eligibility Criteria for Commutation of Sentence and Character
Certificate. 558 Several other documents must be submitted with an inmate's application
for executive clemency. These include (1) a personal letter to the governor stating the
specific reasons for which clemency is sought; (2) the inmate's most recent Performance
Review Summary; 559 (3) the inmate's Admission Data Summary and Diagnostic
Summary; 560 (4) all psychological/psychiatric evaluations made of the inmate while he
has been incarcerated; (5) reports of all disciplinary actions taken against the inmate,
including any investigative reports if applicable; (6) the inmate's most recent time
computation; (7) the inmate's FBI record of arrest; (8) all of the inmate's
detainers/notifications requests and other pertinent law enforcement communications; (9)
the inmate's pre-sentence report or offense report; (10) if serious medical or mental
health problems exist, a report containing the diagnosis, prognosis, and
recommendations; and (11) any additional1 documents that the inmate feels will help the
56
governor make his or her final decision.
Applications are routinely sent to the Colorado Executive Clemency Advisory
Board for evaluation and recommendation. 562 The governor, however, has sole
563
authority to grant or deny clemency in any case.
Connecticut
Distribution of Powers
The power to grant reprieves rests with the governor in all cases except
impeachment, but that power lasts only until the end of the General Assembly's next
session. 564 The legislature has created the Board of Pardons and Paroles, which is
authorized to grant pardons and commutations, conditioned or absolute, including
commutations of death sentences. 565 Until 2004, Connecticut separated clemency and
parole functions, placing responsibility for executive clemency in the Board of
56 6
Pardons.

558. Id.
559. The Performance Review Summary is an annual report compiled for each inmate detailing his or her
progress in the areas of work and training, group living (e.g., cooperation, personal hygiene), participation in
counseling, and progress towards the goals set for the inmate by the correctional diagnostic program. Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 17-22.5-302(1) (Lexis 2006). If an inmate's Performance Review Summary is more than ninety
days old, a new summary must be compiled by the Department of Corrections before an inmate may apply for
clemency. Crim. J. Policy Found., supra n. 550.
560. The Admission Data Summary is a summary of the inmate's background compiled by the Department
of Corrections when the inmate first enters prison. The Diagnostic Summary is a report compiled when the
inmate enters prison concerning his mental state. Personal communication from representative of the
governor's office to authors.
561. Crim. J. Policy Found., supra n. 550.
562. Id.
563. Id
564. Conn. Const. art. IV, § 13.
565. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-124a(f) (West Supp. 2006).
566. Id. at § 54-124(e).
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Structure of Board
The Board is situated within the Department of Correction for administrative
purposes only. 567 The governor appoints the Board's thirteen members with the consent
of either house of the legislature. 568 The governor is obligated to appoint members so
that the Board may "reflect the racial diversity of the state." 569 From the Board's
members, the governor appoints a chairperson, who is compensated and serves full
time. 57 Other members are paid per diem for each day spent in the performance of their
duties. 57 1 Board members serve coterminous with the governor or until a successor is
chosen.

57 2

Five members of the Board are assigned exclusively to hear pardon
applications. 573 Seven are assigned exclusively to parole hearings, while the chairperson
may serve both on parole and pardons panels. 574 With the exception of the chairperson,
once a member is assigned to pardon hearings, he or she may not be subsequently
assigned to parole hearings, and vice versa. 575 Each pardons panel is composed of three
members. 576 For hearings on commutations of death sentences, one member of the
panel must be the chairperson. 577 The Board must hold a pardons hearing at least once
578
every three months.
Process
The legislature has passed some procedural rules that the Board is obligated to
follow, but the new Board itself has not yet promulgated any regulations regarding how
clemency petitions are processed.
Generally, when considering whether to grant a commutation or pardon, the Board
must permit any victim of the crime to appear before it and make a statement for the
record. 579 Rather than appearing before the Board, the victim may submit a written
statement, which the Board must make part of the record at the session. 58 Additionally,
the Board may institute inquiries as to the previous history or character of any prisoner,
and each prosecuting officer, judge, police officer, or other person must, when requested,
provide to the Board whatever information he or she possesses with reference to the
58 1
"habits, disposition, career and associates of any prisoner."

567.
568.
569.
570.
571.
572.
573.
574.
575.
576.
577.
578.
579.
580.
581.

Id. at § 54-124a(a).
Id.
Id.
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-124a(a), (c).
Id. at § 54-124a(c).
Id. at § 54-124a(b).
Id. at § 54-124a(e).
Id.
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-124a(e).
Id.
Id.
Id. at § 54-124a(k).
Id. at § 18-27a(b) (West Supp. 2006).
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 18-27a(b).
Id. at § 18-30 (West Supp. 2006).
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Delaware
Distribution of Powers
The governor has the power to grant reprieves, commutations of sentence, and
He or she may only exercise this power, however, upon the
pardons. 582
recommendation of a majority of the Delaware Board of Pardons. 583 There is an
exception for reprieves of less than six months' duration, which do not require
recommendations from the Board.58 4
Structure of Board
The composition of the Delaware Board of Pardons is set by the Delaware
Constitution. Its members are the Chancellor, Lieutenant-Governor, Secretary of State,
State Treasurer, and Auditor of Accounts. 585 The Board has the power to issue
of witnesses and the production of such documents
subpoenas requiring the attendance
586
necessary for its investigations.
Process
When a convicted person applies for a pardon, the Board must notify the Superior
Court and the Attorney General, who in turn notify each person who was a victim or
witness of the offense for which the person was convicted.58 7 The time, date, and place
of the Board's hearing must be included in the notice to victims and witnesses. 588 Both
victims and witnesses may either testify before the Board or submit a written
589
statement.
Before the Board may consider an application for pardon or commutation of
sentence from a person convicted of certain felonies, a psychiatrist and a psychologist
must have examined the applicant within the year preceding consideration of the
application. 590 The psychiatrist and psychologist who examine the applicant submit to
the Board their opinions as to the mental and emotional health of the applicant and their
59 1
opinions as to the probability of the applicant again committing any crime if released.
The applicant must give written notice of his application for a reprieve, pardon, or

582. Del. Const. art. VII, § 1.
583. Id
584. Id.
585. Id at art. VII, § 2.
586. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4361(a) (Lexis 2001).
587. Id. at § 4361(d).
588. Id.
589. Id.
590. Id. at § 4362(b). Those crimes are an act causing death; sexual offenses; kidnapping and related
offenses; arson and related offenses; burglary in the first degree; burglary in the second degree; robbery;
offenses relating to children and incompetents; cruelty to animals; abusing a corpse; unlawful use of an
incendiary device, bomb or other explosive device; abuse of children; distribution of a controlled substance to a
person under eighteen; or for an attempt as provided by statute to commit any of these crimes. Del. Code Ann.
tit. 1I, § 4362(a).
591. Id. at § 4362(c).
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commutation to (1) the sentencing judge; (2) the Attorney General; (3) the chief of police
having jurisdiction of the place where the crime occurred; and (4) the Superintendent of
the Delaware State Police. 592 Board hearings are open to the public; however, the Board
may consider matters and arrive at decisions in executive sessions. 593 At hearings, the
Board hears those individuals and receives that material "it considers desirable to
discharge its functions to hold a full hearing." 594 The Board also considers the trial
transcript, affidavits, and letters from the judge and jury who tried the case, the
prosecuting attorney, responsible persons in the community where the crime was
committed, and persons who were present at the trial.5 95
No application is considered if there are any judicial proceedings pending
concerning the matter.596 Exceptions are made for cases involving capital punishment or
for other urgent reasons. 59 7 Additionally, a majority of the Board may waive any of its
administrative rules when good cause is shown for adopting other procedures for any
59 8
particular application.
Florida
Distribution of Powers
The Florida Constitution vests the power of executive clemency in the
governor. 599 On his or her own and by executive order, the governor may grant
reprieves, but these may not extend for more than sixty days.600 In order to grant full or
conditional pardons and commute sentences, the governor must have the approval of
60 1
three of his or her cabinet members.
Structure of Board
The Office of Executive Clemency was established by the governor's office in
1975 to process clemency applications. 60 2 The Board relies on the Florida Parole
Commission to investigate applications and to report to it the circumstances, criminal
records, and social, physical, mental, and psychiatric conditions and histories of
applicants. 603 All records developed by any state entity pursuant to an investigation into
an application for executive clemency are classified and may only be released with the

592. Board of Pardons R. 2(d) (available at http://www.state.de.us/sos/pardrule.shtml (amend. Jan. 22,
2004)).
593 Id. at R. 5(a).
594. Id. at R. 6(a).
595. Id. at R. 6(b).
596. Id. at R. 7(a).
597. Board of Pardons R. 7(a).
598. Id. at R. 10.
599. Fla. Const. art IV, § 8(a).
600. Id.
601. Id.
602. See Fla. Admin. Code Ann. tit. 27, app. (2006); Rules of Executive Clemency, http://fpc.state.fl.us/
Policies/ExecClemency/ROEC 12092004 (Dec. 9, 2004).
603. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 947.13(d)-(e) (West Supp. 2006).
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60 4

Process
Eligibility for executive clemency depends upon the type of clemency requested.
For example, a person may not apply for a pardon unless he has completed all sentences
imposed and all conditions of supervision expired at least ten years ago. 6° 5 The
applicant must not have any outstanding detainers, outstanding victim restitution, or
pecuniary penalties totaling more than $1,000 resulting from any criminal conviction or
traffic infraction. 60660For a commutation, a waiver of eligibility must be obtained. 60 7
he or she deems to have exceptional merit on an
Any Board member may place a case
6 °8
upcoming agenda for consideration.
An Application for Executive Clemency can be obtained from the Coordinator 60of9
the Office of Executive Clemency or by downloading it from the Office's website.
The completed application is filed with the Coordinator along with certified copies of the
indictment, judgment, and sentence for each felony conviction. 6 10 The inmate may also
include other documents that are relevant to the application, including character
references and letters of support. 611 When the Coordinator receives the application, he
or she must make reasonable attempts to notify the victim (or the victim's family
members), the prosecuting attorney, the Office of the Statewide Prosecutor, and the
6 12
Office of the Attorney General, Bureau of Advocacy and Grants.
When an inmate has been sentenced to death, an application for executive
clemency may only be filed within one year of the date that his last appeal is rejected 6by
13
the Florida Supreme Court or by the United States Supreme Court, whichever is later.
6 14
The Florida Parole Commission receives completed application for investigation.
Once an investigation is complete, the Coordinator places the case on the agenda
for consideration by the Clemency Board. 6 15 The Board holds meetings during the
months of March, June, September, and December, but the governor may call a special
meeting at any time for any reason. 6 16 Inmates applying for clemency are not required

604. Id. at § 14.28 (West 2003).
605. Rules of Executive Clemency, supra n. 602, at § 5(I)(A). Although the eligibility requirements for a
pardon suggest that only people who have completed their sentences may apply, the rules' definition of a full
pardon contemplates those who are still serving a sentence, as part of the relief included in the pardon
"unconditionally releases a person from punishment." Id. at § 4(I)(A). An inmate may seek to waive eligibility
requirements if at least two years have elapsed since his conviction or at any time if he demonstrates
extraordinary merit. Id. at § 8(1)(A). A waiver may only be granted by the governor with the approval of at
least one Board member. Id.
606. Id. at § 5(I)(A).
607. Rules of Executive Clemency, supra n. 602, at § 5(l)(B).
608. Id. at § 17(A).
609. Id. at § 6(1)(A).
610. Id. at § 6(I)(B).
611. Id.
612. Rules of Executive Clemency, supra n. 602, at § 6(11).
613. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 940.03 (West 2006).
614. Rules ofExecutive Clemency, supra n. 602, at § 7.
615. Id. at § 10(A).
616. Id. at§ II(A).
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to appear before the Board, but they are encouraged to do so; the inmate, or anyone
speaking on his behalf, must notify the Office of Executive Clemency of the intention to
appear at least ten days before the scheduled Board meeting. 6 17 No person is allowed
more than five minutes to present his case, and the total cumulative time allowed for all
presentations in favor of an applicant is ten minutes. 6 18 Likewise, presentations
opposing the application are limited to a total of ten minutes. 6 19 At the hearing, the
inmate's counsel and the state are each allotted ten minutes to present their arguments,
and representatives of the victim's family are allowed to speak for a cumulative time of
five minutes. 62 After the Board hearing, the governor may decide to grant clemency
1
with the approval of at least two members of the Board. 62
A person who has been
622
denied clemency may not reapply for a period of two years.
Special rules apply to commutation applications in death penalty cases. There are
no eligibility requirements for consideration of an application for commutation of a death
sentence to a life sentence. 623 In all cases where an applicant is facing the death penalty,
the Parole Commission can conduct a "thorough and detailed investigation into all
factors relative to the issue of clemency" in order to provide the Board with a final
report. 624 The Rules of Executive Clemency suggest that the investigation should
consist of a series of interviews with the inmate (who is allowed to have counsel
6 25
present), the trial attorneys, the trial judge, and the inmate's family members.
However, the Commission may investigate further if the members feel it is
626
appropriate.
The investigation begins at the time designated by the governor or, if the governor
does not designate a time, when the applicant's opportunities for postconviction relief
have effectively been exhausted. 62 7 The Commission employs a Capital Punishment
Research Specialist who tracks the legal progress of death penalty cases. 628 If the
Commission conducts an investigation, it must notify the Attorney General's Office,
629
which, in turn, notifies the victim or victim's family and requests written comments.
Once the Commission has completed its investigation, those commissioners who
personally interviewed the inmate produce a final report that is submitted to the members

617. Id. at§ I1(B).
618. Id. at § II(C).
619. Rules of Executive Clemency, supra n. 602, at§ 11(C).
620. Id.
621. Id. at § 4.
622. Id. at § 14.
623. Id.at § 15.
624. Rules of Executive Clemency, supra n. 602, at § 15(B).
625. Id. at§ 15(B).
626. Id.
627. Id. at § 15(C). Specifically, investigation begins immediately after the applicant's federal petition for
writ of habeas corpus has been denied by the United States Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals if all appeals
have been timely filed. Id. The investigation commences immediately upon any failure to timely file the initial
motion for postconviction review in state court or any related appeal and likewise upon any failure to timely
file an initial petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court or any related appeal. Rules of Executive
Clemency, supra n. 602, at § 15(C).
628. Id.
629. Id. at§ 15(B).
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of the Clemency Board. 630 The report must include statements made by the inmate
during the investigation, a detailed summary from each of the commissioners who
interviewed the inmate, and all information gathered during the investigation. 6 3 1 The
report is submitted to the Board within 120 days of632the commencement of the
investigation, unless the governor extends the time period.
Like non-death penalty cases, once an investigation is complete, the Coordinator
places the case on the agenda for the next scheduled meeting. 633 In death penalty cases,
however, any member of the Board may, after receiving the report of the Parole
Commission, request a specially called meeting. 634 At the hearing in a death penalty
case, the inmate's counsel and the state are each allotted fifteen minutes to present their
arguments, and representatives of the victim's family are allowed to speak for a
cumulative time of five minutes. 635 The governor may extend these time limits at his or
636
her discretion.
Georgia
Distribution of Powers
The Georgia Constitution creates a State Board of Pardons and Paroles and vests it
with the power of executive clemency subject to certain limitations. 637 One such
limitation is that once the Board has commuted an inmate's sentence from death to life in
prison, no authority exists to pardon or parole the individual until he has served at least
twenty-five years in prison. 638 A second limitation is that where the legislature has
provided for mandatory minimum sentences for certain violent offenses, no authority
commute the sentences of an individual during the mandatory portion
exists to pardon or
6 39
sentence.
the
of
Additionally, the legislature is constitutionally empowered to create sentences of
life without parole for persons convicted of murder and for persons who have previously
been convicted of certain violent offenses. 64 When such a sentence is imposed, the
630. Id. at § 15(D).
631. Id.
632. Rules of Executive Clemency, supra n. 602, at § 15(D).
633. Id. at § 15(E).
634. Id.
635. Id. at § 15(H).
636. Id.
637. Ga. Const. art. IV, § II, l(a).
638. Id. at art. IV, § 11, II(b)(1).
639. Id. at art. IV, § 1I, 11(b)(2). The offenses for which such mandatory minimum sentencing laws can be
passed are armed robbery, kidnapping, rape, aggravated child molestation, aggravated sodomy, and aggravated
sexual battery. Id. Mandatory minimum sentencing laws may only be passed by a two-thirds majority in each
branch of the General Assembly. Id. The Georgia legislature has taken advantage of this provision. Ga. Code.
Ann. § 17-10-6.1 (2004).
640. Ga. Const. art. IV, § II, 11(b)(3). The legislature may provide for a sentence of life without parole
upon any conviction for murder or upon the second conviction for any of the following offenses: murder,
armed robbery, kidnapping, rape, aggravated child molestation, aggravated sodomy, and aggravated sexual
battery. Id. A sentence of life without parole may only be enacted by a two-thirds majority in each branch of
the General Assembly. Id. The Georgia legislature has passed such a law imposing sentences of life without
parole for the commission of serious violent felonies. Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-7(b)(2) (2004).
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Board has no authority to pardon or commute the sentence of the individual so
sentenced.64 1 The Georgia Constitution also reserves to the legislature the power to
prohibit the Board from granting a pardon or to prescribe the terms of a pardon granted
to any person who is incarcerated a second time for an offense for which the person
could have been sentenced to life imprisonment as well as to any person who has
received consecutive life sentences as a result of offenses occurring during the same
64 2
series of acts.
In cases where an inmate has been sentenced to death, the chairperson of the Board
has the power to halt an execution for the amount of time that it takes for the Board to
consider the inmate's application for executive clemency. 64 3 The Georgia Constitution
also provides that, if an inmate can prove his innocence, the Board may grant the inmate
a full pardon regardless of any limitations placed on the Board by other provisions of the
64 4
constitution.
Structure of the Board
The Board of Pardons and Paroles consists of five members who are appointed by
the governor and confirmed by the Senate to serve a seven-year term. 645 The members
of the Board select one of their own to serve as chairperson of the Board for the
following year. 646 The Board's members serve full time at a salary set by the
governor. 647 Members of the Board may be removed for cause or for incapacitation. 648
Process
In Georgia, "[a] pardon is a declaration of record that a person is relieved from the
legal consequences of a particular conviction. It restores civil and political rights and
removes all legal disabilities resulting from the conviction." 64 9 Any person who proves
innocence of the crime for which he was convicted may be granted a pardon; when new
evidence is available to prove a person's complete justification or lack of guilt, that
evidence may be the basis for the pardon. 650 A written application can be submitted to
the Board at any time after conviction. 6 51 In all cases other than those involving the
innocence of the convicted person, a pardon will only be granted to one who has
641. Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-7(b)(2).
642. Ga. Const. art. IV, § I1,
1 11(c). The Georgia legislature has used this power as well. For example, any
person who is convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment and who has been previously
incarcerated under a life sentence must serve at least twenty-five years before the Board may grant him a
pardon. Ga. Code. Ann. § 42-9-39(b) (1997).
643. Ga. Const. art. IV, § II, II(d).
644. Id. at art. IV, § 11, ll(e).
645. Id. at art. IV, § 11, 1.
646. Ga. Code Ann. § 42-9-6(a) (1997).
647. Id. at § 42-9-5 (Supp. 2006).
648. Id. at §§ 42-9-12, 42-9-14 (1997). A "removal committee" composed of the governor, the lieutenant
governor, and one other appointee of the governor other than the attorney general can pass regulations
regarding the procedures to be observed in removing members of the Board for cause and in determining what
conduct by a Board member constitutes cause for removal. Id. at § 42-9-14(a)-(c).
649. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs r. 475-3-.10(3) (1985).
650. Id. at r. 475-3-.10(3)(a).
651. Id.
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completed his full sentence obligation, including serving any probated sentence and
6 52
paying any fine, and who has since gone five years without any criminal involvement.
An application for a commutation of a death sentence to life in prison may be
made to the Board in writing, and the only content requirement is that the application
state the reasons for which a commutation is requested.653 Once the Board receives the
application, it decides whether or not to consider the inmate for a commutation and must
make a decision after the inmate has exhausted all of his appeals through the courts or
within seventy-two hours of the inmate's scheduled execution date regardless of any
pending appeals. 654 Before the inmate's last appeal, the Board will obtain information
concerning the offense for which the inmate was convicted, as well as the inmate's
criminal history. 655 If the Board does not have sufficient time to consider an inmate's
application, it may suspend the inmate's execution for a period not to exceed
ninety days
657
656
Hearings are not mandatory.
in order to allow time for a proper review.
In non-death penalty cases, the Board will consider a request for a commutation
"only when substantial evidence is submitted to the Board in writing that the sentence is
either excessive, illegal, unconstitutional or void; that the ends of justice would be best
served thereby[;] and that such action would be in the best interests of society and the
65 8
inmate."
By statute, when considering "any case within its power," the Board must consider
at least the following information: (1) a report by the superintendent of the correctional
institution in which the person has been confined outlining the conduct of the person
while incarcerated; (2) the results of any physical and mental examinations that may
have been conducted; (3) the apparent response made to efforts to improve the person's
social attitude; (4) the person's work record while confined, including the nature of that
work and a recommendation for appropriate work at which the person can succeed if
released; and (5) the person's educational level, based on standard reading tests, and
educational programs attended. 65 9 The Board may also conduct other investigations it
66 °
deems necessary to be fully informed about the person.
When considering a final decision to grant executive clemency, the Board must
give twenty days' advance notice to the victim and provide an opportunity for the victim
to file a written objection. 66 1 The Board will be relieved of the duty to notify the victim
if the victim has not previously expressed an objection to release and has neither
662
requested notification nor provided current contact information.
Decisions are made by a majority vote of the Board. 663 Georgia statutory law
652.
653.
654.
655.
656.
657.
658.
659.
660.
661.
662.
663.

Id. at r. 475-3-.10(3)(b).
Id. at r. 475-3-.10(2)(b).
Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. R. 475-3-.10(2)(b).
Id.
Ga. Code Ann. § 42-9-20 (1997); Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. R. 475-3-.10(2)(b).
Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 475-3-.10(2)(b).
Id. at r. 475-3-.10(2)(c).
Ga. Code Ann. § 42-9-43(a) (1997).
Id.
Id.at § 17-17-13 (2004).
Id.
Id.at §§ 42-9-20, 42-9-42(a) (1997).
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341

stresses that, notwithstanding any contrary
laws, the Board may pardon anyone whose
664
innocence is determined after conviction.
Idaho
Distribution of Powers
The Idaho Constitution creates a board of pardons named by statute as the Idaho
Commission of Pardons and Parole. 6 65 This Commission is vested with the authority to
grant commutations and pardons in all cases to the extent provided by statute. 666 The
legislature retains the power to prescribe the sessions of the Commission, the application
process, and procedural regulations of the Commission. 667 The governor has the power
to grant reprieves in all cases, but the reprieves granted cannot extend beyond the next
session of the Commission, during which the Commission is to make a determination
with respect to the reprieve or grant of a pardon or commutation. 66 8 By statute, the
Commission's actions on pardons and commutations "with respect to sentences for
murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, kidnapping, lewd and lascivious conduct with a
minor child, and manufacture or delivery of controlled substances" constitute only
6 69
recommendations that must be submitted to the governor for approval.
Structure of Board
The Commission is composed of five compensated, part-time members who are
appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the Idaho Senate and serve at
the governor's pleasure. 67
Not more than three members may be from the same
political party. 6 71 The Commission has an executive director, who is also appointed by
the governor and is a full-time employee. 672 The executive director is the Commission's
official representative and is responsible for the day-to-day management and
administration of Commission business as well as scheduling hearing sessions at times
673
that are convenient to the members.
Process
A request for commutation is initiated by submitting a petition, which cannot
exceed four pages in length, to the Commission in the form provided by it and signed by
the inmate. 674 It must contain the reason the commutation is requested and the

664.
665.
666.
667.
668.
669.
670.
671.
672.
673.
674.

Ga. Code Ann. § 42-9-39(d).
Idaho Const. art. IV, § 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Idaho Code Ann. § 20-240 (Lexis 2004).
Id. at § 20-2 10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Idaho Admin. Code r. 50.01.01.450.01(a), (j) (2006).
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modification of the sentence that is sought. 6 75 Generally, petitions are scheduled for
consideration at one of the Commission's quarterly sessions; however, the Commission
may choose to consider them at any time. 676 Scheduling of hearings is completely at the
discretion of the Commission. 677 If a hearing is scheduled, notice is published in a
newspaper in Boise, Idaho, once a week for the four weeks immediately before the
hearing. 678 A copy of the notice is also mailed to the prosecuting attorney of the county
68
of conviction. 679 Deliberation on the petition is conducted in executive session. 0
In death penalty cases, the Commission maintains an individual file of each person
under such sentence. 68 1 At any time, the Commission may review the file or interview
the inmate without activating the commutation process, 682 which can only be done by
the inmate or his counsel. 6 83 The Commission may elect to receive and consider a
684
petition for commutation of death sentence at any time.
An application for pardon will not be considered until either three or five years
have elapsed since the inmate has been discharged for custody, depending on the nature
of the offense. 685 To initiate the process, an application obtained from the Commission
is completed and returned. 66886 The applicant can attach letters of recommendation or
other supporting documents. 687 When an application is received, the Commission
requests an investigation to be conducted by correctional field personnel in the area in
which the person resides. 68 8 The report of the investigation includes a criminal record
check of the applicant, the applicant's employment history since completing his
sentence, his status as a good citizen, a summary of an interview with the applicant, and
any additional information deemed appropriate. 689 The Commission then reviews the
report in executive session, determining whether or not a hearing will be granted on the
application. 690 If a hearing is granted, the same notice is given as in an application for
69
commutation. 1
For commutation and pardon hearings, the subject is encouraged by the
Commission to attend.692 The Commission allows the participation of attorneys,
families of the subject, victims, and others who have a direct relationship to the hearing

675.
676.
677.
678.
679.
680.
681.
682.
683.
684.
685.
686.
687.
688.
689.
690.
691.
692.

Id. at r. 50.01.01.450.01(c).
Id. at r. 50.01.01.450.01(e).
Id. at r. 50.01.01.450.02.
Id. at r. 50.01.01.450.02(a).
Idaho Admin. Code r. 50.01.01.450.02(b).
Id. at r. 5 0.01.01.450.01(g).
Id. at r. 50.01.01.450.05(a).
Id. at r. 50.01.01.450.05(b).
Id. at r. 50.01.01.450.05(c).
Idaho Admin. Code r. 50.01.01.450.05(d).
Id. atr. 50.01.01.550.01.
Id. at 50.01.01.550.02(a).
Id. at 50.01.01.550.02(a)(ii).
Id. at r. 50.01.01.550.02(b).
Idaho Admin. Code r. 50.01.01.550.02(b).
Id. at r. 50.01.01.550.03.
Id. at r. 50.01.01.550.04.
Id. at r. 50.01.01.200.05(c)-(d).
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or subject. 6 93 Persons who wish to participate must notify the Commission five days in
advance of the scheduled hearing. 694 All written documents to be considered by the
Commission must be submitted seven days in advance of the hearing. 695 Verbal
testimony of witnesses, victims, and attorneys may be limited by the number of persons
allowed to testify and by the available time. 696 Decisions are made by a majority vote of
6 97
the Commission.
Illinois
Distribution of Powers
The Illinois Constitution grants the governor the power to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons for all offenses as he or she deems proper. 698 The
6 99
application process may be regulated by law.
Structure of Board
The Illinois legislature has created the Prisoner Review Board to make
recommendations to the governor in the exercise of his or her clemency power. 700 It
consists of fifteen persons appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the
Senate. 70 1 To be qualified to serve, members must have "at least [five] years of actual
experience in the fields of penology, corrections work, law enforcement, sociology, law,
education, social work, medicine, psychology, other behavioral sciences, or a
combination thereof.'' 7 02 At least six of the members are required to have at least three
years' experience in juvenile matters, and there must be enough political diversity so that
70 3
no more than eight members are of the same political party.
Board positions are full-time, compensated positions, and Board members are
prohibited from holding any other paid positions or engaging in other businesses or
vocations. 7 04 Members are appointed for six-year terms, but the governor may remove
them "for incompetence, neglect of duty, malfeasance or inability to serve." 70 5 All
requests for pardon, reprieve, or commutation must be heard by at least one Board
member, but decisions on those requests require three Board members. 7 06 Based on

693.
694.
695.
696.
697.
698.
699.
700.
701.
702.
703.
704.
705.
706.

Id. at r. 50.01.01.200.06.
Idaho Admin. Code r. 50.01.01.200.06(a).
Id. at r. 50.01.01.200.06(b).
Id. at r. 50.01.01.200.06(d).
Id. at r. 50.01.01.200.08(a).
I11.Const. art. V, § 12.
Id.
730 II1.Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/3-3-1(a) (West Supp. 2006).
Id. at 5/3-3-1(b).
Id.
Id.
Id.
730 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/3-3-1(c).
Id. at 5/3-3-2(a)(6).
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70 7
those decisions, the Board makes confidential recommendations to the governor.

Process
Petitions seeking pardon, commutation, or reprieve must be in writing, signed by
the applicant or his representative, addressed to the governor, and filed with the Prisoner
Review Board. 708 The petition must include a summary of the case, the reasons for
7 9
seeking executive clemency, and other relevant information the Board may require. 0
The Board is required to provide notice of the application to the court of conviction and
7 10
the state's attorney in the county of conviction.
Upon request, the Board must hear each application. 7 11 Applicants may be
represented by counsel. 7 12 After the hearing, the Board makes its recommendations to
the governor in a confidential written report. 7 13 The Board must meet to consider
petitions at least four times per year.7 14 Recommendations are determined by majority
7 16
vote 715 and are not binding on the governor.
The docket for each Board meeting lists all outstanding petitions filed at least
thirty days before the date of the meeting. 7 17 Anyone, including counsel, who wants to
7 18
support or oppose docketed petitions must register in person at the Board's meeting.
Those registered will be heard by the Board or its designated panel at the scheduled
public hearing. 7 19 The Board also considers "petitions on the docket on which there are
720
no appearances and may elect to hear petitioners who are in confinement."
If the governor has denied a petition, the Board cannot accept a repeat petition
from the same person for a full year from the date of the governor's denial. 72 1 The
Board's chairperson may waive the one-year waiting period if the petitioner provides
significant new information that was unavailable to him when the earlier petition was
filed; such new information must be provided in writing. 722 The waiting period may
also be waived if the petitioner can show that a "change in circumstances of a compelling
723
humanitarian nature has arisen since the denial of the prior petition."

707.
708.
709.
710.
711.
712.
713.
714.
715.
716.
717.
718.
719.
720.
721.
722.
723.

Id
Id. at 5/3-3-13(a) (West 1997).
Id.
730 11. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/3-3-13(b).
Id. at 5/3-3-13(c).
Id.
Id.
Id.
730 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/3-3-13(c).
Id. at 5/3-3-13(e); I11.Admin. Code tit. 20, pt. 1610.180(h) (2006).
111.Admin. Code tit. 20, pt. 1610.180(e).
Id.
Id. atpt. 1610.180(0.
Id.
730 111.Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/3-3-13(a-5).
Id.
Id.
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Indiana
Distribution of Powers
The governor, subject to legislative regulations, is authorized by the Constitution
to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons for all offenses except in cases of treason
or impeachment. 724 The Constitution also authorizes the legislature to create a board or
"council" whose advice and consent must be given before the governor may grant
pardons. 725 The legislature has given the Indiana Parole Board the power to hear
clemency applications and make recommendations to the governor. 726 It has not,
however, exercised its constitutional prerogative to limit the governor's authority to issue
pardons only upon a favorable recommendation of the Board.72 7
Structure of Board
The Indiana Parole Board consists of five members who are appointed by the
governor for four-year terms. 72 8 No more than three members may have the same party
affiliation. 729 Members may be reappointed and may be removed for cause but only
after having the opportunity to be heard by the governor. 73
At a minimum, Board
members must have either a bachelor's degree from an accredited school or at least ten
years' experience in law enforcement. 73 1
Members are full-time, salaried state
732
employees.
Process
The Indiana Parole Board has fashioned rules delimiting when inmates are eligible
to apply for clemency. Inmates may apply only after they have served a specified
portion of their sentence. 7 33 Additionally, the inmate must not have had any major
disciplinary violations and no more than one minor disciplinary violation within the
preceding year. 734 Inmates declared ineligible to apply for clemency have no right to
meet with the Board.73 5 They do, however, have the right to appeal an ineligibility
determination by the Board.736 If appealed, the inmate meets with a member of the
Board, who explains the reasons for the determination. 737 The Board member may

724.
725.
726.
727.
728.
729.
730.
731.
732.
733.
734.
735.
736.
737.

Ind. Const. art. 5, § 17.
Id.
Ind. Code Ann. § 11-9-1-2(a)(3) (Lexis 2003).
Id. at § 11-9-2-3.
Id. at§ 11-9-1-1(a).
Id.
Id.
Ind. Code Ann. § lt-9-1-1(b).
Id.
220 Ind. Admin. Code 1.1-4-1(aHe) (2006).
Id. at 1.1-4-1(i).
Id. at 1.1-4-10).
Id. at 1.1-4-1(k).
Id.
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738
request that the Board reconsider.
Those requesting commutations of death sentences may not apply until an
execution date has been set. 739 If that date is subsequently stayed, the Board ceases all
investigation and consideration of the petition, and the inmate must reapply when the
740
next execution date is set.

To initiate the clemency process, an application to the governor for clemency is
filed with the Parole Board. 74 1 The application must be in writing and signed by the
applicant or his representative. 742 Additional information may be required if the Board
74 3
believes it is pertinent to the process of considering the application.
Before making a recommendation to the governor, the Board must: (1) notify the
sentencing court, the victim or the victim's next of kin, and the prosecuting attorney; (2)
conduct an investigation, collecting records, reports, and any other relevant information;
and (3) hold a hearing that provides the applicant and any other interested parties with
the opportunity to present information to the Board. 74
The Parole Board may delegate its inquiry, investigation, hearing, and review
functions to one or more members. 74 5 Members acting on behalf of the Board may
exercise any or all of the Board's powers but cannot make a final decision. 74 6 After
completing the delegated function, those members acting on the Board's behalf must file
a complete procedural record, along with the findings, conclusions, and recommended
74 8
decision. 74 7 The Board will base its final decision upon this information.
Prior to making a recommendation to the governor to grant a commutation, the
Board must investigate the attitudes and opinions of three groups: the community where
the crime occurred; the victim or the victim's relatives and friends; and the friends and
relatives of the offender. 74 9 The Board must also obtain a report regarding the
petitioner's medical, psychological, and psychiatric condition and history. 75 The Board
must consider several factors when making its recommendation to the governor:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the crime for which the offender is committed, and the

offender's participation in that crime;
(2) the offender's prior criminal record;
(3) the offender's conduct and attitude during commitment; and

738.
739.
740.
741.
742.
743.
744.
745.
746.
747.
748.
749.
750.

220 Ind. Admin. Code 1.1-4-1(k).
Id. at 1.1-4-1(d).
Id.
Ind. Code Ann. § 11-9-2-1 (Lexis 2003).
Id.
Id.
Id. at § 11-9-2-2(b).
Id. at § 11-9-1-3(a).
Ind. Code Ann. § 11-9-1-3(b).
Id.
Id.
220 Ind. Admin. Code 1.1-4-4(b) (2006).
Id. at 1.t-4-4(c).
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(4) the best interests of society.

75 1

The Board may also consider:
(1) the offender's previous social history;
(2) the offender's employment during commitment;
(3) the offender's educational and vocational training both before and during commitment;
(4) the offender's age at the time of committing the offense and his age and level of
maturity at the time of the clemency appearance;
(5) the offender's medical condition and history;
(6) the offender's psychological and psychiatric condition and history;
(7) the offender's employment history prior to commitment;
(8) the relationship between the offender and the victim of the crime;
(9) the offender's economic condition and history;
(10) the offender's previous parole or probation experiences;
(11) the offender's participation in substance abuse programs;
(12) the attitudes and opinions of the community in which the crime occurred, including
those of law enforcement officials;
(13) the attitudes and opinions of the victim of the crime, or of the relatives or friends of
the victim;
(14) the attitudes and opinions of the friends and relatives of the offender;
(15) any other matter reflecting upon the likelihood that the offender, if released upon
parole, is able to and will fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding citizen; [and]
(16) the offender's proposed places of employment and of residence were he to be released
7 52
on parole.
Kansas
Distribution of Powers
The Kansas Constitution vests the "pardoning power" in the governor, subject to
regulations and restrictions prescribed by the legislature. 753 The Kansas Parole Board is
authorized by statute to adopt rules determining the procedures used for applications for
pardon and commutation. 754 All applications for clemency must be referred to the

751.
752.
753.
754.

Id. at 1.1-4-4(d).
Id. at 1.1-4-4(e).
Kan. Const. art. 1, § 7.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3701(2) (Supp. 2005).
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Board, which must examine each one and submit a report to the governor. 755 The
governor may not grant or deny any application until he or she has received the report of
the Board unless more than 120 days have elapsed since the application was referred to
the Board. 75675 The governor is not bound by the Board's recommendation.7 57
Additionally, clemency may not be granted unless the statutory notice provisions have
been fulfilled. 758
The governor's latitude is limited in death penalty cases. The governor may
postpone the execution of a death sentence for a limited time.7 59 At the expiration of the
time granted for postponement, however, the sentence of the court must be carried
a death sentence as long as it is not
out.760 The governor also has the power to commute
761
commuted to imprisonment for less than ten years.
Structure of Board
The Kansas Parole Board is comprised of three members who are appointed by the
governor and confirmed by the Senate. 762 No more than two members may be from the
same political party. 76 3 Members are appointed to four-year terms but continue to serve
until their successors are confirmed.7 64 Board positions are full-time76 5 and salaried.76 6
767
The governor designates both the chairperson and vice-chairperson.
"The governor may not remove any member of the [Board] except for disability,
inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office," and members may be removed
only after receiving both written notice of the charges and a public hearing. 768 If a
member is removed, a statement of all charges and findings, along with a record769of the
proceedings, must be filed by the governor in the Office of the Secretary of State.
The Board is empowered "to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance of any
witnesses and the production of any records, books, papers and documents that it
considers necessary for the investigation of the issues before it." 770 Any Board member
members of the
may sign subpoenas and administer oaths. 77 1 Additionally, one or more
772
Board may be authorized to conduct hearings on the Board's behalf.

755.
756.
757.
758.
759.
760.
761.
762.
763.
764.
765.
766.
767
768.
769.
770.
771.
772.

Id. at § 22-3701(4).
Id.
Personal communication from representative of the governor's office to authors.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3701(4).
Id.at § 22-3704 (1995).
Id.
Id. at § 22-3705(a).
Id. at § 22-3707(a) (Supp. 2005).
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3707(a).
Id.
Id.
Id. at § 22-3708.
Id. at § 22-3709.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3707(b).
Id.
Id. at § 22-3720 (1995).
Id.
Id at § 22-3713(a) (Supp. 2005).
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Process
All applications for pardon or commutation of sentence must be referred to the
Board.7 73 An inmate initiates his request for clemency by making a request to the
facility representative. 7 74 The applicant then writes a statement of the reasons for his
request on forms furnished by the Board and provides all information required by the
forms. 7 7 5 The completed application may be returned to the facility representative or
sent directly to the Board.77 6
At least thirty days before a pardon or commutation may be granted, notice of the
application must be provided to the prosecuting attorney and judge of the court of
conviction; for certain offenses, notice must also be provided to the victim of the offense
or the victim's family. 77 7 Additionally, notice must be published in the official
newspaper of the county of conviction. 778 If the applicant is indigent, the state will pay
the publication costs once per twelve-month period.77 9
The Board's review must include an examination of records and reports, as well as
a personal interview with the applicant if requested by the Board, and after the
application is received and notice has been provided, the Board reviews the file to
determine whether it warrants a personal interview with the inmate. 78 Within 120 days
after the application was referred to the Board, the Board must submit a report, including
any information the Board has about the applicant, to the governor. 78 1 In turn, the
governor may not grant or deny any application until he or she "has received the report
of the [B]oard or until 120 days after the referral to the [B]oard, whichever time is the
78 2
shorter."
Kentucky
Distribution of Powers
The governor of Kentucky has the "power to remit fines and forfeitures, commute
sentences, [and] grant reprieves and pardons, except in cases of impeachment." 7 83 A
statement of the governor's reasons for the decision must be filed with the application,
and both are open to public inspection. 784 The governor may ask the Kentucky Parole
Board to investigate and prepare a report in any case of executive clemency, but its
785
recommendations are not binding on the governor.

773.
774.
775.
776.
777.
778.
779.
780.
781.
782.
783.
784.
785.

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3701(4).
Kan. Admin. Regs. r. 45-900-1(a) (2006).
Id. at r. 45-900-1(b).
Id.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3701(3).
Id.
Id.
Kan. Admin. Regs. r. 45-900-1(c).
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3701(4).
Id.
Ky. Const. § 77.
Id.
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 439.450 (Lexis 1999).
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Structure of Board
The Kentucky Parole Board is composed of seven full-time members and two parttime members appointed by the governor and confirmed by the Senate. 7 86 The two parttime members must be from different political parties, and no more than five of the nine
members may be from the same political party. 787 Part-time members' authority,
however, is limited by statute. 788 Each new appointment must be drawn from a list of
three names given to the governor by the Commission on Correction and Community
Service, and each person appointed must have at least five years' experience in the fields
of penology, correction work, law enforcement, sociology, law, education, social work,
medicine, or some combination of these. 789 Alternatively, an appointee with five years
to be qualified. 790 The
of previous experience serving on the Board is considered
79 1
chairperson.
be
governor chooses one full-time member to
Full-time Board members must devote all of their time to the Board and are
salaried employees, with the chairperson being compensated slightly more. 792 Terms are
organization, but by statute a
four years. 793 The chairperson determines the Board's
794
quorum for clemency matters requires four members.
"The [g]overnor may not remove any member of the [B]oard except for disability,
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." 795 Before removal, the governor
must provide the member with a written copy of the charges and an opportunity to be
heard.796 If the member is removed, a statement of all charges and findings, along with
a record of the proceedings, must be filed by the governor in the Office of the Secretary
of State. 797 The executive director of the Parole Board is responsible for administration
and the review, drafting, and promulgation of rules and regulations for the Board.7 98
Process
There does not appear to be any formal procedure for applying for executive
clemency. The governor's office does have a form titled "Application for Pardon,"
which an inmate may fill out and submit to the governor's office. 799 In practice, the
Rather,
Parole Board does not appear to play a role in the executive clemency process.
8
its statutory duty is to conduct investigations at the request of the governor. 00

786.
787.
788.
789.
790.
791.
792.
793.
794.
795.
796.
797.
798.
799.
800.

Id. at § 439.320(1) (Lexis Supp. 2005).
Id.
Id. at § 439.320(7).
Id. at § 439.320(1).
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 439.320(1).
Id. at § 439.320(2).
Id. at § 439.320(3).
Id.
Id. at § 439.320(4).
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 439.320(5).
Id.
Id.
Id. at § 439.320(8).
This form must be requested directly from the governor's office.
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 439.450.
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Louisiana

Distribution of Powers
The Louisiana Constitution vests the power of executive clemency in the governor,
but in order to commute a sentence or grant a pardon the governor must first have a
80 1
favorable recommendation from the Louisiana Board of Pardons.
Structure of the Board
The Louisiana Board of Pardons has the duty to review and take action on
applications for pardons pending before it and meets on regularly scheduled dates and at
other times designated by the Board's chairperson. 8 02 The Board has the additional
power to create rules and regulations and to employ a staff, including "professional
personnel with training or past experience in criminology or related fields such as
sociology, psychology, or psychiatry." 80 3 The Board also has the authority to sanction
applicants for "disorderly, threatening, or insolent behavior, or use of insulting, abusive,
or obscene language." 8° 4 Such
a sanction may include immediate termination of
80 5
proceedings and denial of relief.
By constitution, the Board consists of five members appointed by the governor and
confirmed by the Senate for terms that run concurrently with the term of the appointing
governor. 8 06 By statute, at least one member of the Board may be chosen by the
governor from a list of three names provided by Victims and Citizens Against Crime,
Inc. 807 The governor chooses a chairperson from among the Board members. 808 The
Board members choose their own vice-chairperson. 80 9 Four Board members constitute a
quorum, and all actions of the Board require the favorable vote of at least four
members. 8 1° Each Board member must devote his or her full time to the duties of the
Board and is "prohibited from holding any elective, appointive, or public employment;
or from engaging in any private business or employment which is in conflict with his [or
her] duties" on the Board. 8 11 All Board members are paid an annual salary of $36,000

801.

La. Const. art. IV, § 5(E)(1).
However, a first offender convicted of a non-violent crime, or convicted of aggravated battery,
second degree battery, aggravated assault, mingling harmful substances, aggravated criminal
damage to property, purse snatching, extortion, or illegal use of weapons or dangerous
instrumentalities never previously convicted of a felony shall be pardoned automatically upon
completion of his sentence, without a recommendation of the Board of Pardons and without action
by the governor.

Id.
802.
803
804.
805.
806.
807.
808.
809.
810.
811.

La. Stat. Ann. § 15:572.1(C) (2005).
Id. at § 15:572.3(1)-(2).
Id. at § 15:572.3(4).
Id.
La. Const. art. IV, § 5(E)(2).
La. Stat. Ann. § 15:572.1(A).
Id.
Id. at § 15:572.1(D).
Id. at § 15:572.1(E).
Id. at § 15:572.1(F).
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except for the chairperson, who receives $42,000.812
Process
A person who is sentenced to life is ineligible to apply for executive clemency
until he has served fifteen years from the date of the imposition of sentence. 8 13 This rule
does not apply, however, when the Board determines that new, material evidence exists
that would probably have changed the verdict so long as that evidence was not
814
discovered before or during the trial despite reasonable diligence by the applicant.
For an application to be considered by the Board, it must be received by the
fifteenth day of the month before the Board's next hearing, and applications from an
inmate sentenced to death must be submitted within one year of the denial of the
inmate's direct appeal.815 Completed applications may be given a hearing by the
Board. 8 16 Until notified that a hearing has been granted, applicants may not submit
documents or information other than what is required by the application. 8 17 An
exception applies
to inmates with a life sentence who have documentation proving
818
innocence.
The Board has discretion to refuse to hear an application for any reason. 8 19 A nonexhaustive list of reasons the Board may decide to refuse to hear an application for
clemency includes:
(a) the serious nature of the offense;
(b) insufficient time served on the sentence;
(c) insufficient time has passed since release;
(d) the proximity of parole or good-time date;
(e) institutional disciplinary reports;
(f) probation or parole was unsatisfactory or violated;
(g) past criminal record; or

812. La. Stat. Ann. § 15:572.2 (2005).
813. Id. at § 15:572.4(D); La. Admin. Code tit. 22, § 101(E) (2006).
814. La. Stat. Ann. § 15:572.4(D); La. Admin. Code tit. 22, § 101(E).
815. La. Admin. Code tit. 22, § 101(B), (D).
816. Id. at § 101(A). A complete application must be submitted on the form provided by the Board and
contain the following: the name of the applicant, the applicant's prison number, date of birth, race, sex,
education level, age at the time of the offense, present age, offender class, facility where the inmate is
incarcerated, the parish where the inmate was convicted, the offenses for which the inmate was convicted of,
the parish where the offenses were committed, the date of the inmate's sentence, the length of the inmate's
sentence, the amount of time served, a description of any prior parole or probation, a list of any previous
clemency hearings that the inmate has had, the reasons that the inmate is requesting clemency, the particular
type of clemency sought, and a statement of the facts surrounding the offense. Id. at § 103(A) (2006).
Additionally, inmates must attach their institutional disciplinary reports, id., and, if the inmate is sentenced to
death, proof that the inmate's direct appeal was denied. Id at § 103(B).
817. La. Admin. Code tit. 22, § 103(C).
818. Id.
819. Id. at§ 105(A.I).
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820
(h) any other factor determined by the Board.

If the inmate is favorably recommended by any of the Louisiana Risk Review Panels, the
inmate will automatically receive a hearing without any further consideration by the
82 1
Board.
Contact with members of the Board is limited to appearing or testifying at a public
hearing or writing letters addressed to the Board of Pardons. 822 All letters in favor of
granting clemency are open to public inspection except letters written by or on behalf of
823
the victim; letters opposing clemency generally are not subject to public inspection.
However, any letter written by an elected or appointed public official is open to public
8 24
inspection.
Before a hearing may be set, the applicant must have published notice of the
application for clemency on "three separate days within a thirty-day period of time.., in
any newspaper recognized ... as the official journal of the governing authority of the
parish where the offense occurred. ' 825 Proof of this notice must be given to the Board
within ninety days of when the applicant is notified that a hearing has been granted.8 26
At this time, the applicant may also submit additional letters and documents in support of
827
his application.
At least thirty days before the scheduled hearing date, the Board must notify (1)
the prosecutor and sheriff of the parish where the offense was committed; (2) the
applicant; (3) the victim; (4) the victim's next of kin (unless the Board has received a
written request that notification is not wanted); (5) the Crime Victims Services Bureau of
the Department of Public Safety and Corrections; and (6) any other interested parties
who have previously requested to be notified. 828 All of these parties must be given the
opportunity to appear at the inmate's hearing, 829 and some may be allowed to appear by
telephone. 83° At the hearing, only three people, including the applicant, are allowed to
speak in favor of clemency, and only three persons, including the victim or the victim's
family members, are allowed to speak in opposition, but there is no limit on how many
written statements may be submitted. 83 1 If the inmate fails to attend the hearing and
fails to inform the Board in advance of his inability to attend, the inmate's application is
832
automatically denied.
833
The Board will notify the inmate if it makes the decision to deny the application

820. Id.
821. Id. at § 105(E).
822. La. Stat. Ann. § 15:573.1 (A) (2005); La. Admin. Code tit. 22, § 107(A) (2006).
823. La. Stat. Ann. § 15:573.1(B), (E); La. Admin. Code tit. 22, § 107(D).
824. La. Stat. Ann. § 15:573.1(E); La. Admin. Code tit. 22, § 107(E).
825. La. Stat. Ann. § 15:572.4(C).
826. La. Admin. Code tit. 22, § 109(A) (2006).
827. Id. at § 109(B).
828. Id. at § 111(B). Most of these notices are required by statute; however, Louisiana statutory law does
not require that notice be provided to the Crime Victims Services Bureau. La. Stat. Ann. § 15:572.4(B)(1).
829. La. Stat. Ann. § 15:572.4(B)(2)-(3); La. Admin. Code tit. 22, § 111(C).
830. La. Stat. Ann. § 15:573.2 (2005); La. Admin. Code tit. 22, § I11(C).
831. La. Admin Code tit. 22, § 111(D).
832. Id. at§ Ill(F).
833. Id. at § 113(A).
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or if the governor rejects the inmate's application after a favorable recommendation by
the Board.834 The governor will notify the inmate if he or she decides to grant
83 5
clemency.
Maryland
Distribution of Power
The Constitution of Maryland vests the power of executive clemency in the
governor but provides that, before granting a pardon, the governor must first give notice
836
in one or more newspapers of the earliest day that he or she will make a decision.
Additionally, the governor must submit the applicant's petition and the reasons for his or
her decision to the legislature. 83 7 The Maryland legislature has authorized the Maryland
Parole Commission to "review and make recommendations to the [g]overnor" on
executive clemency when its assistance is requested. 838
The Commission's
839
recommendations are not binding on the governor.
Structure of Commission
The Commission consists of ten members appointed to six-year terms by the
Maryland Secretary of Public Safety and Correctional Services subject to the approval of
both the governor and the Senate. 84 To qualify for a seat on the Commission, an
individual must "be appointed without regard to political affiliation," be a Maryland
resident, and "have training and experience in law, sociology, psychology, psychiatry,
education, social work, or criminology." 84 1 The Secretary, with the governor's
approval, may designate a member of the Commission to serve as chairperson. 842 Also
with the governor's approval, the Secretary may remove a member of the Commission
based on disability, neglect of duty, or misconduct while in office. 84 3 The Secretary
must first serve the Commissioner with written notice of the charges and hold a public
hearing. 844 The Commissioners serve full time, may not have any other employment
that conflicts with their duties, 845 and are compensated by an amount determined by the
84 6
legislature.

834.
835.
836.
837.
838.
839.
840.
841.
842.
843.
844.
845.
846.

Id.at§ 115(A).
Id.at§ 117(A).
Md. Const. art. I1,
§ 20.
Id.
Md. Correctional Servs. Code Ann. § 7-206(3)(ii) (Supp. 2006).
Personal communication from representative of the governor's office to authors.
Md. Correctional Servs. Code Ann. § 7-202(a), (d)(i) (Supp. 2006).
Id. at § 7-202(b).
Id. at § 7-202(g).
Id.at § 7-202(e)(1).
Id.at § 7-202(e)(2).
Md. Correctional Servs. Code Ann. § 7-202(c).
Id.at § 7-203 (Lexis 1999).
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Process
Any inmate may ask the Commission to recommend commutation to the governor
847
when his legal remedies are exhausted and the circumstances of his case are unusual.
The request is then heard at a parole hearing, where the Commission has discretion to
deny the request or submit it to the governor with a recommendation. 84 8 A sentence can
be commuted to a specific time period or to time served, resulting in the inmate's
release. 849 Once the inmate's sentence is commuted, the Commission has discretion to
release him on parole. 850 If the governor denies the clemency request, the applicant may
resubmit it "after a reasonable time." 851 The Commission will recommend commuting a
life sentence "where the case warrants special consideration or where the facts and
852
circumstances of the crime justify special consideration, or both."
Either a petition or a letter to the Parole Commission can initiate a request for a
pardon. 853 A favorable pardon recommendation is more likely if the applicant can
provide proof that he has successfully completed parole or probation, if applicable, and
has adjusted to the community for a period of time extending beyond the latest expiration
date of his sentence. 854
Before making a recommendation to the governor, the
Commission must have the Division of Parole and Probation investigate the individual
and submit a report to the Commission and governor. 855 In cases where pardon is
856
denied, the applicant may resubmit an application after a reasonable time.
The governor's legal counsel also reviews
makes a recommendation to the governor. 857
criteria when making clemency determinations:
relevant offense; (2) the effect that a pardon or
community, and public safety; (3) the inmate's
858
clemency is requested.

applications for executive clemency and
The legal counsel uses the following
(1) the nature and circumstances of the
commutation would have on the victim,
criminal history; and (4) the reason that

Mississippi
Distribution of Powers
The Mississippi Constitution vests the power of executive clemency in the
governor; before a pardon may be granted in a felony case, the petitioner must post his
application in a newspaper in the county where his offense was committed for a period of

847. Code Md. Regs. 12.08.01.15(A) (2006).
848. Id.
849. Id.
850. Id.
851. Id.
852. Code Md. Regs. 12.08.01.15(B).
853. Id. at 12.08.01.16(C) (2006).
854. Id.
855. Id. at 12.08.01.16(B).
856. Id.
857. Governor Ehrlich Clarifies Executive Clemency Process, http://www.gov.state.md.us/pressreleases/
2003/082903_clemency.html (Aug. 29, 2003).
858. Id.
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thirty days. 859 The Mississippi legislature has given the State Parole Board the
"exclusive responsibility for investigating clemency recommendations upon request of
860
the [g]overnor."
Structure of Board
The governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate and without consideration
of political affiliation, appoints five members to the Board who serve terms "at the will
and pleasure of the [g]ovemor." 86 1 The governor also has the power to appoint the
chairperson. 8 62 To be eligible to be a Board member, a person must have either a
bachelor's degree or a high school diploma and four years of work experience. 863 Board
members are full-time employees and are compensated for their services with an amount
determined by the legislature. 864 Members of the Board are immune from civil liability
865
for acts made in good faith and in the execution of the Board's legitimate authority.
Process
Very little is codified concerning applications for executive clemency, but an
examination of the clemency application provides some information as to what is
required. 866 The inmate must first obtain an application from the governor's legal
division and send the completed application to the governor. 867 Separate letters stating
the unusual circumstances that the inmate believes warrant clemency and letters of
recommendation from former employers, pastors, church members, elected officials,
judges, prosecutors, family members, and others must accompany the application. 868 If
the governor believes that further investigation into an inmate's case is necessary in
order to make a decision concerning clemency, he or she may refer the application to the
The Board's
State Parole Board for investigation and recommendation. 869
870
recommendations are not binding upon the governor.
Missouri
Distribution of Powers
By the Missouri Constitution, the governor has the sole authority to grant

859. Miss. Const. art. V, § 124.
860. Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-5(3) (Lexis Supp. 2006).
861. Id. at § 47-7-5(1), (2).
862. Id. at § 47-7-5(1).
863. Id. at § 47-7-5(2).
864. Id.
865. Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-5(4).
866. E.g. Office of the Governor, Application for Clemency, http://www.cjpf.org/clemency/
MississippiApp.pdf (last modified June 16, 2005). An official form must be requested from the governor's
office.
867. Id.
868. Id.
869. Personal communication from representative of the governor's office to authors.
870. Id.
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postconviction reprieves, commutations, and pardons except in the case of treason or
impeachment. 87 1
The legislature may determine the manner of applying for
clemency. 872 It has created the Missouri Board of Probation and Parole, and all
applications are referred to the Board for investigation and recommendation to the
87 3
governor.
Structure of Board
The Board is composed of seven members who are appointed by the governor
subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. 874 To be qualified, members must be
"persons of recognized integrity and honor, known to possess education and ability in
decision making through career experience ....Not more than four members.., shall
be of the same political party." 87 5 Members are appointed for six-year terms and may be
The governor
reappointed. 8 76
They are full-time, compensated employees. 877
878
chairperson.
the
designates
Process
The Missouri Board of Probation and Parole has not issued any rules or regulations
with respect to executive clemency procedures. By statute, however, any meeting,
879
record of proceedings, or vote involving pardons may be closed to the public.
Montana
Distribution of Powers
The Montana Constitution vests the executive clemency power solely in the
governor, subject to procedures provided by the legislature. 880 However, by statute, the
legislature has created a Board of Pardons and Parole that "is responsible for executive
clemency ' 88 1 such that, if the Board recommends that clemency be denied in a noncapital case, "the application may not be forwarded to the governor and the governor
may not take action on the case. '882 The Board's recommendation is not binding for
applications that are forwarded to the governor. 8 83 The governor may grant respite
without any recommendation from the Board. 884 In capital cases, this may have the

871.
872.
873.
874.
875.
876.
877.
878.
879.
880.
881.
882.
883.
884.

Mo. Const. art. IV, § 7.
Id.
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 217.800(2) (West 2004).
Id. at § 217.665(1).
Id. at § 217.665(2).
Id. at § 217.665(3).
Id.at § 217.665(6)-(7).
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 217.665(5).
Id. at § 217.670(5).
Mont. Const. art. VI, § 12.
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-104(1) (2005).
Id. at § 46-23-301(3).
Id.
Id. at § 46-23-315.
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effect of postponing the execution; however, if clemency is not granted before the respite
expires, the death warrant is again in effect and the execution must take place on the date
885
the respite expires.
Structure of Board
The Montana Board of Pardons and Parole has three members and four auxiliary
members. 886 Members must undergo training imparting "knowledge of American Indian
culture and problems" and possess academic training qualifying them for professional
practice in criminology, education, psychiatry, psychology, law, social work, sociology,
887
guidance and counseling, or a related field.
All members serve staggered four-year terms and are appointed by the governor
with the confirmation of the Senate. 88 8 The governor designates the chairperson and
may remove a member only for cause. 889 A majority of the Board constitutes a quorum,
and a majority vote is required for any decision. 890 Members are compensated by
89 1
legislative appropriation.
Process
A person convicted of a crime is not required to exhaust judicial or administrative
remedies before applying for executive clemency; however, an application involving a
death sentence may not be filed while the automatic review before the Montana Supreme
Court is pending. 892 All applications for clemency must be made to the Board. 893 in
death penalty cases, a clemency application must be filed no later than ten days after an
execution date is set. 894 Applications may only be filed by the person convicted of the
crime, that person's attorney, or a court-appointed next friend, guardian, or conservator
acting on the person's behalf.89 5 The application must state the type of executive
clemency requested, the particulars of the crime, the date the crime was committed, the
court of conviction, the applicant's social condition, and the reasons for the clemency
89 6
request.
When an application is made, the Board investigates and makes a recommendation

885. Id.
886. Mont. Code Ann. § 2-15-2302(2) (2005). Auxiliary Board members are obligated to attend those
meetings that regular Board members are unable to attend and, when doing so, possess all the powers of a
regular member. Id. at § 2-15-2302(3).
887. Id. at § 2-15-2302(2).
888. Id. at §§ 2-15-2302(4), 2-15-2302(7), 2-15-124(3).
889. Id. at §§ 2-15-2302(7), 2-15-124(5), 2-15-124(6).
890. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 2-15-2302(7), 2-15-124(8).
891. Id. at § 2-15-2302(7).
892. Id. at § 46-23-301(2).
893. Id.
894. Id.
895. Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-301(2). The Board of Pardons and Parole, however, has adopted a contrary
rule. The Board must receive applications in death penalty cases no later than thirty days before the execution
date, but the Board reserves the power to waive this rule for good cause. Admin. R. Mont. 20.25.901(4)
(2006).
896. Id. at 20.25.901(3).
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to the governor. 89 7 The Board's recommendation is based on (1) all the circumstances
surrounding the crime and (2) the individual circumstances relating to the applicant's
social condition before the crime was committed, when the crime was committed, and
when the application for clemency was made. 898 The Board must also consider: (1) the
nature of the crime; (2) the comments of the judge, the prosecuting attorney, the
community, the victims, and the victims' families; and (3) whether the petitioner's
release would endanger the public. 899 Board rules state that concern for public safety
outweighs even the "most substantial showing of exceptional or compelling
90 0
circumstances."
According to Board regulations, executive clemency may be recommended for an
individual who (1) can satisfactorily prove innocence of a crime for which the person is
serving or has served time; (2) has demonstrated exemplary performance; (3) submits
newly discovered evidence showing complete justification or non-guilt; (4) suffers from
terminal illness or a chronic disability; (5) can satisfactorily prove that further
incarceration would be grossly unfair; (6) can satisfactorily prove that the death penalty
should be avoided; or (7) can satisfactorily
prove the existence of extraordinary
90 1
circumstances.
extenuating
or
mitigating
The Board reserves the right to investigate any case when "substantial evidence
showing innocence or complete justification on the part of the person convicted" is
offered. 90 2 At least thirty days are usually required for an investigation. 903 After all
investigative material has been received and filed with the executive director, the Board
meets to consider the application and determine whether to hold a hearing. 904 If the
Board decides to have a hearing, it must issue an order to set the hearing date and give
notice to all concerned parties. 90 5 In addition, the Board must publish a copy of its order
in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the offense occurred at least
once a week for two weeks before the hearing date. 90 6 The Board must also transmit a
copy of the order to the applicant and to the district judge, county attorney, and sheriff of
the county where the crime was committed. 90 7 Hearings are required in capital cases. 90 8
At a public and recorded hearing, the Board will hear all relevant facts and
information from the petitioner, his counsel and witnesses, and any opponents to the
petition. 90 9 The Board must keep a record of the names of all persons who appeared on
the petitioner's behalf, the names of all persons who appeared to oppose clemency, and

897.
898.
899.
900.
901.
902.
903.
904.
905.
906.
907.
908.
909.

Personal communication from representative of the governor's office to authors.
Admin. R. Mont. 20.25.901(3).
Id. at 20.25.901A(6).
Id.
Id. at 20.25.901A(5).
Id.at 20.25.901A(7).
Admin. R. Mont. 20.25.902(1) (2006).
Id.
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-302 (2005).
Id.at §§ 46-23-302, 46-23-303.
Id. at § 46-23-303.
Admin. R. Mont. 20.25.902(3).
Id. at 20.25.904(1) (2006).
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9
the testimony of all persons who gave evidence.
In every non-capital case in which the Board recommends that clemency be
granted, the Board must send a written decision, along with supporting documentation, to
the governor. 9 11 In all capital cases, the Board must transmit its decision to the governor
within thirty days of the hearing. 9 12 The governor must review the record of the hearing
and the Board's recommendation before granting or denying clemency. 9 13 The
governor's decision to grant or deny clemency is not appealable. 914 Unless the Board
otherwise orders or circumstances change significantly, a person may not reapply for
9 15
executive clemency for thirty-six months.

The governor must report each case in which executive clemency is granted, as
well as the reasons for his or her decision and any objections by Board members, to the
9 16
legislature.
Nebraska
Distribution of Powers
The Nebraska Constitution delegates the "power to remit fines and forfeitures and
to grant respites, reprieves, pardons, or commutations in all cases ... except treason and
cases of impeachment" to a board comprised of the governor, attorney general, and
secretary of state.9 17 By statute, this board is named the Board of Pardons. 918 The
Board of Parole, created by the legislature, may advise the Board of Pardons on the
9 19
merits of any application, but its advice is not binding.
Structure of Board
As stated above, the members of the Board of Pardons are the governor, attorney
general, and secretary of state. 92 The governor is chairperson of the Board. 921 The
Board can issue subpoenas, compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of
documents, administer oaths, and take the testimony of persons under oath. 922 All
actions of the Board are by majority vote. 9 23 The Board may call upon the Board
of
924
Parole to conduct investigations and to submit written reports and recommendations.

910. Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-306(1)-(3) (2005). The Board must also keep records showing that the
affidavit and return of publication from the printer was on file before the hearing. Id. at § 46-23-306(4).
911. Id. at § 46-23-307.
912. Id.
913. Id. at § 46-23-301(3).
914. Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-301(3).
915. Admin. R. Mont. 20.25.901(3).
916. Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-316 (2005).
917. Neb. Const. art. IV, § 13.
918. Neb. Rev. Stat, § 83-1,126 (1999).
919. Neb. Const. art. IV, § 13.
920. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,126.
921. Id.
922. Id. at § 83-1,128.
923. Id. at § 83-1,130(3).
924. Id. at § 83-1,127(4); Neb. Bd. of Pardons, Policy and Procedure Guidelines, Rule 003,02, http://
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Process
A person seeking clemency must request an application from the Board of
Pardons' secretary. 92 5 The completed application must be returned to the secretary,
identifying the specific relief requested and including any other information required by
92 6
the Board.
927
The Board will consider applications at its next regularly scheduled meeting.
928
An informal hearing may be held, and, if so, a record of the proceedings will be made.
In general, the Board will not grant an application for pardon or commutation without a
9 29
hearing.
If the Board grants a hearing to a person seeking clemency for a crime against a
person, the Board will attempt to contact the victim or victim's family and offer them an
opportunity to present information at the hearing. 930 The Board may hear sworn or
unsworn testimony and may receive written statements, as well as any other information
the Board deems useful. 93 1 The Board has discretion over how information is presented
at the hearing; ordinarily the applicant or his representative will present first, followed by
those who oppose the application. 93 2 If the applicant has not yet completed his sentence,
the Board will ask the county attorney from the county where the crime was committed
to attend the hearing and present information concerning the nature and severity of the
crime, as well as any reasons why clemency should be denied. 933 If the county attorney
declines to attend, the Nebraska Attorney General's Office will present the
information. 934 After the hearing, the Board will consider the application and may
conduct further investigation, as needed. 935 The Board will then vote to grant or deny
9 36
clemency.
There are special procedures for clemency applications in death penalty cases. By
statute, whenever a death-sentenced inmate files an application, the sentence may not be
carried out until the Board rules on the application. 937 If the Board denies relief, it may
set the time and date of execution and refuse to accept another application from the
93 8
inmate.
According to the Board's procedural guidelines, the Board's staff prepares a file
concerning the prisoner and begins to gather documentation, just as if an application for

www.pardons.state.ne.us/appguidelines.html (accessed Feb. 4, 2007).
925. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,129(1) (1999).
926. Id.
927. Id. at § 83-1,129(3).
928. Id.
929. Neb. Bd. of Pardons, supra n. 924, at Rule 004.02.
930. Id. at Rule 004.03(A).
931. Id. at Rule 004.03(C).
932. Id.
933. Id.
934. Neb. Bd. of Pardons, supra n. 924, at Rule 004.03(C). The Board may change this requirement through
majority vote. Id.
935. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,130(1).
936. Id.
937. Id. at § 83-1,132.
938. Id.
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clemency had been filed, as soon as the Board is notified that an execution date has been
94 0
set. 939 In addition, the Secretary of the Board immediately issues a stay of execution.
94 1
The stay remains in effect until the Board makes a decision on the application.
The Board meets within five days of the filing of the application to determine
whether a hearing should be held.94 2 A hearing must be held within thirty days after the
application is filed. 94 3 At the hearing, a representative of the death-sentenced inmate
will be given three hours to present information and argument to the Board. 944 The
presentation may include a sworn statement from the inmate made by videotape,
946
audiotape, or affidavit. 94 5 A portion of the allotted time may be reserved for rebuttal.
The State also receives three hours for presentation and argument to the Board, including
time allotted to representatives of the victims who wish to present information. 947 Any
other interested persons may submit written comments or information to the Board on or
948
before the hearing date.
If the clemency application is denied, the stay is lifted.94 9 If the original execution
date has elapsed, the Board issues a warrant to the warden establishing a new date. 95 0 In
each case, the Board votes to determine whether it will accept additional applications
9 51
from the death-sentenced inmate.
Nevada
Distribution of Powers
The Nevada Constitution authorizes "[t]he governor, justices of the supreme court,
and attorney general, or a major part of them, of whom the governor shall be one," to
grant remittance of fines and forfeitures, commute punishments, and grant pardons in all
cases, except treason and impeachment, subject to legislative regulation of the
application process. 952 However, a sentence of death or life imprisonment with no
953
parole cannot be commuted to a sentence allowing parole.
Structure of Board
As required by the Nevada Constitution, the legislature has created the State Board
of Pardons Commissioners, which consists of the governor, the justices of the Supreme

939.
940.
941.
942.
943.
944.
945.
946.
947.
948.
949.
950.
951.
952.
953.

Neb. Bd. of Pardons, supra n. 924, at Rule 004.05.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Jd.
Neb. Bd. of Pardons, supra n. 924, at Rule 004.05.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Neb. Bd. of Pardons, supra n. 924, at Rule 004.05.
Id.
Id.
Nev. Const. art. 5, § 14(1).
Id. at art. 5, § 14(2).
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Court, and the attorney general. 95 4 Board members who have served as a district judge
or as a justice of the Supreme Court for at least four years are entitled to compensation
equal to two percent of their annual salary as a judge per year of service. 9 55 Board
956
members have the authority to administer oaths and affirmations.
Process
Any person seeking executive clemency in Nevada must submit an application to
the Board. 957 The notice must include the following information:
(a) [t]he court in which the judgment was rendered; (b) [t]he amount of the fine or
forfeiture, or the kind or character of punishment; (c) [t]he name of the person in whose
favor the application is to be made; (d) [t]he particular grounds upon which the application
will be based; and (e) [a]ny other information deemed relevant by the Secretary.
At least thirty days before the Board meets to consider the application, the Board must
notify the district attorney and district judge in the county of conviction. 959 The notice
must solicit their recommendations and invite them to testify at the hearing. 960 Notice is
961
not required, however, for an application to commute a death sentence.
All district attorneys receiving notice of an application for clemency must send the
Board a written statement of the facts surrounding the commission of the offense and any
other information affecting the merits of the application. 962 The district attorney must
9 63
also forward a copy of the notice to the victim if the victim has requested such notice.
The Board meets semiannually, but any member of the board or the executive
secretary may call a special meeting with the governor's consent. 964 Clemency
applications must be submitted at least sixty days before the semiannual meeting and
must state whether or not a hearing is requested. 9 65 In general, the Board will not
consider an application unless the director of the Department of Corrections has
recommended the application to the Secretary of the Board.9 66 The Secretary then has
the authority to place an application on the agenda, granting the applicant a hearing
before the Board. 967 The Board retains authority, however, to review an application that
lacks a recommendation from the director of the Department of Corrections or the

954.
955.
956
957.

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(1) (2005).
Id. at § 213.015(1).
Id. at § 213.050(1).
Id. at § 213.020(1).

958 Id.
959. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 213.020(3)-(4). The thirty-day requirement may be waived for good cause. Id. at §
213.020(4).
960. Nev. Admin. Code § 213.060 (2006).
961. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 213.030(2) (2005).
962. Id. at § 213.040(1).
963. Id. at § 213.040(2). The district attorney must treat the victim's personal information, including
address, as confidential. Id.
964. Id. at § 213.010(2); Nev. Admin. Code § 213.020(1), (3) (2006).
965. Nev. Admin. Code §§ 213.040(1), 213.050(7) (2006). The governor may waive the sixty-day period for
special hearings of the board. Id. at § 213.040(2).
966. Id. at § 213.090(1).
967. Id. at § 213.090(2).
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968
approval of the Secretary.
Upon request, the Board must give written notice at least fifteen days before a
meeting to the victims of the crimes committed by each person who is applying for
clemency; each victim may submit a written response to the Board at any time before the
meeting. 969 Hearings before the Board are informal. 970 The Board may, however,
require that testimony be given under oath, require the applicant's
presence at the
9 71
hearing, and accept affidavits and depositions for consideration.

When a death sentence is commuted, the Board must sign a written statement
containing: (1) the name of the person receiving clemency; (2) the time and place where
conviction occurred; (3) the punishment substituted for the death penalty; and (4) the
location where the substitute punishment will take place. 972 In all cases in which
clemency is granted, the Board must provide written notice to the victim at his or her
request.

97 3

New Hampshire
Distribution of Powers
The New Hampshire Constitution vests the "power of pardoning" in the governor,
with the advice of the Executive Council. 974 The governor may, with the advice of the
Council, pardon a death-sentenced inmate on the condition that he will remain
imprisoned for life or any term of years expressed in the pardon. 975 Similarly, the
governor and Council may respite the execution of a death sentence while legal
proceedings are pending or if more time is needed to investigate and consider the
application.

97 6

Structure of Board
The Executive Council is not a typical pardons board. It is rather a constitutionally
created core of the New Hampshire executive branch that advises the governor. 977 The
Council consists of five people who serve two-year terms. 97 8 The governor has the
authority to convene the Council at his or her discretion and, with them, to direct "the

968. Id.at § 213.090(3).
969. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(3).
970. Nev. Admin. Code § 213.190 (2006).
971. Id. at § 213.200.
972. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 213.080(1) (2005).
973. Id. at § 213.095.
974. N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 52.
975. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4:23 (Lexis 2001). The New Hampshire legislature refers to the commutation of
the death sentence as a pardon. It would thus appear that the phrase "pardoning power" in the New Hampshire
Constitution encompasses all typical forms of executive clemency, and hence the governor's commutation
power is actually constitutionally based rather than statutorily based.
976. Id. at § 4:24. A temporary respite may also be granted if it appears to the governor and Council that the
death-sentenced inmate has become insane or is pregnant. Id.
977. N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 60.
978. Id.
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affairs of the state, according to the laws of the land." 97 9
Process
Very little statutory or regulatory guidance is provided for the clemency
application process. Pardon forms are available through the Office of the Attorney
General. 98 Written notice of the clemency application must be given to the state's
counsel and to those identified by the governor. 98 1 In addition, the prosecuting attorney
may be required to provide a statement of the case and any other relevant facts.9 82 The
governor may summon witnesses to appear before him or her and the Council, to testify
983
at hearings, and to produce documents.
New Jersey
Distribution of Powers
The governor may "grant pardons and reprieves in all cases other than
impeachment and treason, and may suspend and remit fines and forfeitures." 984 The
New Jersey Constitution allows the legislature to create a commission or other body to
advise the governor in clemency-related matters. 985
The governor may, upon a
prisoner's application, commute the sentence under whatever terms he or she may
direct. 986 The governor must report each grant of clemency to the legislature; the report
must include the name of the convicted person, the person's crime, the sentence
imposed, its date, and the date of the clemency grant, as well as the governor's reasons
987
for granting clemency.
Structure of Board
The New Jersey State Parole Board consists of a chairperson and eight associate
members. 98 8 Each member is appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of
the Senate and must have training or experience in law, sociology, criminal justice,
juvenile justice, or related fields. 9 89 All terms are for six years. 990 The governor may
remove any Board member from office for cause. 99 1 Members are full-time employees
who are compensated in accordance with state law. 992 All policies and determinations

979.
980.
981.
982.
983.
984.
985.
986.
987.
988.
989.
990.
991.
992.

N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 62.
Personal communication from representative of the governor's office to authors.
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4:21 (Lexis 2001).
Id.
Id. at § 4:28.
N.J. Const. art. V, § 2(1).
Id.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:167-4 (West 1985).
Id. at § 2A:167-3.1 (West Supp. 2006).
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-123.47(a) (West 1997).
Id.
Id.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-123.47(b).
Id. at § 30:4-123.47(c).
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993

Process
Applications for commutation of sentences, other than death sentences, must be
made on forms prescribed by the governor. 994 The governor may refer the application to
the Board for an investigation. 995 Upon referral, the Board must thoroughly investigate
and issue a written report and recommendation to the governor; however, the Board's
recommendation is not binding on the governor. 996 The Board has not published or
promulgated regulations concerning the executive clemency application process.
New Mexico
Distribution of Powers
The governor has the power to grant reprieves and pardons, subject to legislative
requirements. 997 By statute, the New Mexico Parole Board is authorized to investigate
998
clemency applications and report to the governor upon his or her request.
Structure of Board
The Parole Board consists of fifteen members appointed by the governor with the
consent of the Senate. 999 Members serve staggered, six-year terms.1l ° ° The governor
may remove a member for any reason and is responsible for designating the
chairperson.100 1 Members of the Board must be "qualified by such academic training or
professional experience as is deemed necessary to render them fit," and no member can
1 2
be an official or employee of any other government entity.
00 Members are not salaried
10 0 3
expenses.
cover
to
but receive a per diem and mileage
The Board has the power to conduct "investigations, examinations, interviews,
hearings and other proceedings" in order to perform its duties. 1004 The100Board
may also
5
summon witnesses, documents, or tangible things and administer oaths.
Process
State statutes do not specify any procedures for clemency applications.

993.
994.
995.
996.
997.
998.
999.
1000.
1001
1002.
1003.
1004.
1005.

Id. at § 30:4-123.48(a) (West Supp. 2006).
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:167-6 (West 1985).
Id. at § 2A: 167-7.
Id.
N.M. Const. art. V, § 6.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-21-17 (Lexis 2000).
Id. at § 31-21-24(A) (Lexis Supp. 2006).
Id. at § 31-21-24(B).
N.M. Const. art. V, § 5; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-21-24(C), (F).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-21-24(D).
Id. at § 31-21-24(E).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-21-25(B)(2) (Lexis Supp. 2006).
Id. at § 31-21-25(B)(3).
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New York
Distribution of Powers
The governor has the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons for all
offenses except treason and cases of impeachment, subject to legislative regulations
concerning the application process. 1006 The governor must report annually to the
legislature each case of clemency granted, including the name of each convict, his crime,
the sentence and its date, and the date clemency was granted.10 07 In addition, the
governor may issue a subpoena to compel the attendance of persons-either before the
governor or an appointed hearing examiner--and to compel the production1009of
documents. 1008 The governor or the appointed examiner may also administer oaths.
Structure of Board
Upon the governor's request, the New York Parole Board must investigate and
report "the facts, circumstances, criminal records and social, physical, mental and
0 10
psychiatric conditions and histories of inmates under consideration" for clemency.'
The Executive Clemency Bureau within the Division of Parole screens candidates to
information concerning
determine if they meet the eligibility requirements, gathers
10 11
applicants.
with
corresponds
and
applications,
clemency
Process
Pardons are considered in the following circumstances when no other adequate
administrative or legal remedy is available: (1) to set aside a conviction when there is
"overwhelming and convincing proof of innocence not available at the time of
the conviction; or (3) to prevent
conviction"; (2) to relieve a disability resulting from
10 12
deportation or permit reentry into the United States.
Commutation reduces the minimum period of imprisonment, enabling the inmate
to apply for parole earlier than the original sentence would permit. 10 13 The Board of
Parole determines when prisoners are eligible for parole; as a matter of policy, the
governor does not consider these prisoners eligible for clemency. 10 14 Commutation is
available only if (1) the term or minimum period of imprisonment exceeds one year; (2)
the person has served at least one-half of the minimum period of imprisonment; (3) the
person will not become eligible for parole within one year from the date of application;
and (4) the person is not eligible for parole at the Board's discretion. 10 15 Commutation

1006.
1007.
1008.
1009.
1010.
1011.
1012.
1013.
1014.
1015.

N.Y. Const. art. IV, § 4.
Id.
N.Y. Correct. Law §§ 261, 262 (McKinney 2003).
Id. at § 263.
N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-c(8) (McKinney 2005).
New York State ParoleHandbook § 9(4), http://parole.state.ny.us/Handbook.pdf (rev., Feb. 2005).
Id. at § 9(2).
Id. at § 9(3).
Id.
Id.
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North Carolina
Distribution of Powers
The North Carolina Constitution grants the governor the sole power to grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons--except in cases of impeachment--subject to
legislative regulation of the application process. 10 17 In any case in which the
Constitution authorizes the governor to grant a pardon, he or she may grant it subject to
"proper or necessary" conditions, restrictions, and limitations. 10 18 The governor has the
power to determine whether a violation of a conditional pardon has occurred, and, if so,
the duty to order the person confined for the remainder of the sentence. 10 19 The North
Carolina legislature has created the Post-Release Supervision and Parole Commission,
which assists the governor at his or her request in exercising executive clemency
authority. 1020
Structure of Commission
The Post-Release Supervision and Parole Commission consists of one full-time
and two part-time members appointed to four-year terms by the governor from persons
"whose recognized ability, training, experience, and character qualify them for service
on the Commission." 10 2 1 The governor has the power to designate the chairperson and
10 2 2
to remove any member from office for misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance.
All matters are decided by majority vote of the full Commission. 1° 23 Members of the
Commission receive the salary fixed by the General Assembly, as well as necessary
travel and subsistence expenses. 1024
Process
Pardon
There are three types of pardons in North Carolina. A pardon of forgiveness is
granted to those requesting forgiveness of their crimes. 102 5 It does not expunge or erase
a criminal record nor does it restore their right to own or possess a firearm. 1026 An

1016. New York State ParoleHandbook, supra n. 1011, at § 9(4).
1017. N.C. Const. art. III, § 5(6).
1018. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 147-23 (Lexis 2005).
1019. Id. at § 147-24.
1020. Id. at § 143B-266(a).
1021. Id. at § 143B-267.
1022. Id.
1023. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-267.
1024. Id.
1025. Off. Exec. Clemency, Glossary of Terms, http://www.doc.state.nc.us/clemency/glossary.htm (accessed
Mar. 8, 2007).
1026. Id.
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unconditional pardon may be granted where it would assist the person to seek
employment; it also restores the recipient's right to own and possess a firearm. 1027 A
pardon of innocence declares an individual innocent of the crime after it has been
determined by a court that the individual is not guilty. 10 28 It allows the recipient to
pursue expungement of his criminal record. 1029 The pardon in and of itself does not
0 30
expunge or erase a criminal record; expungement is handled by the judiciary.
The North Carolina legislature has mandated that every application for pardon
must be in writing, signed by the party seeking clemency or his representative, and sent
to the governor. 10 31 The application must contain the grounds upon which the pardon is
sought and include a certified copy of the indictment, the verdict, and judgment in the
case. 1032

Once an application is complete, an investigation--coordinated by the Office of
Executive Clemency within the governor's office-is conducted, after which the case is
presented to the governor for decision. 1033 By statute, the Office of Executive Clemency
must notify the victim when it is considering granting a pardon. 1034 The victim has a
constitutional right to this notice, as well as the right to present a written statement for
0 35
consideration by the Office before a pardon is granted.
A person must wait to apply for a pardon until at least five years have passed since
he was released from state supervision (including probation and parole). 1036 The
governor, however, has discretion to reduce the waiting period if the applicant can
demonstrate a "specific need." 10 37 A three-year waiting period exists from the date of
denial of one application until another application may be made. 1038 The governor also
has discretion to reduce the waiting period when new or additional information becomes
10 39
available.
Commutation
A commutation serves to commute the sentence of a presently incarcerated person
or to reduce a sentence by a specified amount of time, to reduce it to time served, or to

1027. Id.
1028. Id.
1029. Id.
1030. Off. Exec. Clemency, supra n. 1025.
1031. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 147-21 (Lexis 2005).
1032. Id.
1033. The Governor's Clemency Office processes all requests for and inquiries about Executive Clemency,
oversees and coordinates investigations, prepares reports and drafts Executive Clemency Orders for the
Governor. Off. Exec. Clemency, supra n. 1025.
1034. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-838 (Lexis 2005).
1035. N.C. Const. art. I, § 37(l)(f)-(g); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-838. Although no time frame is given, the
governor's office will give the victim twenty to thirty days from the date the notification is received to present
his or her views on the clemency application. Personal communication from representative of the governor's
office to authors.
1036. Off. Exec. Clemency, supra n. 1025.
1037. Personal communication from representative of the governor's office to authors.
1038. Id.
1039. Id.
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make it parole eligible. 10 40 The application for a commutation is the same as for a
pardon except that the governor must be informed of the current legal status of the
person's case. 104 1 Victims of crimes have the right to be notified that commutation is
being considered, to be heard, 10 4 2 and, if a commutation is granted, to receive notice
within twenty days of the decision. 1043 Also to be notified in the event of commutation
are the victim's spouse, children, and parents; any other members of the victim's family
who request in writing to be notified; and the Chairs of the Joint Legislative Corrections,
Crime Control, and Juvenile Justice Oversight Committee. 1044
Ohio
Distribution of Powers
The Ohio Constitution vests the power of executive clemency in the governor,
subject to legislative regulation of the application process. 1045 The governor must report
to the legislature during every regular session each case of clemency that he or she has
granted; the report must include the inmate's name, crime, sentence, date of sentence,
date of clemency, and the reasons for the decision. 104 6 The legislature has created the
Adult Parole Authority, which administers the clemency regulations passed by the
legislature. 1047
Structure of Board
The Authority is part of the Parole and Community Services Division of the
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. 1048 The Authority is appointed by the
Director of the Department and consists of a Chief (Chairperson), one or more of the
Superintendents of the Field Services Section of the Department, and the chairperson of
the Parole Board. 1049 To be appointed Chief of the Authority, a person must be educated
10 50
or experienced in the fields of correctional work, law, or social work.
Process
All applications for executive clemency must be made to the Ohio Adult Parole
Authority for their investigation and recommendations. 10 5 1 To initiate the application
process for executive clemency, the inmate or his legal representative must request an

1040.
1041.
1042.
1043.
1044.
1045.
1046.
1047.
1048.
1049.
1050.
1051.

Off. Exec. Clemency, supra n. 1025.
Personal communication from representative of the governor's office to authors.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-838.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 147-16(b)(1) (Lexis 2005).
Id. at § 147-16(2)-(4).
Ohio Const. art. III, § 11.
Id.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5149.02 (West Supp. 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at § 2967.07 (West 1997).
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application form from the Authority. 10 52 The completed application must be returned to
the Authority, which will subsequently investigate the inmate's case and make
recommendations to the governor concerning whether or not clemency should be
05 3
granted. 1
During the investigation, the Authority must comply with several notification
requirements. 10 54 At least three weeks before making a recommendation, the Authority
must notify the judge of the court where the inmate was indicted, the prosecutor, and,
upon request, the victim or the victim's representative. 10 55 The notice must inform the
victim that he or she has the right to submit written statements to the Authority
concerning the effects of the crime and recommendations concerning whether or not
clemency should be granted. 10 56 The Authority must consider the victim statements
before making its final recommendation. 10 57 In cases involving the death penalty, the
governor may modify the notice requirements if there is not enough time in which to
058
comply with them. 1
The Authority may require the prosecutor and the judge to submit a brief statement
of the facts from the trial, as well as a recommendation for or against granting
clemency. 1 059 The governor may grant a reprieve to a person under a sentence of death
requirements and may even do so in
without complying with the mandatory notification
060
1
inmate.
the
from
application
an
the absence of
Once the Board has conducted its investigation, it must forward its
recommendations, along with a brief summary of the case and the record of its
investigation, to the governor for a final decision. 1 061 If the inmate has applied for a
pardon or commutation, the governor has several options. 10 62 He or she may grant the
inmate a full pardon or a full commutation or attach such conditions as he or she sees
fit. 10 6 3
The inmate must agree to those conditions and sign the warrant granting
10 64
clemency; at least one witness must attest to the warrant.
If an inmate is pardoned and released from prison, the Authority must notify the
prosecutor at least two weeks before the release date. 1065 The notice must contain: (1)
the inmate's name; (2) the inmate's release date; (3) the offense for which the inmate
was convicted; (4) the inmate's conviction date; (5) the sentence imposed on the inmate;

1052. Ohio Parole Bd., Application for Executive Clemency Instructions and Guidelines, http://
www.cjpf.org/clemency/OhioApp2.pdf (last modified June 16, 2005). This site provides a sample clemency
form. To obtain an official form, the inmate must directly contact the Adult Parole Authority of the Ohio
Parole Board.
1053. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2967.07.
1054. Id. at § 2967.12 (West Supp. 2006).
1055. Id. at § 2967.12(A)-(B).
1056. Id. at § 2967.12(B).
1057. Id.
1058 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2967.12(D).
1059. Id. at § 2967.03 (West 1997).
1060. Id. at § 2967.08.
1061. Id. at § 2967.07.
1062. Id. at § 2967.04.
1063 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2967.04(A).
1064. Id.
1065. Id. at § 2967.121(A) (West Supp. 2006).
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(6) the length of time that the inmate will be under supervision (if applicable); (7) contact
information for the inmate's6 supervising officer; and (8) the address where the inmate
106
will reside once released.
Oklahoma
Distribution of Powers
The Oklahoma Constitution vests the power of executive clemency in the governor
but mandates that he or she may not grant clemency unless a majority of the members of
the Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board recommend it. 1067 The governor may, however,
grant reprieves, which may not extend beyond sixty days without the consent of the
Board. 1068 The constitution also allows the legislature to impose restrictions and
10 69
regulations upon the governor's executive clemency power.
Structure of Board
The Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board consists of five members, three of which
are appointed by the governor. 1070 One member is appointed by the Chief Justice of the
Oklahoma Supreme Court, and one is appointed by the Presiding Judge of the Oklahoma
Criminal Court of Appeals. 10 7 1 The terms of the members expire at the same time that
the governor's term expires, and members are removable only for cause. 10 72 The Board,
which is authorized to hire professional investigators, must impartially investigate all
applications for clemency and recommend applicants that it deems worthy of clemency
to the governor. 1073 New members of the Board receive twelve hours of training, and all
members must complete an additional six hours of training for each year that they serve
on the Board. 10 74 The members select
their own chairperson. 1075 By law, Board
107 6
public.
the
meetings must be open to
Process
The chairperson determines when the Pardon and Parole Board will meet to
evaluate clemency applications. 1077 The Board must provide all prosecutors in the state
with a list of the clemency applications to be considered at the next board meeting at
least twenty days in advance. 1078 Similarly, the Board must notify members of the

1066.
1067.
1068.
1069.
1070.
1071.
1072.
1073.
1074.
1075.
1076.
1077.
1078.

Id. at § 2967.121(B).
Okla. Const. art. VI, § 10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Okla. Const. art. VI, § 10.
Id.; Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 332.1 (2001).
Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 332.1A (2001).
Id. at tit. 57, § 332.4(A).
Id. at tit. 57, § 332.2(G).
Id. at tit. 57, § 332.2(A).
Id. at tit. 57, § 332.2(B).
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10 7 9
victim's families and inform them of their right to testify at the hearing.
At the hearing, time must be set aside for testimony from the prosecutor, the
victim's family members, and the inmate or those acting on his behalf. 10 80 For security
purposes, the Board regulates admittance to the hearings, generally not allowing the
inmate and the victim's family to be present at the same time. 10 8 1 The victim's family
members receive five minutes to address the Board at the hearing, and no more than two
victim's family members per offender may appear. 1 082 Unlike most communications
between the Board and family members, statements made at the hearing are not
confidential. 10 83 Prosecutors and law enforcement officials are also allowed to address
10 8 4
the Board but are subject to the same limitations if they speak on the victim's behalf.
Persons speaking on the inmate's behalf receive two minutes to address the Board, and
no more than two people appear on behalf of a single inmate. 1085 The offender may also
be eligible to appear, and there are no limitations imposed on the amount of time that he
1086
may take in addressing the Board.
Within twenty days of the hearing, the Board must send written notification of its
recommendation to the victim's family members. 10 87 Anyone can inquire about the
Board's decision sooner than that by telephoning the Board's office. 10 8 8 After twenty
days, the recommendations of the Board may also be viewed on the Board's website,
which is the Board's chosen method of notification. 10 89 However, the Board must still
090
notify the members of the victim's family.1

If the Board does not approve an inmate's application for clemency, the
application is deemed denied. 109 1 If the Board approves an inmate's application, it must
forward its recommendation, along with the application itself, to the governor within
thirty days. 1° 92 The governor then has ninety days to grant or deny clemency, and the
application is deemed denied if no action is taken in that time. 1093 If the governor grants
clemency, the Board must provide written notification to (1) the sheriff of the county
where the inmate was sentenced; (2) the prosecutor of the county where the inmate was
sentenced; (3) the chief law enforcement officer of any city or town in the county where
the inmate was sentenced, upon request; and (4) any victim who previously requested to
be notified, provided the Board does not disclose the address of the inmate's new place

1079.
1080.
1081.
1082.
1083.
1084.
1085.
1086.
1087.
1088.
1089.
1090.
1091.
1092.
1093.

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 57, § 332.2(C).
Okla. Admin. Code § 515:1-7-1(b)-(d) (Supp. 2005).
Id. at § 515:1-7-1 (a).
Id. at § 515:1-7-2(b).
Id.
Id. at § 515:1-7-2(c).
Okla. Admin. Code § 515:1-7-2(d).
id. at § 515:1-7-2(e).
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 57, § 332.2(D).
Okla. Admin. Code § 515:1-5-2(a) (Supp. 2005).
Id. at§ 515:1-5-2(b).
Id. at § 515:1-5-2(d).
Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 332.19 (2001).
Id.
Id.
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094

of residence. 1

Anyone submitting information to the Board may assert or substantiate a claim of
confidentiality; in the absence of such a claim, the infornation will be publicly
available.10 95 However, the following information is always considered confidential: (1)
victim protest letters; (2) correspondence from persons exercising their rights under the
Oklahoma Constitution; (3) an inmate's criminal history not resulting in convictions; (4)
juvenile records; (5) medical records; (6) references to Department of Corrections
internal investigations; (7) pre-sentence investigations; and (8) any "other information
deemed confidential by the [Board's] Executive Director or General Counsel pursuant to
Oklahoma7 law."'1 096 Publicly available information can be reproduced at the Board's
office.

10 9

One of the interesting features of the clemency process in Oklahoma is that the
Board sets aside time for public input during its monthly business meeting. 10 98 Anyone
can place an item on the agenda by contacting the Board's office at least seven days
before the meeting and having the item approved by the chairperson at least three days in
advance.10 99 Additionally, the chairperson may recognize anyone to speak at the
hearing. 1100
Oregon
Distribution of Powers
The governor of Oregon has the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons for all offenses except treason, subject to legislative regulations. 1 101 Similarly,
the governor has the power to remit fines and forfeitures, as regulated by the
legislature. 1102 He or she must report to the legislature at its next meeting each case of
03
clemency granted and the reasons for the grant. 11
Structure of Board
The Oregon legislature has created the State Board of Parole and Post-Prison
Supervision, but the Board's only clemency-related responsibility is supplying records to
11
the governor. 04

1094.
1095.
1096.
1097.
1098.
1099.
1100.
1101.
1102.
1103.
1104.

Id.at § 360(B).
Okla. Admin. Code § 515:1-3-2(d) (Supp. 2005).
Id.
Id. at § 515:1-3-2(a).
Id. at § 515:1-7-2(a).
Id. at § 515:1-7-2(a)(2).
Okla. Admin. Code § 515:1-7-2(a)(1).
Or. Const. art. V, § 14; Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.649 (2005).
Or. Const. art. V, § 14.
Id.
Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.650(3) (2005).
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Process
When an application for clemency is made to the governor, a copy of the signed
application must be served on: (1) the district attorney of the county of conviction; (2)
the district attorney of the county in which the applicant is incarcerated; (3) the State
Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision; and (4) the Director of the Department of
Corrections.1105 Proof of service by affidavit must be presented to the governor. 1106 All
recipients of the above-described notice must provide any requested information, records
relating to the case, and any other relevant information to the governor. 1107 Relevant
information that must be provided includes: (1) statements by the crime victim or the
crime victim's immediate family; (2) a statement by the district attorney of the108county of
conviction; and (3) photos of the victim and the autopsy report, if applicable.
Following receipt by the governor of a clemency application, he or she is
prohibited from granting the application for at least thirty days. 109 If the governor has
not granted clemency in 180 days, the application is deemed denied, and the inmate must
11 10
reapply.
Pennsylvania
Distribution of Powers
In all criminal cases except impeachment, the governor has the power to remit
fines and forfeitures and to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons.1 l l ' The
governor may exercise his or her power to grant pardons and commutations, however,
1112
only on the written recommendation of the majority of the Board of Pardons.
Additionally, if the case involves a death sentence or life imprisonment, the governor
may not act except on the unanimous recommendation of the Board of Pardons and only
3
after a full hearing in open session after public notice. 111
Structure of Board
The Board of Pardons is composed of the lieutenant governor, who is chairperson,
the attorney general, and three members appointed by the governor with the consent of
the Senate. 1 1 14 The three members appointed by the governor must be residents of the
state.11 15 Additionally, one must be a crime victim, one a corrections expert, and the

1105.
1106.
1107.
1108.
1109.
1110.
1111.
1112.
1113.
1114.
1115.

Id. at § 144.650(1).
Id. at § 144.650(2).
Id. at § 144.650(3).
Id.
Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.650(4).
Id.
Pa. Const. art. IV, § 9(a).
Id.
Id.
Pa. Const. art. IV, § 9(b).
Id.
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1117
6
third a doctor of medicine, psychiatrist, or psychologist. 111 Terms are for six years.
Three members constitute a quorum. 118 The Board's records of its actions are open for
public inspection at all times. 119

Process
Applications for clemency are made on forms prescribed by the Board.1 120 A fee
is required to obtain the form although the Board may waive the fee if the applicant
provides evidence of indigency. 112 1 An individual must file the original application
along with ten copies with the Secretary of the Board.1 122 If a person is not confined at
the time of application, he must also furnish five passport-type photos. 1123 With the
exception of capital cases, an applicant for executive clemency must pay a filing fee,
which may be waived upon proof of indigency. 1124 In death penalty cases, the
application must be filed with the Board within ten days of the governor's issuance of a
112 5
death warrant specifying the execution date.
A copy of each application received is sent to the court, the district attorney of the
county of sentencing, and the correctional institution in which the applicant is confined
for the purpose of soliciting comments on the application's merits. 1126 Judges and
district attorneys have a statutory duty to provide information upon request of the
Board. 1 127 An additional copy is sent to the Board of Probation and Parole for
investigation. 1128
When the reports of the Board of Probation and Parole and the opinions of the trial
officials have been received, the Board will review the case and vote in public as to
whether a hearing will be granted. 1129 For prisoners serving life sentences or sentences
for crimes of violence, a majority of the Board is required to vote in favor of the
hearing. 1130 In all other non-capital cases, only two votes are required for the applicant
to obtain a hearing. 113 1 In capital cases, death-sentenced inmates seeking commutation
of their sentence automatically receive a public hearing. 132

1116. Id.
1117. 71 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 113 (West Supp. 2006).
1118. Id.
1119. Id.
1120. Pa. Code tit. 37, § 81.221 (2006).
1121. Id.
1122. Id. at § 81.222(a). The application is available for public inspection. Id. at § 81.227.
1123. Id. at § 81.222(b).
1124. Pa. Code tit. 37, § 81.225 (2006).
1125. 71 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 299(c) (West Supp. 2006); Pa. Code tit. 37, § 81.231(b) (2006).
1126. Pa. Code tit. 37, § 81.226(a) (2006).
1127. 71 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 299a (West 1990).
1128. Pa. Code tit. 37, § 81.226(a).
1129. Id. at § 81.226(b).
1130. Id. at § 81.231 (a). "Crimes of violence" include murder of the third degree, voluntary manslaughter,
rape, sexual assault, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, aggravated assault, robbery, kidnapping; an attempt
to commit any of the previous offenses; or an offense committed while in visible possession of a firearm. 71
Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 299(h); Pa. Code tit. 37, § 81.202 (2006).
1131. Pa. Code tit. 37, § 81.231(a).
1132. Id.at§81.231(b).
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If a public hearing is denied, the application is deemed denied at that time. 133 If a
public hearing is granted, the Board makes a reasonable effort to notify victims who are
registered with the Board's Office of Victim Advocate, as well as "those whose
whereabouts are otherwise known."' 1 1 34 Victims are notified that they are entitled to
offer "prior comment" regarding an application that has been granted a hearing, which
may be submitted in writing or presented orally. 1135 Written communications from the
1136
victim with the Board are confidential.
If a hearing is granted to a person sentenced to death or life or who was convicted
of murder, voluntary manslaughter, or an attempt to commit murder or voluntary
manslaughter, each member of the Board will interview the applicant before the public
hearing. 1137 If a Board member fails to interview the applicant, that member is
prohibited from voting on the application. 1138 The interview may be conducted either
individually or as a group. 1139 Although the interview is private, it must be recorded,
and "subsequent use" of the interview is left to the Board's discretion. 1140 The
applicant's attorney may attend the interview. 1141
Hearings of the Board are public and audiotaped for preservation purposes. 1142 A
confined applicant is prohibited from attending the public hearing, but he may designate
a person to appear on his behalf.1 14 3 If the applicant is not confined at the time of the
be
hearing, he must appear unless excused by the Board. 1144 Applicants may 1 145
them.
by
designated
person
any
by
or
counsel
retained
privately
represented by
Additionally, confined applicants may request representation from the Department of
of Pennsylvania may attend the
Corrections.1146 The attorney for the Commonwealth
114 7
hearing and offer his or her recommendation.
In non-capital cases, fifteen minutes are allowed for the entire presentation in
The same amount of time is allotted for the
support of an application. 1148
opposition. 1 149 In capital cases, however, a maximum of thirty minutes is allowed for
each side. 1150 The Board may also request or subpoena a witness to appear at the

1133. Id. at § 81.226(b).
1134. Id. at § 81.226(c). Aside from this personal notice, the Board must also publish a general notice at least
one week before the hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the offenses were
committed. Id. at § 81.233.
1135. 71 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 299(d); Pa. Code tit. 37, § 81.226(d).
1136. Pa. Code tit. 37, § 81.226(d).
1137. 71 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 299(e); Pa. Code tit. 37, § 81.232(a) (2006).
1138. Pa. Code tit. 37, § 81.232(b).
1139. Id. at § 81.232(c).
1140. Id.
1141. Id.
1142. Id. at § 81.263.
1143. Pa. Code tit. 37, § 81.281 (2006).
1144. Id.
1145. Id. at § 81.282.
1146. Id.
1147. Id.
at § 81.283.
1148. Pa, Code tit. 37, § 81.292(a) (2006).
1149. Id.
1150. Id. at § 81.292(b).
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hearing. 1151
The application must be approved by the Board at a public hearing by a majority
vote. 1 152 An application for commutation of a death or life imprisonment sentence must
be approved by the Board at a public hearing by a unanimous vote. 1153 If a
recommendation for commutation is granted to a person sentenced to death or life or
who was convicted of murder, voluntary manslaughter, or an attempt to commit murder
or voluntary manslaughter, the recommendation to the governor must include a
requirement that the individual serve at least one year in a "prerelease center" before he
is released on parole. 1154 Recommendations for commutations are always conditional
because the person must not commit any probation or parole violations or any new
criminal offenses. 115 5 Recommendations for pardons may be made conditional in the
115 6
same manner.
Finally, an applicant may ask the Board to reconsider any decision. 1157 The
applicant must show a change of circumstances or "other compelling reasons" to warrant
reconsideration. 1158 The request is taken up at the next public hearing upon a public
motion by any Board member. 1159
A majority vote is required to grant
reconsideration. 1160
South Carolina
Distribution of Powers
South Carolina divides clemency power between the governor and the Probation,
Parole, and Pardon Services Board. By the South Carolina Constitution, the governor
has the sole power to grant reprieves and to commute a death sentence to a sentence of
life in prison. 116 1 The granting of all other clemency, however, is left to the
legislature.1162 By statute, the legislature has given the power to grant clemency in all
other cases solely to the Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services Board.1 163 The Board
also considers all petitions for reprieves and commutations of death sentences referred to
it by the governor for recommendation. 1164 In those cases, its recommendation is not
binding on the governor, but, if the governor does not follow the recommendation, he or
she must provide reasons for not doing so. 116 5 The governor is not obligated to refer

1151.
1152.
1153.
1154.
1155.
1156.
1157.
1158.
1159
1160.
1161.
1162.
1163.
1164.
1165.

Id. at § 81.293.
Id. at § 81.301(a).
Pa. Code tit. 37, § 81.301(a).
71 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 299(f); Pa. Code tit. 37, § 81.301(b).
Pa. Code tit. 37, § 81.301(c), (e).
Id. at § 81.301(d).
Id. at § 81.271(a).
Id.
Id. at § 81.271(b).
Pa. Code tit. 37, § 81.271(b).
S.C. Const. art. IV, § 14.
Id.
S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-920 (1989).
Id. at § 24-21-910 (Supp. 2005).
Id.
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116 6
cases that fall within his or her clemency authority to the Board for recommendation.

Structure of Board
The Board of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services has seven members,
appointed by the governor with the consent of the Senate, who each serve a six-year
term. 1167 Six of the seven members are appointed from each of the congressional
districts, with one member appointed at large. 116 8 The Board selects its own chairperson
each year. 1169 Members are not salaried but receive per diem and expenses. 1170 Board
members are subject to removal by the governor for "malfeasance, misfeasance,
incompetency, absenteeism, conflicts of interest, misconduct, persistent neglect of duty
117 1
in office, or incapacity.,
Process
In South Carolina, a pardon means that the "individual is fully pardoned from all
the legal consequences of his crime and of his conviction, direct and collateral." 1 17 2 By
statute, each pardon application must be accompanied by an application fee, which is
applied towards the "pardon process. ' '1173 In addition, the offender must have paid in
74
full any restitution ordered by the court to be eligible for a pardon. 11
The legislature has established criteria that, when satisfied, require the Board to
consider the application for pardon. The Board must consider a request for pardon when
the applicant has either completed probation, been discharged from confinement without
parole, or has successfully completed parole or at least five years of parole. 1175 Those
who are incarcerated at the time of application are eligible only when evidence of
"extraordinary circumstances" is produced.l176 Additionally, "[t]he victim of a crime or
a member of a convicted person's family living within [South Carolina] may petition for
a pardon for a person who has completed supervision or has been discharged from a
1
sentence." 177
To obtain a pardon from the Board, the applicant must write to the Department of
Probation, Parole and Pardon Services for an application. 1178 The application has three
components: (1) written letters of reference; (2) information from the applicant; and (3)
the application fee. 1179 After the individual submits the application, it is investigated by

1166. Id.
1167. Id at § 24-21-10(B)-(C).
1168. S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-10(B).
1169. Id.
1170. Id. at § 24-21-12.
1171. Id. at § 24-21-11; id. at § 1-3-240(C) (2005).
1172. S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-940 (1989).
1173. Id. at § 24-21-960(A) (Supp. 2005).
1174. Id. at § 17-25-322(E) (2003).
1175. Id. at § 24-21-950(A)(1)-(3) (Supp. 2005).
1176 Id. at § 24-21-950(A)(4).
1177. S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-950(A)(5).
1178. Dept. of Probation, Parole & Pardon Servs., Applying for a Pardon:Frequently Asked Questions, http://
www.dppps.sc.gov/pardon-faq.html (accessed Feb. 4, 2007).
1179. Id.
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agents of the Department in the county where the offense was committed.'1 180 When the
investigation is completed, the case is turned over to the Board for a hearing. 181
The Board must hold hearings during which it is statutorily obligated to permit
arguments and appearances by counsel or any individual before it. 1 182 However, an
applicant has no right of confrontation. 1183 The chairperson may direct that hearings be
conducted by three-member panels, and a unanimous decision of such a panel constitutes
a decision by the Board. 1 84 A panel that is not unanimous does not constitute an act of
the Board, and the matter is referred to the entire Board for determination. 1185 The vote
of the majority of the Board usually constitutes the Board's decision. 1186 However, an
order of pardon must be signed by two-thirds of the members of the Board.' 18 ' No
written law, regulations, or guidelines exist with respect to commutations of sentences.
South Dakota
Distribution of Powers
The South Dakota Constitution gives the governor the power to grant pardons,
commutations, and reprieves, except in cases of treason and impeachment, and to
suspend and remit fines and forfeitures. 1188 The governor may, however, by executive
order delegate to the Board of Pardons and Paroles the authority to hear applications for
clemency and to make recommendations.l189 The governor is never, however, bound to
1190
follow the Board's recommendations.
Structure of Board
The Board of Pardons and Paroles consists of nine members. 11 9 1 The governor,
the attorney general, and the Supreme Court appoint three members each. 1192 For each
set of three, at least one appointee must be an attorney, for a minimum of three attorneys
on the Board. 193 Each member of the Board must be a resident of South Dakota and is
appointed only with the advice and consent of the Senate. 1194 Members serve four-year
terms and are eligible for reappointment. 1195 The chairperson is selected by the

1180.
1181.
1182.
1183.
1184.
1185.
1186.
1187.
1188.
1189.
1190.
1191.
1192.
1193.
1194.
1195.

Id.
Id.
S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-50 (Supp. 2005).
Id.
Id. at § 24-21-30(A).
Id.
Id.
S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-930.
S.D. Const. art. IV, § 3.
S.D. Codified Laws § 24-14-1 (2004).
Id.at § 24-14-5.
Id.at § 24-13-1.
Id.
Id.
S.D. Codified Laws § 24-13-1.
Id.at § 24-13-2.
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1 197
Board.1196 A majority of the Board is required for a quorum.
The Board is administered under the direction and supervision of the Department
of Corrections but retains "the quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative, advisory, and other nonadministrative functions otherwise vested in it" and exercises those functions
independently of the Department of Corrections. 1198 Board members
are compensated
1199
pursuant to statute for attending meetings and for their expenses.

Process
An individual must serve notice on the state's attorney who prosecuted the
individual or his or her successor at least thirty days before filing an application for
clemency with the Board." 2° Additionally, the applicant must publish notice once a
week for three consecutive weeks in one of the official newspapers of the county where
the offense was committed. 120 The notice must include the person's name, the offense,
the date of conviction, and the term
of imprisonment. 12 0 2 An affidavit of publication
120 3
must accompany the application.
Applications for clemency are on a form provided by the Board of Pardons and

Paroles. 1204 It must be accompanied by a written statement, signed by the applicant,
setting forth a "reasonable and realistic recommendation the [B]oard might make to the
12 6
12 5
[g]ovemor." 0 The statement may include any pleas supporting the application. 0
The application, notices, and any supporting papers must be filed at least thirty days
before the Board's regular meeting at which the hearing on the application is to be
120 7
held.
After the application is received, the Board gives notice to the prosecuting
120 8
attorney, the trial judge, and the sheriff of the county where the offense occurred.
Additionally, upon scheduling a clemency hearing, the Board must notify the victim. 1209
The executive director of the Board is responsible for filing a copy of the applicant's
12 10
prison record with his clemency application.
A hearing is held on all applications. 12 11 Verbal arguments and petitions before
the Board in support of or opposing any application for clemency are considered, and

1196. Id.at § 24-13-4.
1197. Id. at § 24-13-4.1.
1198. Id. at § 24-13-3.
1199. S.D. Codified Laws § 24-13-5 (2004).
1200. Admin. R. S.D. 17:60:05:03 (2006).
1201. S.D. Codified Laws § 24-14-4 (Supp.2006).
1202. Id.
1203. Id.
1204. S.D. Dept. of Corrects., Forms. Executive Clemency Pardon Application, http://www.state.sd.us/
corrections/forms.htm (accessed Feb. 4, 2007).
1205. Admin. R.S.D. 17:60:05:01 (2006).
1206. Id.
1207. Id. at 17:60:05:08.
1208. Id. at 17:60:05:06.
1209. S.D. Codified Laws § 24-14-4.1 (2004).
1210. Admin. R. S.D. 17:60:05:07 (2006).
1211. Id. at 17:60:05:06, 17:60:05:08.
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written statements that may have a bearing on the case are accepted. 1212 When
considering an application, the Board has established a set of non-exhaustive criteria,
including:
(1) Substantial evidence indicates that the sentence is excessive or constitutes a miscarriage
of justice;
(2) The applicant's innocence of the crime for which he was convicted.., has been proven
by clear and convincing evidence;
(3) The applicant has shown remarkable rehabilitation;
(4) Substantial evidence indicates that the [B]oard should be in a position at the earliest
possible time to deal with the applicant as a parolee under supervision;
(5) Review of the applicant's personal and family history; his attitude, character,
capabilities, and habits; the nature and circumstances of the offense or offenses; and the
effect the inmate's release will have on the victims of his crime and the community
indicates that [the] applicant has carried the stigma of the crime for a long enough period to
justify its removal;
(6) The applicant wishes to pursue a professional career from which society can benefit,
but a felony conviction prevents it; and
(7) The applicant's age and medical status is such that it is in the best interest of society
12 13
that the inmate be released.

A favorable recommendation of clemency must be made by a majority of the
Board. 12 14 When the Board recommends clemency, a record is made of the findings,
which must include the reasons for the recommendation. 12 15 The record is furnished to
12 16
If the application is denied,
the governor, along with the Board's recommendation.
1217
matter.
the
rehear
or
the Board will not reconsider
Tennessee
Distribution of Powers
12 18
The
Tennessee vests the power of executive clemency in the governor.
governor has the power to grant reprieves and pardons after conviction, except in cases
of impeachment. 12 19 The legislature has given the Tennessee Board of Probation and
Parole the duty, upon the governor's request, to consider and to make nonbinding
1220
recommendations concerning all requests for pardons, reprieves, or commutations.

1212.
1213.
1214.
1215.
1216.
1217.
1218.
1219.
1220.

S.D. Codified Laws § 24-14-6 (2004); Admin. R. S.D. 17:60:01:06 (2006).
Admin. R. S.D. 17:60:05:12 (2006).
S.D. Codified Laws § 24-13-4.6 (2004).
Id. at § 24-14-7; Admin. R. S.D. 17:60:05:09 (2006).
Admin. R. S.D. 17:60:05:09.
Id. at 17:60:05:10.
Tenn. Const. art. 111,§ 6.
Id.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-104(a)(10) (Lexis 2003).
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Structure of Board
The Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole is composed of seven members who
are appointed by the governor and who are autonomous. 122 1 All members serve six-year
terms and are eligible for reappointment.] 2 22 In considering persons for appointment,
the governor is to give "preference to candidates with training, education or experience
in the criminal justice system, law, medicine, education, social work or the behavioral
sciences." 1223 No member of the Board may hold any other salaried public office or
engage in any other paid business or profession. 12 24 The governor appoints one member
of the Board to serve as its chairperson for a term of two years. 122 5 All votes of the
Board are 27
by public ballot or public roll call. 1226 A majority of the Board constitutes a
12
quorum.
The governor or the attorney general and reporter may remove a Board member for
knowing or willful misconduct in office, knowing or willful neglect, failure to perform
any duty, or the conviction of any felony offense. 122 8 Removal is conducted according
1229
to formal and general procedures provided by law.
The Board may make favorable or unfavorable recommendations, based upon its
application of guidelines and criteria adopted by the governor. 1230 The Board also has
the "authority upon request of the governor to issue warrants authorizing the arrest and
return to their former places of incarceration of persons who are reasonably believed to
have violated the conditions of their grants of executive clemency." 123 1 Also charged to
the Board is the duty, when requested by the governor, to collect records, make
investigations, and report to the governor the "facts, circumstances, criminal records, and
the social, physical, mental, and psychiatric conditions and histories of prisoners under
consideration" for clemency. 1232 Board members have the authority to administer oaths
and to issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of
documents. 1233
Process
Upon receiving a request for executive clemency, the Board sends the inmate an
executive clemency application with a cover letter explaining the application
1235
procedure.1234 The person requesting clemency must apply directly to the Board.

1221.
1222.
1223.
1224
1225.
1226.
1227.
1228.

Id. at § 40-28-103(a).
Id. at § 40-28-103(b).
Id. at § 40-28-103(c).
Id.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-103(e).
Id. at § 40-28-105(b).
Id. at § 40-28-105(d)(1).
Id. at § 40-28-105(f).

1229. Id.
1230.
1231.
1232.
1233.
1234.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-104(a)(10).
Id. at § 40-28-104(a)(13).
Id. at § 40-28-106(c).
Id. at § 40-28-106(a)(i)-(2).
Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1100-1-1-.15(l)(a)(1) (2006).
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An application for pardon must include enough evidence to enable the Board to
determine whether the applicant is eligible to be considered for a pardon under the
governor's guidelines. 1236 After reviewing the application and supporting information,
the Board decides whether the application should be scheduled for a hearing. 1237123If
the
8
applicant is deemed ineligible for consideration, he will be notified by the Board.
For commutation requests, the Board reviews the application and any supporting
information to determine whether the applicant is eligible for consideration and should
be scheduled for a hearing. 1239 If the application does not meet the
governor's criteria,
1240
the Board notifies the inmate that he is ineligible for consideration.
After the Board receives the application, the individual is notified as to whether he
will receive a hearing and, if so, the date, time, and place of the hearing. 124 1 Hearings
are held promptly following the notice to the applicant, unless they are delayed at the
applicant's request or pending receipt by the Board of essential information. 124 2 The
notice to the applicant explains that he is entitled to appear at the hearing and to present
witnesses and other evidence in his favor. 1243 The notice also includes a description of
the type of evidence considered by the Board. 1244 Notice of the hearing is also sent to
the appropriate judge and district attorney general. 1 24 5 The notice to the judge and
district attorney solicits their comments and recommendations concerning clemency for
24 6
the applicant. 1
For consideration at the hearing, the Board's staff may compile the following
information on the applicant:
(i) a reclassification/ parole summary completed by the institutional staff, if the applicant is
an inmate;
(ii) information about the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense and conviction.
Such information shall be obtained through investigation conducted by a parole officer or
other individual designated by the Board;
(iii) a psychiatric/psychological evaluation if the applicant is an individual convicted of a
sexual offense or sex related crime;
(iv) information about medical, mental and/or family problems or needs obtained through
investigation by a parole officer or other individual designated by the Board, if appropriate;
[and]
(v) the application, original request, and supporting evidence, and any correspondence in

1235.
1236.
1237
1238.
1239.
1240.
1241.
1242.
1243.
1244.
1245.
1246.

Id. at 1100-1-1-.15(!)(a)(2).
Id. at 1100-1-1-.15(l)(b)(1).
Id. at 1100-1-1-.15(1)(b)(2).
Id. at 1100-1-1-. 15(1)(b)(3).
Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1100-1-1-.15(l)(c)(1).
Id. at I 100-1-1-.15(1)(c)(2).
Id. at l100-1-1-.15(1)(d)(1).
Id.
Id.
Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. l100-1-1-.15(l)(d)(l).
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-126(b) (Lexis 2003); Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1100-1-1-.15(I)(d)(2).
Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1100-1-I-. 15(1)(d)(2).
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the Board's file concerning the application.

1247

Additional information is obtained if the applicant is requesting a pardon,
including: (1) information from FBI and local records checks; (2) information regarding
recent social history and reputation in the community; and (3) information verifying the
reasons for the pardon request. 124 8 The Board's staff obtains this information to ensure
that clemency hearings are not completely ex parte; however, the burden remains on the
1249
applicant to establish that he is entitled to clemency.
At a clemency hearing, the Board considers the following factors:
(i) the nature of the crime and its severity;
(ii) the applicant's institutional record;
(iii) the applicant's previous criminal record, if any;
(iv) the views of the appropriate trial judge and the district attorney general who prosecuted
the case;
(v) the sentences, ages and comparative degree of guilt of co-defendants or others involved
in the applicant's offense;
(vi) the applicant's circumstances if returned to the community;
(vii) any mitigating circumstances surrounding the offense;
(viii) the views of the community, victims of the crime or their families, institutional staff,
parole officers or other interested parties; and
250

(ix) medical and/or psychiatric evaluation when applicable. 1

At the end of the hearing, the Board may either inform the applicant of its
recommendation or take the case under advisement. 12 51 When the decision has been
made, the chairperson designates one member of the Board to prepare a report for the
governor. 12 52
This report must include: (1) a statement of the reasons for the
recommendation; (2) the complete file; (3) the views of the various Board members, if
the recommendation is not unanimous; and (4) whether the recommendation is positive
253
or negative, as well as any suggested terms and conditions. 1
After the Board's clemency recommendation, it must forward to the appropriate
standing committees of the legislature a written list of the names of all persons receiving
favorable and unfavorable recommendations for executive clemency along with the
12 54
reasons for the recommendations.
In reviewing the Board's recommendation, the governor seriously considers

1247.
1248.
1249.
1250.
1251.
1252.
1253.
1254.

Id. at 1100-1-1-.15(1)(d)(3).
Id. at 1100-1-1-.15(1)(d)(4).
Id. at 1100-1-1-.15(1)(d)(5).
Id. at 1100-1-1-.15(1)(d)(6).
Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1100-1-1-.15(1)(d)(7).
Id. at I 100-1-1-.15(1)(d)(8).
Id.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-107(b) (Lexis 2003); Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1100-1-1-.15(1)(f).
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commutation requests if the applicant has "demonstrated[] by clear and convincing
evidence that [he] has made exceptional strides in self-development and selfimprovement, and would be a law abiding citizen." 1255 Additionally, the applicant must
satisfy one of the following conditions:
A. Petitioner is suffering from a life-threatening illness or has a severe chronic disability,
said illness or disability is supported by appropriate medical documentation and the relief
requested would mitigate said illness or disability; or
B. Petitioner's parent, spouse or child has a life-threatening illness, said illness is supported
by appropriate medical documentation, and the petitioner is the only person able to assist in
the care of such person; or
C. Petitioner has been rehabilitated, is no longer a threat to society, has demonstrated, to
the extent his age and health permit, a desire and an ability
to maintain gainful
256
employment, and fairness supports the petitioner's application. 1
Tennessee also has a unique form of clemency called "exoneration." After
considering any newly discovered evidence in a particular case, the governor may grant
exoneration to any person whom he or she finds did not commit the crime for which the
person was convicted. 1257 However, a person may not apply for or receive exoneration
until all possible state judicial remedies have been exhausted. 12 58 As a matter of law,
exoneration unconditionally and automatically expunges all records of
the person's
2 59
1
citizenship.
of
rights
all
restores
and
conviction
and
arrest, indictment,
Texas
Distribution of Powers
The Texas Constitution mandates that the legislature establish a Board of Pardons
and Paroles. 1260 It vests in the governor the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons only upon a written recommendation signed by a majority of the Board.161 The
governor may, however, grant one reprieve in a capital case for a maximum of thirty
days.1262
Structure of Board
The Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles consists of seven members that are
appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. 126 3 To be eligible,

1255. Tenn. Bd. of Probation & Parole, Application for Commutation, http://cjpf.org/clemency/
TennesseeApp.pdf (last modified July 18, 2005).
1256. Id.
1257. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-27-109(a) (Lexis 2003).
1258. Id.
1259. Id. at § 40-27-109(b).
1260. Tex. Const. art. IV, § 11 (a).
1261. Id. atart. IV,§ 1l(b).
1262. Id.
1263. Tex. Govt. Code Ann. § 508.031(a) (2004). In 2003, legislation effective January 2004 reduced the
Board from eighteen members to seven. At the same time, the legislature authorized the Board to hire "parole
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Board members must be "representative of the general public" and have lived in Texas
for the two years preceding the appointment. 1264 A former employee of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice may not serve on the Board until two years have passed
since his or her employment was terminated, and no more than three Board members
may be former employees of the Department at any given time. 1265 Several provisions
126 6
also disqualify a person from Board membership based upon conflicts of interest.
Each Board member must receive training on the Board's roles and governing
laws. 1267 The governor designated one member of the Board to be the Presiding Officer;
the Presiding Officer serves as the administrative head of the Board, delegating
authorities and responsibilities, appointing advisory committees, and establishing
268
administrative policies and procedures.1
Board members serve terms of six years, and the terms are staggered so that onethird of them expire every two years. 1269 Members receive salaries determined by the
legislature. 1270 The governor may remove one of his or her own appointees "at any time
and for any reason." 127 1 However, members appointed by former governors may only
be removed for cause. 1272 Grounds for removal for cause are: (1) statutory ineligibility
for membership; (2) inability to discharge duties for a substantial part of the term
attend half of the regularly scheduled
because of illness or disability; and (3) failure to
1273
Board or panel meetings during a calendar year.
Board members have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. 1274 By
statute, Board members are not required to meet as a group to perform their duties in
127 5
clemency matters.
Process
Reprieve from a Death Sentence
The Board defines a reprieve as a "temporary release from the terms of an imposed

commissioners" to hear and decide parole matters in three-member panels that must include at least one Board
member. The eleven people who were Board members at the time the legislation became effective but were
not appointed in 2004 were employed as "parole commissioners." Because three-member panels have always
voted on parole decisions, this structural change in the Board has not affected parole considerations, as the
eighteen people making parole decisions now are the same as those who made them before the change.
Clemency decisions, however, are voted on by the entire Board and not by panels. Thus, rather than eighteen
votes, clemency matters are now decided by only seven. Personal communication from representative of the
governor's office to authors.
1264. Tex. Govt. Code Ann. § 508.032(a)-(b) (2004).
1265. Id. at § 508.032(c)-(d).
1266. Id. at § 508.033.
1267. Id.at § 508.0362.
1268. Id. at § 508.035.
1269. Tex. Govt. Code Ann. § 508.037(a)-(b) (2004).
1270. Id. at § 508.039.
1271. Id.at § 508.037(c).
1272. Id. at § 508.034(a).
1273. Id.
1274. Tex. Govt. Code Ann. § 508.048(b) (2004).
1275. Id.at § 508.047(b).
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sentence."' 1276 In a capital case, the governor is authorized to grant one reprieve not
exceeding thirty days. 1277 However, the governor may grant a longer reprieve upon the
278
recommendation of the Board. 1
Once an inmate's death warrant has been issued, he may apply for a reprieve from
the governor. 1279 An application written by, or on behalf of, an inmate must contain (1)
the name of the inmate and his attorneys or other representatives; (2) certified copies of
the indictment, judgment, jury verdict, and sentence, including a document verifying the
scheduled execution date; (3) a brief statement of the offense for which the inmate was
sentenced to death; (4) a brief history of all relevant appellate proceedings, including any
current proceedings; (5) a brief statement of all legal issues that have been raised during
the judicial proceedings; (6) the requested length of time for the reprieve, in thirty-day
increments; (7) all grounds for requesting the reprieve, as long as the grounds do not ask
the Board to decide technical questions of law that are better decided by a court; and (8)
a brief statement of the effect that the inmate's crime has had upon the victim's family
members.

12 80

An application for a reprieve must be delivered to the Board of Pardons and
Paroles no later than twenty-one days before the scheduled execution date.12 8 1 Any
supporting documentation must be submitted to the Board no later than fifteen days
12 82
before the scheduled execution date.
An inmate may request an interview in his application or any supplementary
filing. 1283 The interview is conducted at the prison by a member of the Board
designated by the presiding officer. 1284 Only the inmate, the designated Board member,
and Texas Department of Criminal Justice staff may attend the interview, and the Board
may consider the inmate's statements during the interview when evaluating his clemency
application. 1285
After the Board has received the application and conducted the interview, it may
recommend by majority vote that the governor grant the inmate a reprieve from
1287
1286
The Board does not have to meet to do either.
execution or refuse to do so.
Alternatively, the Board may schedule a hearing on the request for a reprieve, at which
any trial officials may attend and present information. 12 88 Upon request, the Board must
also notify a representative of the victim's family, allowing that family member to attend

1276. Tex. Admin. Code tit. 37, § 141.111(31) (2006).
1277. Id. at § 143.41(a).
1278. Id.at § 143.41(bHc).
1279. Id.at § 143.43(a) (stating that "[tlhe written application in behalf of a convicted person seeking a board
recommendation to the governor of a reprieve from execution must be delivered to the Texas Board of Pardons
and Paroles, Clemency Section, Austin, Texas, not later than the twenty-first calendar day before the execution
is scheduled").
1280. Id.at § 143.42.
1281. Tex. Admin. Code tit. 37, § 143.43(a) (2006).
1282. Id.at § 143.43(b).
1283. Id. at § 143.43(d).
1284. Id. at § 143.43(e).
1285. Id.
1286. Tex. Admin. Code tit. 37, § 143.43((l)-(2).
1287. Tex Govt. Code § 508.047(b).
1288. Tex. Admin. Code tit. 37, § 143.43(f)(3), (g).
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the hearing or submit written comments pertaining to the case.12 89 Additionally,
advocates for and against the death penalty generally and members of the public may
submit written comments for the Board's consideration at its headquarters at any
290
reasonable time. 1
Hearings are generally open to the public although the Board may meet in
executive session to discuss confidential matters. 1291 The Board's decision, which is by
majority vote, must be made and announced in an open meeting within a reasonable time
after the hearing. 12 92 If the Board recommends that a reprieve be granted, the governor
does not have to act upon that recommendation. 1293
Pardon
The Board defines a full pardon as an "unconditional act of executive clemency...
which serves to release the grantee from the conditions of his ... sentence and from any
disabilities imposed by law thereby."' 1294 A full pardon does not, however, declare a
person innocent of the crimes committed, nor does it truly absolve an offender of the
legal consequences of his crime, such as registering as a sex offender. 12 95 Only a special
pardon-a full pardon on the grounds of innocence-declares a person innocent of the
crime and provides for complete freedom from legal implications of the conviction. 1296
The Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles will not consider a request for a full
pardon from an inmate who is currently in prison unless "exceptional circumstances
exist." 1297 With respect to pardons on the grounds of innocence, the Board will not
consider an application unless it has a written recommendation from at least two trial
officials, accompanied by "documentary evidence of actual innocence," or the court's
recommendation. 1298 Such evidence may include DNA tests, other forensic tests, or
affidavits from witnesses. 1299 If the Board recommends0 that
a pardon be granted, the
0
recommendation.13
that
on
act
to
obligated
not
is
governor

1289. Id. at § 143.43(g).
1290. Id. at § 143.43(i).
1291. Id.at § 143.43(h).
1292. Id. at § 143.43(h), (j).
1293. Tex. Admin. Code tit. 37, § 143.42 (stating "the board will consider recommending to the governor a
reprieve of execution of death sentence").
1294 Tex. Admin. Code tit. 37, § 141.111(20).
1295. E.g. Taylor v. State, 612 S.W.2d 566, 571 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (holding that a full pardon would not
"wipe the slate clean" in terms of probation eligibility (citing Watkins v. State, 572 S.W.2d 339, 343 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1978))).
1296. Tex. Admin. Code tit. 37, § 141.111(14) (defining full pardon as " [a]n unconditional act of executive
clemency by the governor which serves to release the grantee from the conditions of his. .. sentence and from
any disabilities imposed by law thereby"); see also Tex. Bd. Pardons & Paroles, Executive Clemency in Texas,
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/ bpp/execclem/execclem.html (accessed Mar. 22, 2007).
1297. Tex. Admin. Code tit. 37, § 143.6 (2006).
1298. Id.at § 143.2(a).
1299. Id.at § 143.2(b).
1300. Id.at § 143.1 (stating "[e]xcept in cases of treason or impeachment, after conviction, the governor may
grant a full pardon upon the recommendation and advice of a majority of the board" (internal citations omitted)
(emphasis added)).
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Commutation of a Death Sentence to Life in Prison
Texas statutes define a commutation of sentence as an "act of clemency by the
governor which serves to modify the conditions of a sentence."' 130 1 The Texas Board of
Pardons and Paroles will consider a recommendation of commutation at the written
request of the inmate, 13 02 the governor, 13 03 or a majority of the trial officials of the court
of conviction. 1304 The procedure followed by the Board upon receipt of a valid 1305
request
is similar to that followed by the Board when considering a request for a reprieve.
Commutation of Sentence in Non-Death Penalty Cases
The Board considers applications for commutation of sentence in non-death
penalty cases only upon the written recommendation of a majority of the trial
officials. 130 6 In their recommendation, the trial officials must state that the penalty now
appears excessive and suggest a definite term that would be more just. 13 07 Finally, the
recommendation must provide reasons based on facts directly related to the case that
existed at the time of trial but were unknown to the court and jury. 130 8 Alternatively, the
reasons may be based on a statutory change in penalty for the offense that renders the
original penalty excessive. 1309
Utah
Distribution of Powers
The Utah Constitution creates a Board of Pardons and Parole, which has the power
by majority vote to commute punishments and grant pardons subject to legislative
regulation. 1310 Although the governor may grant respites or reprieves, any such grants
may not extend beyond the next session of the Board, which will then consider whether
1
to extend the reprieve or to grant a commutation or pardon. 311
Structure of Board
By Constitution, Board members are appointed by the governor with the consent of
the Senate. 13 12
The Board has five full-time members and five pro tempore
members. 13 13 Salaries of Board members are determined by the governor, based on a

1301.
1302.
1303.
1304.
1305.
1306.
1307.
1308.
1309.
1310.
1311.
1312.
1313.

Id.at § 141.111(4).
Tex. Admin. Code tit. 37, § 143.57(a)(2).
Id. at § 143.58.
Id.at § 143.57(a)(1).
Id. at § 143.57.
Id. at § 143.52 (a).
Tex. Admin. Code tit. 37, § 143.52 (d)(1)-(2).
Id. at 143.52(d)(3).
Id.
Utah Const. art. VII, § 12(1), (2)(a).
Id. at art. VII, §12(3)(a).
Id. at art. VII, §12(1).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-2(1) (Lexis 2003).
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range specified by the legislature.'
The Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice recommends five applicants to
the governor for appointment to the Board of Pardons and Parole unless the governor is
appointing a sitting board member to a new term in office. 13 15 All members serve a term
of five years, though the expiration of terms is staggered. 13 16 The governor selects a
chairperson who in turn selects a vice chairperson. 13 17 In addition, the Board must
appoint a mental health adviser whose responsibilities include preparing reports and
recommendations on "all persons adjudicated as guilty and mentally ill.' 13 18 Any
member of the Board may be removed by the governor for inefficiency, neglect of duty,
13 19
malfeasance, malfeasance in office, or for cause after a hearing.
A majority of the Board constitutes a quorum, and action taken by a majority of the
Board constitutes an action of the Board. 1320 Additionally, one Board member or an
examiner appointed by the Board may conduct any investigations, inquiries, or hearings
that the Board has authority to undertake. 132 1 When approved and confirmed by the
Board, actions taken by the appointee are deemed the action of the Board. 1322 The
Board is empowered to issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence, to administer oaths, and to take testimony during an
investigation. 1323
Process
1324
The Board may grant a commutation or pardon only after a full hearing.

Commutationsfor Death Penalty Cases
The Board of Pardons and Parole may consider the commutation of a death
sentence only to life without parole. 1325 Only the applicant or the applicant's attorney
may apply. 1326 The petition must be in writing, signed by the inmate, and include the
grounds upon which the applicant seeks review; the state must be given the opportunity
to respond to the petition in writing. 13 27 The Board reviews the petition to determine
"whether [it] presents a substantial issue which has not been reviewed in the judicial
process"; if there is no such issue, the hearing is denied. 132 8 The Board may not
consider legal issues that have already been reviewed by judicial courts, should have

1314.
1315.
1316.
1317.
1318.
1319.
1320.
1321.
1322.
1323.
1324
1325.
1326.
1327.
1328.

Id. at § 77-27-2(1), (2).
Id. at § 77-27-2(3)(a).
Id. at § 77-27-2(2)(a).
Id. at § 77-27-4.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-2(4)(a).
Id.at § 77-27-2(2)(c).
Id.at § 77-27-2(2)(e).
Id.at § 77-27-2(2)(f).
Id.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-9(3) (Lexis 2003).
Id. at § 77-27-5(1)(d) (Lexis Supp. 2006).
Id. at § 77-27-5.5(1) (Lexis 2003).
Id. at § 77-27-5.5(2).
Id. at § 77-27-5.5(3)-(4).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5.5(5), (7)(a).
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been raised during the judicial process, or, if based on new information, are subject330
to
judicial review. 1329 If a substantial issue is found, the Board must conduct a hearing. 1
There are separate procedures for those inmates sentenced to death before April
27, 1992, and those inmates sentenced to death on or after that date. 133 1 In short, the
limitations on the authority of the Board to consider the legal issues outlined above do
not apply to those convicted before April 27, 1992.1332
In cases of inmates sentenced to death before April 27, 1992, the inmate must file
his petition no later than seven days after the sentencing court has signed a warrant
setting an execution date. 1333 In cases of inmates sentenced to death on or after April
27, 1992, the inmate must file his petition no later than twenty-three days before the
scheduled execution date. 1334 Regardless of the sentencing date, if an execution is
stayed for any reason before the hearing has commenced, the commutation proceedings
terminate. 1335 If, however, an execution is stayed after a hearing has begun, the hearing
1336
continues and the Board renders its decision.
In all cases, the petition must include copies of all written evidence the petitioner
intends to present at the hearing, as well as the names and summary of anticipated
testimony of all witnesses he intends to call. 1337 If the petitioner was sentenced before
April 27, 1992, the petition should also include a statement of reasons why the petitioner
believes commutation should be granted. 1338 This statement, along with the above, is all
that is required in the petition of such an inmate.
For petitioners sentenced on or after April 27, 1992, the application must include
not only a statement of reasons the petitioner believes the sentence of death is not
appropriate but also whether any of the proffered reasons have been reviewed in the
judicial process. 1339 If the petition involves new information, the inmate must provide a
statement explaining why it should be considered new and why it was not, nor currently
is, subject to judicial review. 134 0 If the petition is based on legal or constitutional
grounds, the applicant must provide a statement explaining why the Board is not
statutorily prohibited from considering it. 134 1 If the Board believes it cannot hear the
petition due to legal or constitutional issues, it must deny the hearing for lack of a
134 2
substantial issue.
In any case, if the petitioner has already had a commutation hearing, the petition
must also include a statement explaining "what, if any, new and significant information

1329.
1330.
1331.
1332.
1333.
1334.
1335.
1336.
1337.
1338.
1339.
1340.
1341.
1342.

Id. at § 77-27-5.5(6).
Id. at § 77-27-5.5(7)(b).
Utah Admin. Code rr. 671-312-2, 671-312-3 (July 1, 2006).
Id.atr. 671-312-1 (July 1, 2006).
Id. at r. 671-312-2(1).
Id. at r. 671-312-3(1).
Id. atrr. 671-312-2(1),671-312-3(1).
Utah Admin. Code rr. 671-312-2(1), 671-312-3(1).
Id. at rr. 671-312-2(2)(c), 671-312-3(2)(g).
Id. at r. 671-312-2(2)(b).
Id. at r. 671-312-3(2)(c).
Id. at r. 671-312-3(2)(d).
Utah Admin. Code r. 671-312-3(2)(e).
Id. atr. 671-312-3(3).
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exists" to justify another hearing.1343 A copy of the petition must be sent to the attorney
344
representing the state. 1
After the petition has been filed, the process is substantially the same for all
petitioners, regardless of the date of sentencing. The state has seven days to respond and
must provide copies of written evidence, names of witnesses, and a summary of their
anticipated testimony to the Board and the petitioner. 134 5 The Board can request
additional information from either side. 1346 The day after receiving the state's response,
the Board must hold a pre-trial conference to limit the number of witnesses for each side
1347
and to clarify the issues.
The hearing itself is not adversarial and cross-examination is not allowed by either
side. 1348 The Board itself may question any witness, the inmate, the inmate's
representative, and the state's representative. 1349 The state's representative is limited to
rebutting the petitioner's claim and assisting the Board in determining the relevant
facts. 1350 All witnesses are under oath, and the Board may impose a time limit on each
side for presenting its case. 135 1 The Board then reconvenes in open session to announce
and distribute its written decision. 1352
The Board has not promulgated regulations regarding commutation procedures in
non-death penalty cases.
Pardons
The Board may pardon or commute the sentence of any offender who was
confined for a felony or class-A misdemeanor only after a full hearing in open
session. 1353 However, a person sentenced to life without parole may not be pardoned
unless the Board finds "by clear and convincing evidence that the person is permanently
' 1354
incapable of being a threat to the safety of society."
The Board only considers for pardon those whose sentence has been terminated or
expired for five years and who have exhausted all judicial remedies including
expungement.1355 After verifying that the individual meets these criteria, the Board may
135 6
investigate the petitioner, including his criminal, personal, and employment history.
After considering an application, the Board may deny a petition by majority vote without
a hearing. 135 7 If the Board decides to consider granting a pardon, however, the Board

1343.
1344.
1345.
1346.
1347.
1348.
1349.
1350.
1351.
1352.
1353.
1354.
1355.
1356.
1357.

Id. at rr. 671-312-2(3), 671-312-3(2)(f.
Id. atrr. 671-312-2(),671-312-3(1).
Id. at rr. 671-312-2(5), 671-312-3(6).
Utah Admin. Code rr. 671-312-2(5), 671-312-3(6).
Id. at rr. 671-312-2(6), 671-312-3(7).
Id. at rr. 671-312-2(7), 671-312-3(8).
Id. at rr. 671-312-2(7), 671-312-3(8).
Id. at rr. 671-312-2(7), 671-312-3(8).
Utah Admin. Code rr. 671-312-2(8), 671-312-3(9).
Id. at rr.
671-312-2(9), 671-312-3(10).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-9(I)(a), (c).
Id. at § 77-27-9(2)(d), (6).
Utah Admin. Coder. 671-315-1 (July 1,2006).
Id.
Id.
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will schedule a hearing and notify the victim, the chief law enforcement officer of the
arresting agency, the presiding judge of the court of conviction, and the prosecuting
pardon may be granted, and the petitioner is
attorney. 1358 A conditional or unconditional
1359
results.
the
of
writing
in
notified
Decisions of the Board in cases involving pardons and commutations are final and
are not subject to judicial review. 1360
Virginia
Distribution of Powers
The Virginia Constitution vests in the governor the sole power to grant reprieves
and pardons after conviction, except when the prosecution was carried out by the House
of Delegates, and to commute capital punishment. 136 1 The Virginia legislature has
authorized the Parole Board, at the request of the governor, to investigate and report to
him or her on cases in which executive clemency is sought. 13 6 2 Additionally, the Board
may investigate and report to the governor with its recommendations on any other case
in which it believes action by the governor is proper or in the best interest of the
public. 1363 Recommendations are not binding on the governor in any way. 1364 The
Board, at the governor's request for conditional pardon and after violation of those
1365
conditions, is empowered to re-incarcerate the once-pardoned individual.
Structure of Board
The Virginia Parole Board consists of up to five members appointed by the
governor subject to confirmation by the General Assembly. 1366 At least one member of
the Board must be a representative of a crime victims' organization or a victim of
crime. 1367 Board members have no limitation on the amount of time they can serve,
368
instead serving at the pleasure of the governor. 1
The governor designates one member of the Board as the chairperson, who is
considered a full-time state employee. 1369 No more than two other members may be
designated by the governor as full-time employees. 1370 All other members are part-time

1358. Id.
1359. Id.
1360. Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3).
1361. Va. Const. art. V, § 12.
1362. Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-136(5) (Lexis Supp. 2006); id. at § 53.1-231 (Lexis 2005).
1363. Id. at § 53.1-231.
1364. Va. Const. art. V, § 12; Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-231. All clemency authority is vested solely in the
governor. Sec. of the Cmmw., Clemency, http://www.commonwealth.virginia.gov/JudicialSystem/Clemency/
clemency.cfm (accessed Mar. 20, 2007).
1365. Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-136(3).
1366. Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-134.
1367. Id.
1368, Id.
1369. Id. at § 53.1-135.
1370. Id.
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employees. 1 1

Process
Executive clemency is handled by the Secretary of the Commonwealth. Although
there is no apparent formal application process for commutations, the Secretary has
established a procedure to apply for three types of pardons: (1) an absolute pardon
(which is predicated on the belief that the inmate is innocent and serves as the basis for
record expungement); (2) a conditional pardon (which allows presently incarcerated
inmates to secure their release from confinement under conditions which, if violated,
pardon (which provides "official
may result in re-incarceration); and (3) a simple 372
forgiveness" but does not serve to expunge records). 1
To apply for a pardon, an individual must send a letter to the governor containing
(1) reasons for the request; (2) name; (3) date of birth; (4) Social Security number; (5)
current address; (6) the crime the inmate has been convicted of; (7) the date and court of
conviction; (8) sentence or other disposition of conviction; and (9) location of
373
incarceration. 1

Once the application is received, the request is reviewed to determine if it warrants
investigation by the Virginia Parole Board. 1374 If so, an investigation is requested and
the governor's office then proceeds based on the Board's recommendation. 1375 If a
petition for clemency is denied, the petitioner has no right of appeal but may reapply
1376
after a two-year period.
Washington
Distribution of Powers
The Washington Constitution vests the pardoning power in the governor, limited
by legislative regulations. 1377 The governor must report to the legislature at each session
each case of reprieve, commutation, or pardon granted and the reasons for granting
them. 13 78 The Clemency and Pardons Board is charged with receiving petitions from
individuals, organizations, and the Department of Corrections for commutation of
sentences and pardoning of offenders in extraordinary cases and making
recommendations to the governor. 1379 These recommendations, however, are not
binding on the governor. 1380

1371. Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-135.
1372. Sec. of the Cmmw., Clemency: Pardons, http://www.commonwealth.virginia.gov/JudicialSystem/
Clemency/pardons.cfm (accessed Feb. 4, 2007); see also Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-392.2 (Lexis 2004).
1373. Personal communication from representative of the governor's office to authors.
1374. Va. Code. Ann. § 53.1-231.
1375. Id.
1376. Sec. of the Cmmw., supra n. 1372.
1377. Wash. Const. art. 111,sec. 9.
1378. Id. at art. 111,sec. 11.
1379. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.94A.885(1) (West 2003).
1380. Id. at § 10.01.120 (West 2002).
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Structure of Board
The Washington State Clemency and Pardons Board is housed within the office of
the governor and consists of five members serving staggered four-year terms appointed
by the governor and confirmed by the Senate. 138 1 Board members8 2 elect their own
13
chairperson and are uncompensated except for travel reimbursement.
Process
The Board receives petitions for executive clemency. 1383 Prior to recommending
clemency on behalf of a person, the Board must hold a public hearing on the petition
wherein the prosecuting attorney is given thirty days' notice along with a copy of the
petition. 1384 The prosecuting attorney, in turn, is to notify victims, victim's family
members, witnesses, and the law enforcement agency or agencies that conducted the
investigation about the hearing. 1385 The Board must consider the statements given by
13 86
those so notified in whatever form.

The Board itself does not publish the rules and regulations it follows in making
clemency recommendations. According to the Criminal Justice Policy Foundation, the
Board's review committee determines which clemency applications will be heard by the
full Board. 1387 The Board reviews only those cases referred to it by the review
committee. 1388

Wyoming
Distribution of Powers
The governor has the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons for all
offenses except treason and cases of impeachment, subject to legislative regulation of the
application process. 1389 At each regular session, the governor must communicate to the
legislature who was granted executive clemency and the reasons for the grant. 1390 The
Wyoming Constitution grants the legislature the power to create a penalty of life in
prison without parole for a class of crimes over which the governor has no commutation
power. 139 1 The legislature has used this constitutional grant and created a class of

1381. Id. at § 9.94A.880(l)-(2) (West 2003). It should be noted that the Indeterminate Sentence Review
Board is also authorized to "pass on the representations made in support of applications for pardons for
convicted persons and make recommendations thereon to the governor," but only when requested to do so by
the governor. Id. at § 9.95.260(1) (West Supp. 2006).
1382. Id. at § 9.94A.880(3H4).
1383. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.94A.885(l).
1384. Id. at § 9.94A.885(3).
1385. Id.
1386. Id.
1387. Crim. J. Policy Found., Clemency: Washington, http://cjpf.org/clemency/Washington.html (last updated
Jan. 19, 2007).
1388. Id.
1389. Wyo. Const. art. IV, sec. 5.
1390. Id.
1391. Id. at art. Ill, sec. 53.
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crimes punishable by life in prison without parole over which the governor has no
commutation power. 1392 The legislature may also limit commutations of death
sentences to life in prison without parole, which cannot in turn be commuted any
1394
further. 1393 However, the power of the governor to issue pardons is not so limited.
Although the Wyoming Board of Parole makes recommendations for commutations, the
governor is not bound by any recommendation and retains the sole authority to grant or
deny pardons, reprieves, and commutations subject to the substantive limitations
39 5
imposed by the legislature. 1
Structure of Board
The Wyoming legislature has created the Wyoming Board of Parole. 1396 The
Board is composed of seven members appointed for six-year terms by the governor with
the advice and consent of the Senate, with no more than four members being of the same
political party. 1397 Board members serve at the pleasure of the governor. 1398 The
members elect their own chairperson. 1399 Board members receive a salary equivalent to
that of Wyoming's legislators. 14 00 The Board's role in executive clemency decisions is
limited to recommending prisoners for commutations of sentence. 140 1 Although three
members constitute a hearing panel empowered to make parole decisions, fewer than
three are empowered to make decisions regarding commutation recommendations to the
governor. 1402 A decision by the majority of a panel constitutes a decision of the
Board. 1403
Process
Wyoming's legislature regulates the manner in which applications for pardons and
14 4
reprieves are made. Applications for pardons and reprieves are sent to the governor. 0
In the case of pardons, the governor must notify the district attorney of the county in
which the applicant was indicted or informed against at least three weeks before
considering the application. 1405 Within ten days after receiving such notice, the district
attorney must send the governor "a statement setting forth the time of the trial and
conviction, the date and term of the sentence, the crime of which the person was
convicted and any circumstances in aggravation or extenuation which appeared in the

1392.
1393.
1394.
1395.
1396.
1397.
1398.
1399.
1400
1401.
1402.
1403.
1404.
1405.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(a), (c) (2005).
Wyo.Const. art. III, sec. 53.
Id.
Personal communication from representative of the governor's office to authors.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-401(b) (2005).
Id.
Id.; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-1-202(a) (2005).
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-401(c).
Id.at § 7-13-401(d).
Id. at § 7-13-401(f).
Id.
Id.at § 7-13-401(f).
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-13-801(a), 7-13-804(a) (2005).
Id. at § 7-13-804.
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140 6

trial and sentencing of the person."
The Parole Board does not maintain any current regulations regarding procedures
or substantive criteria for making commutation recommendations to the governor. Nor
are there any available procedures and criteria used by the governor in making clemency
decisions.

1406. Id at § 7-13-805.
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APPENDIX C: DISPOSITIONS OF CASES RAISING CLAIMS UNDER HOUSE V.BELL,
AS OF OCTOBER 9, 2006
In the following cases, the inmate failed to overcome procedural default, either
because he did not present any new reliable evidence (NRE) or because the court was not
persuaded that a reasonable juror would have voted differently (NRJ).
Allee v. Neb. Atty. Gen., 2006 WL 1867037 (D. Neb. June 29, 2006) (NRE)
Alongi v. Hendricks, 2006 WL 2129107 (D.N.J. July 26, 2006) (NRJ)
Arrington v. Williams, 2006 WL 2615512 (10th Cir. Sept. 13, 2006) (NRE)
Arthur v. Allen, 459 F.3d 1310 (1 1th Cir. Aug. 14,2006) (NRE)
Artiaga v. Money, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46935 (N.D. Ohio July 11, 2006) (NRE)
Ballardv. Quarterman,2006 WL 1983182 (S.D. Tex. July 13, 2006) (NRE)
Benjamin v. Crosby, 2006 WL 1890295 (M.D. Fla. July 10, 2006) (NRE)
Breault v. Super, 2006 WL 2521394 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2006) (NRE)
Breault v. Wakefield, 2006 WL 2583625 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 2006) (NRJ)
Brown v. Quarterman,2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54919 (N.D. Tex. June 22, 2006) (NRE)
Cobbs v. McDonough, 2006 WL 2092381 (N.D. Fla. July 26, 2006) (NRE) (Petitioner
did not show any new evidence but instead claimed that his counsel was ineffective
because he failed to investigate whether or not the petitioner was competent to stand
trial. This was not enough to overcome the procedural default.)
Coffield v. Quarterman, 2006 WL 1852015 (S.D. Tex. June 30, 2006) (NRE)
Collins v. U.S., 2006 WL 1789119 (N.D.N.Y. June 27, 2006) (NRE)
D'Amario v. Walsh, 2006 WL 2360167 (D. Mass. Aug. 16, 2006) (NRE)
Daniels v. McDonough, 2006 WL 2620143 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2006) (NRE)
Darity v. McDonough, 2006 WL 2792891 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2006) (NRE)
Davis v. McDonough, 2006 WL 2801986 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2006) (NRE)
Davis v. Stowitzky, 2006 WL 2642403 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2006) (Petitioner argued that
he had new DNA evidence that would exonerate him, but his petition was filed about
nine years too late. The Court ruled that the petition was so untimely that relief was not
warranted.)
Edmond v. Norris, 2006 WL 2792177 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 28, 2006) (NRJ)
En Matti v. Houston, 2006 WL 2176613 (D. Neb. July 31, 2006) (Petitioner presented no
evidence of actual innocence which is one avenue to overcome the procedural default.)
Escobar v. Miller, 2006 WL 2239080 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2006) (NRE) (In support of his
actual innocence claim, the petitioner presented several affidavits claiming that someone
else committed the crime. However, the court ruled that the affidavits were insufficient
to overcome the procedural default because they conflicted with each other.)
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Fisher v. Dretke, 2006 WL 2129062 (S.D. Tex. July 27, 2006) (NRE)
Foster v. Quarternan, 2006 WL 2806686 (5th Cir. Oct. 2, 2006) (The petitioner's
"stand-alone" innocence claim was denied because House v. Bell did not change the
existing law to recognize the validity of stand-alone innocence claims.)
Free v. Nish, 2006 WL 2583462 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2006) (NRE)
Garciav. Quarterman, 2006 WL 2413714 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2006) (NRE)
Gilreathv. McDonough, 2006 WL 2620149 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2006) (NRE)
Greene v. Lafler, 2006 WL 2457524 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2006) (NRJ)
Hazelton v. Shannon, 2006 WL 2302666 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2006) (NRE)
Hernandez v. Sheahan, 455 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2006) (The petitioner's claim was based
on his Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against the police for refusing to entertain his claim of
erroneous identification. The court cited House v. Bell to explain why this suit was
improper.)
Hill v. Mitchell, 2006 WL 2807017 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2006) (NRE)
In re Brown, 457 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2006) (NRE)
Kan. v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516 (2006) (This case did not address an actual innocence
claim; instead, the dissent discussed actual innocence to highlight contentious issues
surrounding the death penalty.)
LaFleur v. White, 2006 WL 2559806 (E.D. Mich. July 28, 2006) (NRE)
Lantanasio v. Beard, 2006 WL 2794571 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2006) (NRE)
Leggett v. Brooks, 2006 WL 2641196 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2006) (NRE)
Lenz v. Norris, 2006 WL 2682171 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 18, 2006) (NRE)
Luckett v. Berghuis, 2006 WL 1779383 (E.D. Mich. June 26, 2006) (NRE) (The
petitioner presented affidavits that would serve to impeach a trial witness but did not
present any new evidence.)
Lynn v. Roberts, 2006 WL 2522490 (10th Cir. Sept. 1, 2006) (NRE)
McCaleb v. Gansheimer,2006 WL 2785772 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 2006) (NRE)
Nuetzel v. Walsh, 2006 WL 2742000 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2006) (NRE)
Pelton v. Duncan, 2006 WL 2792742 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2006) (NRE)
Richardson v. Greene, 2006 WL 2707334 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2006) (NRE)
Rios v. Quarterman,2006 WL 1877094 (W.D. Tex. July 5, 2006) (NRE)
Spencer v. Farrey,2006 WL 2691611 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 19, 2006) (NRE)
Stanley v. Shannon, 2006 WL 2191268 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2006) (The petitioner
presented new evidence, but his claims were dismissed until the state court ruled on the
timeliness of the petition.)
Taylor v. McDonough, 2006 WL 2660115 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2006) (NRE) (The
petitioner did not deny committing the crime; instead, he raised an actual innocence
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claim because the jury found he was guilty of robbery with a deadly weapon without
identifying or describing the weapon.)
Thorp v. Dormire, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63323 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 6, 2006) (The
petitioner did not raise an actual innocence claim, but the court cited House v. Bell as one
method of overcoming a procedural bar.)
Torrefrancav. Schriro, 2006 WL 1981788 (D. Ariz. July 13, 2006) (NRE)
Urcinoli v. Cathel, 2006 WL 2246368 (D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2006) (NRE)
Villegas v. Hendricks, 2006 WL 2806291 (D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2006) (NRE)
Watts v. Roper, 2006 WL 2708630 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 20, 2006) (NRE)
Wendt v. McDonough, 2006 WL 2189145 (M.D. Fla. July 31, 2006) (NRE)
Wheeler v. US., 2006 WL 2078425 (M.D. Fla. July 24, 2006) (NRE & NRJ)
White v. Warden, 2006 WL 2640633 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 13, 2006) (NRE & NRJ)
In the following case, House v. Bell was used, not to address an actual innocence issue,
but to allow postconviction DNA testing:
Osborne v. D.A. 's Off. 3d Jud. Dist., 2006 WL 2456467 (D. Alaska Aug. 3, 2006) (The
petitioner was granted an injunction requiring police to provide him with access to
evidence so that he could perform postconviction DNA testing. The court used House v.
Bell to explain its ruling, noting that the United States Supreme Court's reliance on
House's new DNA evidence influenced its decision.)
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